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NARRATIVE

OF THE

)NQUEST OF FINLAND

BY

THE RUSSIANS

IN THE YEARS 1808-9.

AN UNPUBLISHED WORK BY A RUSSIAN OFFICER OF RANK.

EDITED BY

GEN. MONTEITH, K.L.S. F.R.S.

MADRAS ENGINEERS.

LONDON:

[EL BOOTH, DUKE STREET, PORTLAND PLACE.

1854

246. b. 59

THE following pages were given to me by the Author, a Russian officer of rank, since deceased. The work was never published, only 250 copies having been printed for distribution among the Author's friends.

W. M.

June 1854.

TO THE

HON. MOUNTSTUART ELPHINSTONE

These Pages are Inscribed,

AS A TRIBUTE OF RESPECT TO HIS PUBLIC CHARACTER

AND A GRATEFUL ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF

MANY ACTS

OF PERSONAL FRIENDSHIP.

EDITOR'S PREFACE.

So long a period of time has elapsed since the events recorded in these pages took place, that it may be necessary to say a few words on the causes which brought them about.

It will be remembered that, in the year 1807, Russia was obliged to sign the Treaty of Tilsit; and though the campaign had been in its latter part disastrous, the good fortune of the Russian empire obtained terms that could hardly have been looked for. By the secret articles of this treaty (a copy of which was obtained by the British Government, and published several years after), it was agreed that Russia should take possession of Finland, and that Denmark should be

compelled to make over her fleet to France, and join in the general confederacy against England. The power of Denmark to maintain an independent neutrality was doubtful, and in consequence a British fleet and army were sent against Copenhagen, to demand that the fleet should be given in deposit to the British Government. The Danish Government naturally refused, and Copenhagen was taken by the army under Lord Cathcart, and the fleet commanded by Admiral Gambier.

Great hopes were entertained that the King of Sweden, by the aid of England, might be able to hold out against Russia; in Sweden at least, if not in Finland. Gustavus Adolphus had indignantly rejected the terms offered him, and the character he enjoyed for heroism and decision led to a false estimate of his talents.

His apparent heroism was not followed by a corresponding activity in making preparations to repel an invading army, and with very few exceptions the Swedes were overcome, or forced to retreat in every encounter. The writers of the time accused Russia of having successfully tampered with the Swedes, and that the surrender of Sweaborg and other places of great importance was owing to treason and corruption

on the part of their commanders. This charge is denied, both by the Swedes and Russians. It is, however, incontestable, that a strong Russian party had long existed in Sweden. Be this as it may, the terms of the capitulation, by which Russia engaged to pay large sums of money to make up deficiencies in the military chest, is most suspicious; numbers of the Swedish officers passed into the service of Russia; and the revolution which so soon after drove Gustavus from the throne, shows how great was the feeling against his policy and government. The King's character had more of obstinacy than decision, and the Swedish commanders assert, with truth, that their orders were to retire before any superior force, and not risk any doubtful contests.

The British Government had, however, decided to support Gustavus, and a force of 10,000 men, under Sir John Moore, arrived on the 17th of May, 1808: they found the Swedish army was scarcely sufficient for the defence of the territory still unoccupied by the enemy; but the King was bent on attempting the conquest of Zealand and the recovery of Finland. To neither of these proposals did Sir John Moore think himself authorised to acquiesce, as on both points the

enemy were much superior in numbers and position. The discussions on this subject assumed so serious an aspect, that Sir J. Moore escaped from Sweden in disguise, and brought back the small English army in conformity to his instructions. Gustavus IV. was shortly after forced to abdicate.

Count Bouxhoevden's proclamation to the inhabitants of Finland, given in the Appendix, is worthy of attention from the resemblance existing between it and the one issued by Prince Gortschakoff to the people of Moldavia and Wallachia.

CHAPTER I.

CAMPAIGN OF 1808.

In the beginning of the year 1808, the war in Germany had scarcely come to an end before the clouds again began to gather in the North. A rupture took place between Russia and Sweden, in consequence of the impolitic obstinacy of Gustavus Adolphus IV., who resisted all the overtures that were made to him. Even the aspect of the dangers threatening his kingdom failed to shake his iron resolution, and war soon became inevitable.

Count Bouxhoevden was appointed by the Emperor Alexander to the command of the army. The Russian Government had succeeded in giving an exaggerated idea of the numerical strength of the force, by skilfully displaying their resources to the best advantage, and making great demonstrations of activity in military preparations and the movement of troops in the capital. The Swedish

ambassador at St. Petersburg could not fail to participate in the general error, and it rapidly found its way to Stockholm.

The 17th and 21st division of the Russians were formed into three columns and several smaller detachments, and crossed the Kymen on the $\frac{8}{20}$th of February,* at Aberfors, Stromfors, and Keltis; their aggregate strength did not exceed 16,000 men, including a regiment of dragoons, one of hussars, one of Cossacks, and 200 Cossacks of the Imperial Guard.

On entering the Swedish territory at Aberfors, Count Bouxhoevden considered it advisable to send a flag of truce, demanding to be received without opposition. The officer who was the bearer of this message was fired upon, and by this act war was in fact declared. The Russian general, however, issued two proclamations, addressed to the armies of Swedish Finland. In the first of these he exhorted the people to remain quietly in their homes, assuring them strict discipline should be maintained among the troops, and also promising that all the provisions, &c. which might be furnished to the army should be punctually paid for, while every respect should be shown to the laws and the institutions, civil and religious, of the country.

* The Russians still reckon by the old style.

The climate of Finland is very severe, but at this season the cold was dry and not excessive. The snow was deep, and not sufficiently firm for ordinary marching; the Russian light infantry were therefore provided with snow-shoes, fit for travelling over that unstable surface, and the artillery was mounted upon sledges.

The aspect of the eastern part of the country does not differ materially from that of the portion of Finland anciently belonging to Russia. After passing Wiborg the mountains are more considerable in size, and enormous masses of rock are heaped upon each other in every direction. In some places the quantity of flints and of granite stones is so considerable that it would be difficult to find an unencumbered space, even of a few yards square. The roads are narrow and crooked, but tolerably firm, the forests dark, and the general appearance of the country savage and gloomy. The numerous sheets of water with which it is intersected were at that time converted into solid plains of ice, capable of bearing not only troops of every description but even the heaviest artillery.

The Swedish Government had resolutely refused to believe in the possibility of a war upon their territory, and, in spite of all the intelligence transmitted to them, they disdained to make any prepara-

tions to repel an attack. The troops of the army of Finland were still dispersed in the cantonments they occupied in time of peace, and the frontier was only guarded by a chain of feeble posts. Count Bouxhoevden resolved to take advantage of this false security, the first and most important fault committed by his adversaries.

It was not possible the Swedes should oppose any serious resistance at Aberfors. The loss on the side of the Russians was confined to a few dragoons and the officer who was ambitious of being the first to cross the bridge of the Kymen, which had nearly been a cause of war some years before. Their left column occupied Lowisa the same day; the right, under the orders of Prince Bagration, pushed on by Rausala and Laptresk, as far as Elima; while the centre division proceeded, without meeting with any resistance, as far as Chordom. The Swedish Colonel Palmfield fell back upon Borgo.

The Russians had nothing to gain at Lowisa except a magazine of forage, which they captured. The approach to this little town from the sea is defended by a fort called Swartholm; it was invested, and 1800 men were left to carry on the siege under the orders of Generals Monkhanoff and Briscorn.

The detachment opposed to the left column of the Russians* had taken up its position in the defile of Forsby. It is a collection of barren rocks with precipitous sides, and quite impregnable from the front, but was turned by the Bay of Permo on the ice and attacked on the left by Lilienthal, whither General Toutchkoff (2d) had proceeded. A brisk fire was opened without doing much execution, and an engagement of cavalry took place on the ice between the Cossacks of the Guard and the dragoons of Nyland, after which the Swedish Colonel, Count Gripenberg, retreated by Ilby to Borgo. He tried several times to recover his position under the protection of six pieces of artillery, but being repulsed by Generals Borozdin and Orloff-Denisoff he made good his retreat during the night to Tavastheus. The Swedish Colonel Stjernval, an officer bearing a high character, was made prisoner at the defile of Forsby; and General Klercker, who had provisionally taken the command of the troops, escaped with difficulty from Borgo at the moment the advanced guard of the Russians entered the town, which is the most ancient in Finland. Count Bouxhoevden established his head-quarters there on the $\frac{13}{26}$th of February.

* Under the command of Lieut.-general Prince Gortchakoff.

While these operations were going on Prince Bagration, of the 21st division, was advancing from Laptresk and Angerby to Artsjo, where he made a night attack upon a Swedish brigade commanded by the Adjutant-general Adlerkreutz, from the $\frac{\text{15th to 16th}}{\text{27th to 28th}}$. It was conducted by the Russian Colonels Karpendoff and Ericson, and was a sharp and successful affair; the 2d regiment of Chasseurs particularly distinguished themselves. The loss was about 100 men on both sides, and Adlerkreutz fell back upon Tavastheus. Several other partial engagements took place at Orimattila, Lachtis, and Kowkis; but the advance of the left column, by isolating these posts, naturally led to their fall. Some of them were taken, and from others the troops in garrison made a precipitate retreat, carrying with them everything to be found in the country—inhabitants, provisions, cattle, and sledges.

In the meanwhile Count Klingsporr, one of the great lords of the kingdom, and of the senior generals in the army, had been appointed to the command of the troops in Finland. He established his head-quarters first at Tavastheus, where General Klercker had concentrated a force of 5000 men. The instructions received by Count Klingsporr from the King were to give way to the supe-

riority of the enemy's force, to fall back when necessary, and not to endanger the army of Finland in a struggle he considered unequal. The force then assembled in Finland amounted to 14,984 regular troops, and about 4000 militia (*vargering*). Of these 800 were cavalry, and about as many more artillerymen; 7000 were in garrison at Sweaborg, and 700 in Swartholm; both garrisons being included in the number cited above.

Without allowing himself to be hindered by the local difficulties he had to encounter, and more especially by the state of the roads from the deep snows, which had prevented the advance of Prince Bagration, Count Bouxhoevden resolved to follow up the advantages gained by the left column. The occupation of Helsingfors would isolate the fortress of Sweaborg, and intercept the direct communication between that great military dépôt and the principal corps of Count Klingsporr. A column of light troops, under the orders of Count Orloff-Denisoff, supported by the cavalry of General Borozdin, was therefore despatched by the great road of Borgo to Helsingfors; and at the same time a detachment entrusted to Colonel Anselme de Gibory advanced from Ostersund and occupied the intervening space, then covered with solid ice, between Helsingfors and the fortress, and

which forms its port; while General Toutchkoff (3d) marched to occupy by a détour the road leading from Helsingfors to Abo, with the intention of cutting off whoever might attempt to retreat in that direction. The enemy did not wait for these operations to be in full force; they formed upon the ice in double columns, evacuated Helsingfors, and took the road to Sweaborg: they were attacked by the cavalry of Orloff-Denisoff, who took 124 prisoners and 6 guns; the remainder reached Sweaborg. 18 guns, a howitzer, 10,000 balls, 4000 shells and grenades, 4500 muskets, 15,000 horse-shoes, a great quantity of tools, some stores, and a well-provided military hospital, fell into the hands of the Russians at Helsingfors.

Sweaborg was immediately surrounded by a cordon of light troops, sufficient to prevent the garrison from receiving any fresh supplies, and General Raievsky was provisionally charged with establishing a blockade, for which purpose Count Bouxhoevden was only able to leave him four battalions and 200 cavalry.

After having thus advanced as far as he considered advisable with his left column, Count Bouxhoevden felt the necessity of losing no time in compelling Count Klingsporr to evacuate Tavastheus. He rapidly brought forward all the

columns of his little army to bear upon the town, and advanced to within a short march of it. Their total strength did not exceed 9000 men, the rest of the troops being absorbed by the detachments, the guards of the magazines, and the number of men left before the various places they had invested. But few had fallen in the skirmishes that had taken place, and the number of the sick was inconsiderable.

The approach to Tavastheus was disputed inch by inch. General Klercker, a man of seventy years of age, but full of energy and military ardour, had made every preparation for a general action, and Klingsporr, on his arrival from Sweden, found a garrison of 5000 men. The new Commander-in-chief was very little younger than his predecessor. For a moment he appeared undecided what steps he should take, but the rapidity of the movements of the Russian army, the idea entertained of their great numerical superiority, and the fear of the heavy responsibility he would incur by going counter to the instructions he had received from the King, weighed upon the mind of General Klingsporr; he followed the advice of his council, and hastily abandoned Tavastheus and its citadel, where the Russians found 18 guns and 3 mortars. The remainder of the Swedish artillery, which could

not be carried away, and a quantity of arms and ammunition, were thrown into a lake. General Klingsporr retreated towards Tammerfors and Bjorneborg, and fixed his head-quarters at Kurvola, $\frac{\text{23d Feb.}}{\text{8th March}}$. General Bouxhoevden took possession of his at Tavastheus, $\frac{\text{25th Feb.}}{\text{6th March}}$.

Independently of his anxiety to follow out to the very letter the instructions he had received from the King, the Swedish General was further induced to retire without fighting, from the necessity under which he conceived himself to be of accelerating by his presence the organisation of the troops raised in Ostro-Bothnia, and above all of assembling all the troops which were still scattered in Southern Finland, and in the Savolax; that is to say, in the opposite extremities of the kingdom.

The Savolax, the province at the eastern extremity, had just been invaded by a new Russian column of about 3000 men, and consisting of a portion of the regiments of the 5th division, under the command of General Toutchkoff (1st). This general marched from the Russian fortresses, Wilmanstadt and Nyslot, drove before him a brigade commanded by Colonel Count Cronstedt, and occupied, $\frac{16}{28}$th February, Randasalmi, Sulkawa, and Pumola. He concentrated his forces at Christina, expecting to meet with resistance at St. Michel, a

place which had attained considerable celebrity in the former war; but Cronstedt had fallen back in the direction of Piexmaki and Kuopio.

The singularity of the names of these places, which it is not in our power to avoid or to alter, is worthy of attention, inasmuch as those that sound peculiarly strange denote the population of the district to be of Finnish origin; along the coasts, and in various parts of the country, the ear distinguishes other sounds, more closely resembling the more familiar accents of the Gothic languages. Where this occurs, the inhabitants are descended from Swedish colonists anciently settled in the country. The difference of character in the two nations is distinctly marked; their language, their features, their manners, and their dress, differ from each other as much as their origin. The descendants of the Swedes possess more energy, and have a strong love of their country; their habitations are more spacious and more convenient; they wear the European dress, and are particularly distinguished from the Finlanders by their superior civilisation.

Another observation, which is perhaps worth making, concerns the manner in which the Russian army was broken up into small divisions; for it must have been remarked, that from the very beginning of the invasion, in spite of the paucity of their

numbers, the troops were spread over the considerable extent of country comprised between the Lakes of Upper Finland and the Gulf which washes the shores of its southern extremity. This apparent dissemination is rendered necessary by the very nature of the country. Although cut up and intersected in every direction by lakes, marshes, rocks, and forests, the means of communication are far from rare, and may all lead to results of greater or less importance. They may serve to protect a post, to transmit supplies to it, or to expose it to danger. These roads are constructed upon a firm and solid foundation, and are a noble trophy of the industry of man. They very seldom give way, and are almost always practicable for troops; and whether a force be acting on the offensive, or merely on the defensive, it would be as unsafe to neglect any one of them as it would be in the valleys of Switzerland: indeed it is necessary to possess one's self of nearly the whole of them, in order to secure the principal roads being kept open, to provide shelter for the soldiers in so severe a climate, and to enable them to avail themselves of some of the local resources which are rendered indispensable by the rapid and decisive system of warfare adopted in the present day; and these precautions are indeed doubly necessary, by the circumstance of the habita-

tions being but thinly scattered over the face of the country, the villages in general inconsiderable, the country itself unproductive, and deficient in the means of transport. There is but little danger of being beaten in detail in Finland, and it would very rarely be possible for a superior force to meet with ground on which a great number of fighting men could be drawn up. Each detachment of 1000 or 1500 men forms, in fact, a small army, and its commander ought to possess a certain degree of talent, as he must be capable of creating resources for himself, and will often be compelled to act without waiting for orders from his superior officers. The history of the engagements we shall have occasion to describe will prove that the victories alternately gained by each party were far more due to the constant relays of troops, and to the talent and resolution of their chiefs, than to any numerical superiority on the field of battle.

In entering into these details, however, we must not lose sight of the general aspect of the country as regards great military operations. There are in it six strategic points, and the taking and holding of these can alone secure the conquest which was the aim of Russia.

They are,—

Sweaborg, improperly called the Gibraltar of

the North, a sea-port with an arsenal, and an entrepôt of commerce. It commands the channel of communication by sea all along the coast line, and also the grand communications of the Russian frontiers towards Abo.

Tavastheus, a central town situated on the most elevated table-land in Finland, in the midst of a fertile country, at the junction of all the great lines of communication from the north, the east, and the south of Finland. It has a market.

Abo is the capital and the principal point of communication with Sweden. A sea-port, the seat of government and of a university. It is a station of a squadron of the coasting flotilla, and has a dockyard. Abo is also the place of embarkation for the islands of Aland.

Vasa, a commercial town at the termination of several of the great rocks. From its situation opposite to the Swedish port of Umea, it offers in summer a landing-place easy of access, and in winter a passage upon the ice from the Gulf of Bothnia.

Kuopio, or rather Idensalmi, which commands the eastern part of the country, and is only accessible by a single road.

Uleaborg, the last key of Northern Finland to which any reasonable expedition can tend.

CHAPTER II.

The General had thus succeeded in obtaining in a few days all the first results he could possibly wish for. Sweaborg was invested and isolated, the provinces of Nyland and Tavastheus were in his power, and the arming of the reserves in the eastern provinces put a stop to. The enemy was in retreat towards the north, and a considerable portion of the line of coast was invested by the Russian troops; and all this had been accomplished by means of a few well-ordered forced marches, and some engagements, attended with but trifling loss of life; the ardour of the troops sustained them under excessive fatigue in a rigorous climate.

The precipitate retreat of Count Klingsporr was a proof that he could not venture to trust, as yet, to his means of defence. It was impossible for the Swedes to remain at Tammerfors and Bjorneborg. Their commander had only a choice of two alterna-

tives, either to cross the ice of the Gulf of Bothnia between Vasa and Amea, and retire into Sweden, or to draw the war towards the north, and thus remove the Russians from their original position, and from the southern part of the country. In either case, his hope for the success of the campaign must be founded upon the resistance that could be offered by Sweaborg, and upon what diversion it might be possible for Sweden to make, as soon as the navigation was open, in some part of the great extent of coast which it would be necessary for the Russian army to guard.

It was on this reasoning that Count Bouxhoevden based his ulterior operations. After the evacuation of Tavastheus he brought the 21st division, with the exception of a detachment directed upon Abo, under Major-general Chepeleff, to bear upon the traces of Count Klingsporr, and the 5th division under General Toutchkoff (1st) received orders to march upon two columns from Jorois, where it then was, to Vasa, where Count Bouxhoevden hoped it would arrive before Count Klingsporr could reach the town. The 17th division, under Count Kamensky, was destined to regulate the blockade of Sweaborg, to carry the fortified point of Hangö-udd, and to form a line of communication from Helsingfors to Abo. Some battalions of the per-

manent garrisons of the fortresses of Russian Finland occupied the posts left in surveillance over the conquered country, and guarded those where military stores had been established.

At this time the army was reinforced by some troops, pioneers and artillery, intended to reduce Sweaborg. The detachment left before Swartholm was soon equally available for that purpose, that small fort having capitulated after being bombarded for five or six days. The act of capitulation agreed upon between Captain Drentler of the Engineers and the commandant, Major Gripenberg, contained eleven articles, of which the following is the purport:—The fort to surrender exactly in the state it then was; the garrison were to be prisoners, except the soldiers who were natives of Finland, and who would be discharged and permitted to return to their own homes; the garrison to march out with the honours of war; private property to be respected; and the officers permitted to retain their swords. Should a truce or peace take place before the surrender was completed, the capitulation was to be considered null and void. The commandant had also reserved to himself the right of sending a report to the King of Sweden.

Two standards, 20 officers, 733 non-commissioned officers and privates, 200 guns and mortars,

a quantity of arms and ammunition, and a magazine of unground corn, fell into the hands of the Russians when they entered Swartholm on the $\frac{6}{18}$th of March.

This surrender was attributed to the want of fuel, of which the garrison had not had time to collect a sufficient provision, to the destruction of the only mill, and to the prevalence of sickness caused by the want of good drinking water.* But however that might be, Swartholm was a most valuable acquisition to the Russians, for it commanded the entrance of the harbour of Lovisa, and would have intercepted all the navigation along that line of coast. It was found in an excellent state of defence, with the exception of a few errors in construction, which are usually met with in small fortified places.

Prince Bagration having been employed to observe the movements of General Klingsporr had pushed on his advanced guard, under the command of General Jankowicz, by Lempalá to Tammerfors, which they took possession of. A few of the

* The Emperor Alexander visited Swartholm in 1809. An engineer officer observed to him how much the garrison must have suffered, crowded as they were in unhealthy casemates, and compelled to subsist upon unground grain. The Emperor replied, "I detest cowards, and I am happy to find our enemies do not belong to that class."

enemy's squadrons tried to dispute the passage of the frozen lake, on the shores of which Tammerfors is situated, but they were dispersed with some loss by the hussars of Grodno. An attempt upon a rear-guard of infantry was less successful; it forced its way through the Russian troops and saved the convoy it was employed to protect. The Russians had marched 75 versts almost without a halt.

Count Klingsporr had retreated successively by Rautila, Lautakyla, Kumo, and Gammalby, as far as Normark. He appeared disposed to contest the occupation of Bjorneborg, and covered that town with a strong vanguard, drawn up on the two banks of the Kumo. Prince Bagration attacked him in three detachments, and carried by assault the villages of Keikio, Kumo, and Jorillac. This last was covered by Abattis, but was quickly taken by the 25th Chasseurs.

On the $\frac{5}{17}$th the Swedes burned several bridges on the great road, and cut down large trees, so as to render it impassable; so that the Russians found it necessary to proceed by cross-roads, or by winter tracks covered with snow: nevertheless, Jankowicz came up with the enemy on the frozen surface of the Kumo, near Haistila, where Count Löwenhjelm, chief of the staff of the Swedish army, had assembled three battalions and a few hundreds of the dragoons

of Nyland, with some artillery. The Russian force only amounted at the time to 1200 men and six pieces of artillery, the remainder of the troops gradually coming up. When Prince Bagration arrived in person, a brisk engagement had already begun in the front. He ordered them to turn the position occupied by Löwenhjelm upon a head of the river, by the villages of Haistila and Ulfsby. This movement, which directly threatened Bjorneborg, compelled the Swedish general to change his ground: he retreated, and Prince Bagration occupied Bjorneborg. A good many lives were lost on this occasion, and several officers were wounded.*

At the same time these events were taking place, a detachment entrusted to General Koulneff had been following very closely the Swedish brigade of Adlerkreutz from Tammerfors, by Kyro and Numijarva, threatening at the same time Himola and Christinestadt.† Baron d'Adlerkreutz changed his route and retired by Lappo, on the road to Ny-Carleby, whilst General Klingsporr continued to abandon the ground along the line of the coast.

* Amongst others, Lieut.-colonel Rüdinger of the Russian, and Mr. de Reutercrona of the Swedish army.

† A battle was fought in 1714 in the neighbourhood of Kyro, near the village of Hanno, between the Russian army under Prince Galitzen, and that of the Swedes under the command of Baron d'Armfeldt.

Prince Bagration had just conferred on General Raievsky the command of the troops intended to act towards the north. He proceeded to Christinestadt on the $\frac{12}{24}$th, and Vasa on the $\frac{17}{29}$th of March, while Koulneff reached Kistaro on the $\frac{16}{28}$th and placed himself in communication with General Toutchkoff (1st). The brigade of Cronstedt had offered some resistance to the last-named officer, only at the posts of Lapvierta and Kuopio; and after having left in that town four battalions and some cavalry, under the orders of General Boulatoff, for the sake of protecting his communications, menaced from the side of Idensalmi, he had marched with the rest of his troops, fifteen battalions and some squadrons, to Rautalamby and Istoumäki, the $\frac{12}{24}$th March.

On this Count Klingsporr thought it necessary to continue his retreat to the north, and from the $\frac{\text{11th}}{\text{23d}}$ to the $\frac{14}{26}$th of March he moved his head-quarters successively to Nerpes, Pörtom, and Wöra, where he concentrated the nucleus of his army.

Whilst Generals Raievsky and Toutchkoff (1st) were following the movements of the Swedish army, and thus without fighting were making a rapid advance towards the north, Prince Bagration only allowed one day's rest to the remainder of his division at Bjorneborg, although they had

marched 200 versts* in eight days, and hastened to march southwards towards Abo by the coast road. General Chepeleff was detached with 1600 men from Tavastheus upon this city, and arrived before Prince Bagration, without having encountered the slightest resistance. Count Bouxhoevden transported his head-quarters there on the $\frac{13}{25}$th.

The Swedes, before abandoning the capital of the country, without striking one blow in its defence, set fire to their fleet of galleys, composed of 64 vessels of war.

The activity of the Russians was rewarded by the capture of the strong castle of Abo, celebrated as having been the prison of Eric XIV., with the arsenal, containing 325 guns of all sizes, a great number of projectiles, arms, and ammunition, together with 280 brass cannons and a considerable dépôt of naval stores, all of which fell into their hands.

The cape, or rather the fortified rocks of Hangö-udd, shared the same fate. The importance of this place is entirely in a maritime point of view; for, like Swartholm and Sweaborg, it commands all the coasting navigation. The batteries, although incomplete, were mounted with 55 guns and well

* 140 miles.

provided with ammunition. The Swedish Government had collected the materials there for completing the works—this duty devolved upon the Russian engineers, and in a few weeks Hangö-udd was secure from a *coup-de-main.*

Southern and Central Finland had thus been conquered in the short period of a month. Count Bouxhoevden was desirous of following it up by the capture of the islands of Aland, where the inhabitants had manifested a hostile feeling.

The principal object of this expedition was to place an additional barrier between Finland and Sweden, and it was entrusted to Mr. de Neidhardt, a major on the staff. He merely took with him a small number of Cossacks, but the islands submitted at the first summons, a few Swedish troops by which they were garrisoned having retired to their own country; and Colonel Vouitch established himself there $\frac{\text{31st March}}{\text{12th April}}$, with a party of the 25th Chasseurs.

Such rapid progress, and such glorious results, are in themselves a sufficient eulogium upon the military skill which directed all the operations. Nevertheless the precipitate retreat of General Klingsporr, and the delays in the movements of the 5th division under General Toutchkoff, occasioned by local obstacles and the difficulty of procuring

provisions, had disconcerted the plans laid by Count Bouxhoevden. It had been impossible to break up the line of the Swedish troops, or to force the great body of their army to retreat beyond the Gulf to Vasa, as the Russian commander-in-chief had intended; imagining, no doubt, the enemy opposed to Prince Bagration would not have yielded almost without a struggle. The body of General Klingsporr's army was almost entire. It is true he had been compelled to retreat to the arid plains of the north, and with one only channel through which he could obtain provisions, namely, by a road making an immense circuit extending to Lapland, and communicating with the rest of the kingdom by Tornea and Swedish Westro-Bothnia. In this situation Count Klingsporr could not fail to suffer great inconveniences and privations, but the season was approaching when the navigation would again be open, and he could not doubt he would receive assistance. In the meanwhile the campaign was not at an end—it was necessary to form other plans, and to have recourse to the operation rejected by Count Bouxhoevden after the fall of Tavastheus, viz. to make a direct attack upon Uleaborg from Kuopio.

In taking this resolution, after so long a delay, the Russian general thought it possible it might

still not be too late. He ordered the brigade of General Boulatoff to proceed by forced marches, by Idensalmi and Pipola, towards Uleaborg, whilst General Toutchkoff (1st) should continue to advance upon Gamle-Carleby and Jacobstadt. He directed these chiefs to attack the enemy wherever they were inclined to resist.

General Raievsky left some troops at Vasa, as much to guard the passage of the Quarken, then supposed easy, as to watch the security of the line of communications; a precaution rendered doubly necessary by the circumstance that the Russian line was every day becoming more extended, and that provisions could not follow their march with sufficient celerity.*

Colonel Koulneff, in consequence of these new instructions, marched to attack the enemy, and came up with them in the defile of Sundby at a critical moment, for their artillery was embarrassed

* One of the greatest difficulties the Russians had to encounter during this war proceeded from the scarcity of carriage. The Swedes carefully carried off the horses and the carts, or sledges, of the peasants. The convoys of provisions arrived from Russia at an enormous expense, and it was only owing to the anxiety of the Emperor Alexander, and the indefatigable attention of Count Araktchéieff, the Minister of War, that the army sometimes had abundant supplies, and was generally preserved from actual urgent want.

in the snow. He obliged them to separate their brigades, and after a long engagement to retire by hardly visible roads, and always in a northerly direction. The rear-guard of the Swedes was commanded by Count Gripenberg. This officer, being unable either to retreat or to pass the principal column, which was locked in a cross-road, suddenly wheeled about upon Koulneff, in order to regain the principal route near the church of Pedersöre. This manœuvre saved the Swedish artillery, and their columns succeeded in rejoining each other at Lappalax.

After this negative advantage, General Klingsporr continued his retreat by Gamle-Carleby, Maringais, Lackto, and Himango, from the $\frac{15}{27}$th of March to the $\frac{\text{23d March}}{\text{4th April}}$. He made a short halt at Pyhajocki on the $\frac{27}{8}$th, and remained at Brahestadt until the $\frac{3}{15}$th of April. Some newly-raised troops joined him on these marches.

The advanced guard of the Russians followed close upon their traces. It was commanded by Koulneff and Tourtchaninoff, and advanced 600 versts in 22 days, constantly keeping the enemy in view, allowing them no respite, and giving innumerable proofs of valour and skill in the skirmishes which took place daily. On the $\frac{\text{31st March}}{\text{12th April}}$ this advanced guard reached Himango. Generals Toutch-

koff (1st) and Raievsky established the main body of their forces at Jacobstadt and Gamle-Carleby on the $\frac{31\text{st March}}{12\text{th April}}$.

All serious engagements were then suspended for some days by a heavy fall of snow, accompanied by excessive cold; and during this enforced truce a sort of acquaintance sprung up between the armies. Hopes were now entertained that the Finlander troops, of whom the greater portion of Count Klingsporr's army was composed, might be inclined to lay down their arms, and M. de Hubert, a diplomatic agent, was despatched to the spot to endeavour to bring about so desirable a result. But the event did not justify the hopes they had presumptuously formed. On the contrary, it appeared the Swedes had known how to make the most of the time they had gained, and that they had taken advantage of it to reorganise the order of march of their columns, which had before been in the greatest disorder.

At length the Swedish Lion awoke under the 64th parallel of north latitude.

Koulneff had occupied the post of Kalajocki ($\frac{1\text{st}}{13\text{th}}$ April), and the great body of the Russian troops assembled there on the $\frac{3\text{rd}}{15\text{th}}$, while Boulatoff was approaching from Frantzilla. The advanced guard of the Swedes under Colonel Gripenberg, composed

of about 2000 troops of all descriptions, occupied Ypperi, in front of Pyhajocki, where Klingsporr at last appeared determined to make a stand. Colonels Tourtchaninoff and Karpendoff opened a sharp attack, while Koulneff, advancing on the ice along the Gulf of Bothnia, harassed the enemy's flank. Gripenberg found himself by this manœuvre driven from position to position, and in spite of the broken nature of the ground, which afforded him better means of defence, he was compelled, after an obstinate resistance, to retreat to Wirets. General Klingsporr had just begun to retreat with his army towards Brahestadt; he felt the necessity of supporting the efforts made by Gripenberg, and marched to assist him in disengaging his troops embarrassed in the deep snow. On arriving on the field of battle he placed in front a large body of artillery, and detached Count Löwenhjelm, with a brigade and some squadrons of dragoons, to retain Koulneff upon the ice. The Swedish officer was successful in his attack, but having been dismounted and wounded in a charge of cavalry, he was taken prisoner with his aide-de-camp, Captain Clairfeldt, who was endeavouring to defend him. The disorder which followed this accident was taken advantage of by Koulneff; he pushed on as far as the mouth of the river of Pyhajocki, where Gripenberg had taken up

his ground for the fourth time: from this point he continued his retreat without opposition.

After having occupied Brahestadt on the $\frac{6}{18}$th of April, Koulneff again dislodged the Swedes from Olkijocki, but at the manse of Sikajocki the combat was renewed on a more extensive scale. The Russian cavalry tried to repeat the manœuvre which they had found successful on the preceding days at the mouth of the river of Sikajocki, but were repulsed with considerable loss by the Swedish artillery and the dragoons of Nyland. The battle had continued for several hours without any decisive result, when General Adlerkreutz, who had succeeded Count Löwenhjelm as chief of the staff, observed that the fire of the Russians began to slacken, charged down upon them and forced them to retreat to Mojasi. Night separated the combatants, who had been engaged eight hours—the whole length of the day under that hyperborean sky. The Russians had nearly taken the Swedish headquarters; they were saved by their ignorance of the localities and the bravery of the guard.

This was the first serious engagement, and cost above 1000 on both sides. Flemming, the Swedish general of brigade, was killed; and among the Russians, Major Konsky of the 24th Chasseurs. The names of Koulneff, Bacon, Pahlen, Tourt-

chaninoff, and Silix, d'Adlerkreutz, Gripenberg, Dobeln, Fock, and Björnstjerna,* were honourably mentioned in the two armies.

The victory was doubtful. The Russians were driven from the ground, but they regained possession of it through the retreat of General Klingsporr, which he continued on the $\frac{7}{19}$th of April, to Lumijocki. The Swedish army assembled at Lumijocki and Limingo, and the Russians near Brahestadt and Karinkinda.

In this attitude of repose, the necessary consequence of the excessive fatigues and the forced

* A Swedish orator compared this battle to that of Mantirea, or even of Marengo, an exaggeration, which the circumstances which drew forth his speech perhaps rendered excusable. We must, however, acknowledge, that it was a transition from the strictest defensive measures to the offensive, and that this day restored energy to the army, whose moral force might reasonably be supposed to have been diminished by six consecutive weeks of continual retreat, exposed to privations of every kind, and to excessive fatigue, A remarkable circumstance occurred: Colonel Koulneff observed a Swedish officer, M. de Björnstjerna, exposing himself to danger without the slightest precaution, and moved by a noble generosity, which is indeed a distinguishing trait of his character, he desired the Chasseurs not to fire at him; and at the same time d'Adlerkreutz, from a similar feeling of admiration, gave orders to his men to spare Koulneff. The war of which we are now giving a sketch furnished more than one example, like those we now mention, of chivalrous and generous rivalry.

marches the troops had undergone, both sides resolved to await the arrival of the troops from the Savolax. This state of things lasted until the $\frac{15}{27}$th of April.

General Toutchkoff (1st) had enjoined General Boulatoff to carry on his operations on Uleaborg according to the plan of the commander-in-chief; or, if he did not consider himself sufficiently strong to succeed in such an operation with his unassisted forces, he was to come and join his extreme right by Frantzilla and Revolax. Boulatoff chose the latter part, and his column marching on the $\frac{8}{20}$th of April by Wihandi, reached Revolax on the $\frac{12}{24}$th with about 2500 men.

The brigade of Colonel Cronstedt, which had until that time been opposed to General Boulatoff, stopped at Temmes. Another Swedish brigade (the 5th), under Colonel Sandels, entered Uléassalö and Carlön, on the shores of the Gulf of Bothnia. A sustained connexion was thus established between the troops coming from the Savolax and the principal body of the army of Count Klingsporr, his 1st, 2d, and 3d brigades having been posted about the environs of Lumijocki.

A glance upon the map shows the Swedes might be said to have only one foot in Finland; and the reunion of the Russian columns was likely

to afford General Toutchkoff the only means of throwing them back upon Tornea. The idea of completely breaking their line was henceforth given up, on account of the insufficiency of their forces for the execution of a project which would certainly be decisive, but which required the employment of the troops in two separate directions. The prestige of a great numerical superiority which had so long prevailed was dissipated, and after the battle of Sikajocki the Swedish army had regained confidence. Nevertheless Toutchkoff awaited the reinforcement under Boulatoff to execute the instructions he had received, and which commanded him positively to resume the offensive. A decided victory was required to conclude the campaign, and bring about the dissolution of the Finlander regiments.

Klingsporr and his staff had on their side equally strong motives for seizing any opportunity of gaining an unexpected advantage, and they could only hope for it by suddenly overwhelming the weakest of the two Russian corps before it could rejoin the other. Boulatoff was about to quit Revolax, and a very few hours would place him within reach of the support of Toutchkoff's troops—but these hours were not allowed him. Klingsporr had resolved on acting on the offensive.

A brigade under Count Cronstedt marched on the $\frac{15}{27}$th of April from Temmes, by Pavola, to Revolax; and Adlerkreutz from Lumijocki, with a smaller detachment, started for the same point. If these columns could succeed in separating Boulatoff from Toutchkoff, it was intended they should menace the communications of the latter towards Brahestadt, and Klingsporr was resolved to attack the Russian force in front at the same time on the coast road.

This plan may appear rather complicated, when one considers the distance between the columns, nevertheless it was successful even beyond the hopes of the Swedes.

The march of Count Cronstedt was retarded by the deep snows, and the attack of Adlerkreutz upon the left of Toutchkoff had been made some time before he came up; the engagement had already lasted some hours, and the Swedes had been repulsed with loss. The battle appeared ended, and General Boulatoff, only anxious to rejoin Toutchkoff, was pushing on in that direction, when his extreme right and some companies posted near the church of Revolax were unexpectedly charged by the brigade of Cronstedt, which advanced rapidly by the frozen stream of Revolax and the village of Händelä, whilst his light troops made themselves

masters of all the outskirts of the neighbouring woods. Boulatoff hastened to the spot, and immediately saw he had no resource but to draw up his troops in a mass around the manse, where he resolved to defend himself so as to allow General Garnault, who commanded the left, and whose troops had in the first instance been engaged with Adlerkreutz, to come to his rescue. But, unfortunately for him, General Garnault, imagining the engagement totally at an end, had obeyed an order previously given, and set forward on his march to Sikajocki. He had marched at the head of his troops, and his column was thus destitute of a commander.

When Boulatoff found himself thus abandoned and overpowered, he ordered the colours to be torn from the staff, and dispatched an officer to General Toutchkoff to assure him he would die with his arms in his hands. He was repeatedly wounded, but maintained the coolness and self-possession of a hero. He at last fell into the hands of the enemy, almost in a dying state, and was treated with the respect and consideration due to unfortunate heroism. In this engagement the Russians lost nearly 800 men, four guns, and nine ammunition-waggons.

This check deprived Toutchkoff of all hopes of

terminating the campaign, or even of long retaining his position at Sikajocki. His communications near Wikanda having been menaced he fell back with his principal force to Pyhajocki, only leaving an advanced guard at Brahestadt, hoping by these arrangements to be able to await the arrival of the reinforcements promised him by Bouxhoevden. The whole amount of his force, including the remains of the column of Boulatoff, was 4760 infantry, 587 cavalry, and 19 guns. Count Klingsporr had 12,922 troops of all descriptions, including the brigade of Sandels, and a numerous artillery; but there was a great deal of sickness in this army, which was divided into six brigades.

It was not long before the disastrous consequences of the battle of Revolax began to appear. A battalion, and some supplementary detachments, left in charge of the magazines formed by the Russians at St. Michel, to the south of Kuopio, were to have followed the march of Boulatoff's column, and have served as an escort to a park of artillery and a quantity of ammunition. The order to retrograde arrived too late,—the detachment was attacked and surrounded at Pulkila, on the $\frac{\text{20th April}}{\text{2d May}}$, by Colonel Sandels, and was obliged to yield, after a desperate resistance. The utmost efforts of a

young officer* only enabled him to save two guns and a few fugitives. He rejoined General Toutchkoff at Raukalaks.

This fresh misfortune left the approach to Kuopio entirely uncovered. The brigade of Sandels, composed of four battalions, six guns, and about 3000 men, preceded by a numerous band of insurgent peasants, forming an advanced guard, advanced upon the town by rapid forced marches; it was defended by a small Russian garrison,† too feeble to offer any resistance: they consequently evacuated the town and retreated to Warkhaus, leaving some carriages, a military hospital, and a magazine, to fall into the hands of Sandels.

An insurrectional movement manifested itself in several parishes, simultaneously with the first reverses of the Russians. It threatened to become general, and added to the daily-increasing difficulties experienced by the Russians in obtaining provisions and keeping up means of communication.‡

* Serbine, 2d captain in the regiment of Mokileff.

† A company of the regiment of Peime, under Lieutenant Pavlenko.

‡ The want of arms and ammunition paralysed this insurrection, which would probably have become general if the Swedish Government could have supplied them.

General Toutchkoff (1st) was induced to retreat again as far as Lackto and Gamle-Carleby by this incident, and the necessity he felt himself under of contracting his line. Brahestadt was evacuated, and shortly afterwards occupied by Count Klingsporr, who detached a party towards Kajana, and posted his army on the southern shores of the Pyhajocki, taking care to fortify his position strongly. General Toutchkoff (1st) took similar precautions at Himango and Gamle-Carleby. The thaws, the breaking up of the ice in the numerous torrents of Northern Finland, and the melting of the snows, took place at this period, forming insurmountable obstacles to the carrying on of any military operations of a rapid or decisive character. All that could be done by the commanders on both sides, and indeed all they attempted to do, was to endeavour beforehand to provide themselves with the means and precautions necessary for action at a future period.

Sandels alone still continued, almost without opposition, to spread alarm in Eastern Finland. The Russian Government was compelled to devote some battalions to forming posts which might guard their ancient frontier and defend the fortified town of Nyslot, from which the principal portion of the garrison had been withdrawn, from a mistaken idea

of its security, and, at the same time, the increased demand for troops, which were required for the posts containing military stores, and also to escort convoys. Some squadrons of dragoons were detached from the troops employed at the siege of Sweaborg to defend and also to overawe the country of Heinola; and, finally, a fresh division arrived from Russia, under the command of General Barclay de Tolli, and proceeded to Kuopio by forced marches.* While these events were taking place, Count Bouxhoevden was detained at Abo by business connected with the necessary administration of his army and of the province, and was especially occupied with the system of defence which the coming season, and the great extent of the coast line, would render necessary. His troops in the southern part were thus disposed :—

The 17th division, Count Kamensky, composed of 10,930 infantry, 1262 cavalry, and 74 guns, was employed at the siege of Sweaborg, and in detachments along the coast, from Swartholm as far as Ecknäs and Hangö-udd.

* This reinforcement consisted of the following troops: of the Guards there were the grenadiers, a battalion of chasseurs, and a company of artillery; of regiments of the 6th division, 3rd Chasseurs, Nizovsky, Azoff, Volhynia; troops withdrawn from fortresses on the frontiers, a company of artillery, and two incomplete battalions.

The 21st division, Prince Bagration, occupied city and province of Abo, Bjorneborg, and vastheus, and a strong detachment of light troops arded the islands of Aland. This corps had ler arms 6959 infantry, 1110 cavalry, and 20 ns.

CHAPTER III.

THE wish not to interrupt the thread of our narrative has prevented us hitherto from casting our eyes upon Sweaborg. At the time we speak of, affairs had begun to take a decisive turn on that important subject.

This fortress is built upon five islands, or rather rocks, in the Gulf of Finland. Three of these islands, Wester-Swartö, Lilla-Oster-Swartö, and Stora-Oster-Swartö, are situated in sight of the city of Helsingfors, and even within long range of cannon shot. On that side they mask the island of Wargön, which is considered as the citadel of the place; Langörn is a detached fortress upon a sixth island, nearer the coast than the others; and Gustavswärd, at the opposite extremity, has a citadel which sweeps the channel from a triple row of batteries.

All these islands are bristling with cannon, and the works are principally constructed of granite, and for the most part as massive as the foundation on which they are built. It would serve no purpose to describe all these constructions, many of which have been raised without any definite plan, and are whimsical, defective, and useless; but which, as a whole, render the fortification a work of the first order. The sea by which it is surrounded serves instead of a ditch, and where in some places artificial ditches have been necessary they are cut in the rock.

Wargön is almost entirely bomb-proof. Basins and spacious docks were constructed by Chappman and Tunberg, and these imperishable trophies of their genius surround the monument of the founder, Marshal Ehrenswärdt, who lies buried in the fort of Wargön. Sweaborg has cost Sweden immense sums of money, and the construction of the fortifications occupied half a century.

The defence of this place was entrusted to Admiral Count Cronstedt, a veteran officer of the Swedish navy. The garrison amounted to above 7000 men, partly Swedes, partly natives of Finland; 721 among them were seamen.

The numerical strength of the Russians employed on the siege varied greatly, according as the

demand for troops elsewhere was more or less urgent.

At first it was hardly a third as considerable as the garrison, but it was gradually augmented.

In the beginning of March the besiegers had eleven battalions, four squadrons, four field-batteries, two companies of pioneers, and one of artillerymen, without guns to serve the batteries.

The heavy artillery was brought with extreme difficulty on sledges to Sweaborg from Russian Finland. It was successively posted on the Cape of Helsingfors, the island of Skandetlandet, and the surrounding rocks, by General Suchtelen, who directed the engineer department. During the whole time hostilities were carried on against Sweaborg the number of artillery never exceeded forty-six pieces of cannon, of which sixteen were mortars.

The blockade was gradually straitened, according as the augmentation of the Russian force permitted them to draw it closer and closer round a fortress of that extent. The batteries could only be established by means of the most arduous labour; the only possible means of constructing them was upon facines and stuffed gabions, which had but little weight or power of resistance, rendering it necessary the parapets should be of very considerable thickness. Earth and turf were alike

wanting upon those barren rocks covered with deep snow; and besides the difficulty of establishing approaches, and breaching batteries upon the ice, the poverty of the Russians in artillery, in ammunition, in workmen, in tools, and even in soldiers, rendered it perfectly impossible to attempt to conduct the attack upon Sweaborg according to the regular rules of a siege. The possibility of taking it by storm was at one time discussed, but at last the commands of the Emperor Alexander and the dictates of sound reason prevailed. The Emperor's orders were, gradually to make the blockade closer and closer, according as their augmented means might permit, to bombard the place, and not to venture an assault except as a last resource.

The first shots were exchanged on the $\frac{\text{23d Feb.}}{\text{6th March,}}$ the occasion being a Russian battery on a rock in the middle of the harbour and between the fortress and the city of Helsingfors. A fire was opened by it upon some hundreds of labourers employed by the Swedish commandant to break up the ice before the points he considered the most accessible, and consequently the most exposed to danger. It was vigorously replied to, and the guns being pointed high, every shot told upon the houses in Helsingfors. The city was threatened with total

destruction, and in order to avert it a flag of truce was despatched to Admiral Cronstedt, to represent to him the disasters to which he was exposing the inhabitants, most of whom had relations or friends among the garrison, and pointing out to him the danger it involved of reprisals on any Swedish cities that might be reached by the war. Cronstedt coldly replied that the destruction of Helsingfors was necessary for his own defence; however, after holding a consultation with his council, he changed his mind, and it was agreed on both sides not to construct any works in that direction, and to consider that point as neutral ground.

The Russians were therefore able to establish their magazines, their military hospitals, and their parks of artillery, at Helsingfors, with perfect safety. This city afforded the only shelter to be found in all that neighbourhood for the troops and the head-quarters.

All the surrounding heights were gradually becoming crowned with the Russian artillery, and these batteries fired almost at random upon the mills, the magazines, the sailors' huts, and the wooden buildings left exposed by the ramparts. Fires broke out several times during the ten days this cannonade continued. The number of projec-

tiles thus thrown amounted to 1565, and the fortress fired in return 2477 shots.

Various parleys took place on different occasions, in the course of which General Suchtelen thought he observed, that the moral vigour of some of the chiefs was hardly what might have been expected from the material strength with which the fortress was provided. His plans for accelerating the surrender of the place were based upon this hint; he considered that one means of success would lie in keeping up a constant anxiety and alarm among the garrison, composed of good troops, but who were little accustomed to war, and in fatiguing and harassing them by keeping them constantly on the alert. This system was carried out: constant alarms were raised, sometimes in the daytime, but much more often during the night. Sometimes it was a party of drums and riflemen; sometimes one or even two field-batteries would take advantage of the shelter of the rocks to creep along the ice, even within the range of grape-shot.

Colonel Argoum of the artillery distinguished himself particularly in these expeditions. He was a positive *réveillon* to the garrison. He continually varied his stratagems, and the time and

place where the attack would be made never could be foreseen.

A strong effect was produced by these means. The Russian generals very soon became aware that Admiral Cronstedt, accustomed to look at everything with the eye of a seaman, felt unnecessary anxiety about some points he considered too much exposed, as well as about some faults in the construction of his works, and also that he exhausted the strength of his people by keeping them incessantly at work without their being allowed sufficient rest. In fact, he appeared to regard Sweaborg in the light of a ship in danger of being boarded. He persuaded himself, and his opinion was shared by many of his officers, that the winter, by surrounding the fortress with a field of solid ice, deprived it of its principal strength, and that it would not be secure from a *coup-de-main*.

A great number of fugitives had taken refuge in Sweaborg at the commencement of the Russian invasion,—worse than useless for the defence of the place, but consuming the provisions. Admiral Cronstedt was sensible of the error he had committed in receiving them in the first instance, and he tried to rid himself of their presence; but the rigorous laws of war prevented the Russians from

showing a courtesy which would have been misplaced under such circumstances, and the unfortunate population was repulsed by their advanced guard. The Swedish admiral nobly refused an offer that was made him, to allow *his family alone* to quit the invested fortress.

Under the veil of military politeness, the Russian officers took care to supply the Swedish admiral regularly with the newspapers and gazettes they received from the Continent. At that time they were filled for the most part with disastrous accounts of everything in Sweden. The bulletins of the Russian army, the proclamations, the letters from families dispirited by the loss or absence of their heads,—everything that could tend to depress the spirits of the garrison, and that it was to the advantage of Russia should be believed and discussed in Sweaborg, was transmitted there daily, and received with the eager curiosity naturally felt by men cut off from all other intercourse with the rest of the world.

A personal acquaintance with some of the superior officers enabled the Russian generals more and more to appreciate the characters of those with whom they had to deal. Colonels who for twenty years had been assiduously occupied in the cultivation of their military farms,—subalterns who had

never seen the face of war—a sort of rivalship between the Swedes and Finlanders—the number of women—the dissatisfaction of many—the prodigal consumption permitted by inexperience of the provisions, always so precious in a besieged place—the firm belief entertained of the superiority of the Russian forces;—such were the principal elements of the perplexity and anxiety which distracted the minds of the admiral and his officers.

Nevertheless the high reputation borne by Count Cronstedt for talent, valour, and honesty, as well as attachment to his king and country, had a great effect upon men's minds. It was of consequence thoroughly to understand the man himself, and an opportunity of conferring with him personally was taken every advantage of.

In the interviews that followed, it was easy to perceive that he secretly disapproved of the politics of his Government, that he considered Sweaborg as a precarious possession, and that he was full of anxiety for the safety of the flotilla, on board of which he had distinguished himself at the battles of Wiborg and Swenksund, and which an ill-fated shell might reduce to ashes. He could not conceal his apprehensions concerning the alliance with England; and it must be confessed, the events at Copenhagen might warrant a distrust of their good

faith towards any naval power. As a seaman, he was embarrassed by the defence of immoveable walls; as a man, and the father of a family, his heart appeared to bleed for the sufferings of those dear to him.

Doubt and hesitation are great faults in war, and it rarely happens that they do not lead to the most fatal results.

Count Cronstedt was naturally of an anxious disposition; it is a sort of moral malady, from which neither courage nor even probity itself can preserve those who are not endowed with due energy of mind. Placed in a difficult situation, where he was abandoned to distrust of himself, without any one beside him on whose opinion he could rely, his feelings of uncertainty and want of confidence in his resources could not fail to become contagious. His high position had been given him by the King, and confirmed by the general respect in which he was held, and which he had well earned during a long and honourable career; his very reputation made it impossible the irresolution he evinced should fail to paralyse the energy of his subordinates—and,

"The *fortress* that deliberates is lost."

Count Cronstedt was too fond of calling together

his council; a middle course is too frequently the consequence of such assemblies: on the present occasion they considered it a great stroke of policy if they could contrive to gain time, to preserve the fleet, to save their honour, and not to run any risk at present.

An armistice was proposed, and after long conferences it was agreed to, under the name of Convention at the island of Lonan on the $\frac{\text{24th March}}{\text{5th April}}$. The conditions were as follow:—

"*Convention between their Excellencies Messrs. De Suchtelen, Chief Engineer, &c. &c., and De Cronstedt, Vice-Admiral, &c. &c.*

"There shall be an armistice between the Russian troops besieging Sweaborg and the Swedish garrison, from this day until the 3d of May, N. S., of the current year 1808.

"If at noon on the 3d of May the fortress has not been effectually succoured by at least five ships of the line, it shall be given up to H. M. the Emperor of Russia. Be it understood, that it is necessary such succour shall at that hour have actually entered the harbour of Sweaborg, and that if it should only be in sight of the fort, it shall be considered as not having arrived.

"The day after this Convention shall have been

approved of by the General commanding in chief Count Bouxhoevden, Admiral Cronstedt shall cause the island of Langörn to be evacuated, and the guard relieved by a Russian guard. On the two following days, from twenty-four hours to twenty-four hours, the same shall be done with the island of Wester-Swartö, including the small works of Löwen upon the adjoining rocks, and that of Oster-Lilla-Swartö.

"The garrisons which are in these places shall pass into the great islands which compose the fortress, taking with them nothing but what is actually their own private property, without injuring or destroying anything in the works, the magazines, the artillery, or the stores; always excepting the provisions, which they are at liberty to carry away with them.

"Of the three islands which are the security for this Convention, the island of Langörn shall be given up entirely to the Russian troops, who, however, shall not be permitted to construct any works there on the side opposite to the fortress before the said 3d of May.

"As to the other two islands, although also occupied by Russian troops, they shall be restored (in case succour should arrive before the stipulated day) exactly in the state in which they are at pre-

sent; and in the meanwhile the Swedish hospital which is there shall remain under the charge of the Swedish superintendants and medical officers. They shall have no communication with Sweaborg, except for the transport of convalescents, or of sick who may be received in their stead, without exceeding the number who are actually in hospital at present. The mill and the bakehouse of Wester-Swartö will be for the use of the said hospital.

"On the 3d of May, at the time the fortress is surrendered, the garrison shall march out with all the honours of war, the conditions of the ceremonial being the same as those granted to the garrison of Swartholm.

"At noon on the said day the Swedish garrison shall have evacuated Gustavswärd, and it shall be at that same hour occupied by the Russian troops, who shall at the same time relieve the guard at the gates of the island of Wargön, which serves as a communication with Gustavswärd. This island of Wargön, and that of Stora-Oster-Swartö, shall be evacuated in the course of the day, if possible, or at the farthest on the next day, according as the garrison may be able to be carried away in boats, if the ice should break up before then. Considering the uncertainty that must prevail on that head, it shall be agreed upon before the termination of

the period fixed what measures may be necessary for the transport of the garrisons with promptitude and safety, as well as the families and persons who follow the garrison.

"Each individual shall keep his own property, but everything that is not private property shall remain in the fortress; and the Admiral binds himself not to destroy anything from this time forward, to consider the harbour as well as the fortress in a state of blockade, and therefore not to send out of the harbour any vessel of whatever nature; and, lastly, not to allow any vessels not actually in the harbour to be launched.

"All the officers who are natives of Sweden shall, if they wish it, have permission to return to Sweden, on binding themselves not to serve against Russia or her allies during the whole of this war.

"The Swedish non-commissioned officers and privates shall be sent under a military escort to Wiborg, or other places at no great distance. All those who would wish to remain under the sovereignty of the Emperor of Russia will take the oath of allegiance, and will enjoy all the advantages offered to them by His Imperial Majesty in his proclamation of the $\frac{19\text{th}}{31\text{st}}$ March, 1808.

"The Finlander regiments entering the service of His Imperial Majesty shall not be employed

against Sweden or her allies during the present war, and shall enjoy the advantages offered in the proclamations published by His Imperial Majesty, especially that of the $\frac{19th}{31st}$ March.

"The regiment of Adlerkreutz, after having taken the oath of allegiance, shall not be disbanded during the war, and shall continue to possess whatever advantages it at present enjoys.*

"Whatever has been here agreed upon for the land force shall apply equally to the naval service. The civil officers, and all individuals in general, are placed upon the same footing in this article.

"The fortress shall be delivered up with everything belonging to it; with its artillery, ammunition, and stores of all kinds, as well as everything belonging to the fleet or flotilla. Nothing is to be destroyed or injured from this time forth, as it has been before agreed.

"The flotilla shall be restored in its actual condition to Sweden after peace may have been concluded, provided always England shall restore to Denmark the fleet taken from that power last year.

* This regiment was composed of volunteers from all parts of the country, and to have disbanded it would have been to let loose upon Finland a horde of vagabonds without homes or means of subsistence.

"The archives, plans, and other papers relating to the fortress, shall be faithfully delivered to officers appointed to receive them. The Russian Commander trusts to the word of honour of Admiral Cronstedt that nothing shall be taken away.

"Every desirable facility shall be afforded for the departure of the families in Sweaborg; and in all cases not particularly specified everything shall be conducted honourably on both sides.

"In case the arrival of succours before the stipulated period should cause the islands of Wester-Swartö and Lilla-Swartö to be evacuated, Admiral Cronstedt binds himself to furnish a sufficient number of boats to allow of the evacuation taking place in the space of twenty-four hours, during which period no hostilities shall take place until all the troops shall have reached the main land.

(Signed) "SUCHTELEN.
"CRONSTEDT."

"*Separate Article.*

"In case the fortress should surrender according to the Convention signed this day, Admiral Cronstedt proposes that the deficiencies of his military chest, not exceeding a sum of 100,000 rix dollars,* Swedish currency, and verified according

* About 8000*l.*

to all the usual forms, shall be made good by the Emperor of Russia on account of Sweden; the General commanding in chief, Count Bouxhoevden, engages to lay this proposal before his sovereign, and to do his utmost to obtain his consent to it.

"Admiral Cronstedt shall be allowed to despatch two couriers to the King, the one by the northern, the other by the southern road. They shall be furnished with passports and safeguards, and every possible facility shall be given them for accomplishing their journey.

"Done at the Island of Lonan, $\frac{\text{25th March}}{\text{6th April}}$, 1808."

This convention is in truth rather remarkable, especially the last article, and it gave rise to many interpretations and surmises. The most intimate acquaintance, however, with the whole transaction, enables me to declare that not the slightest dishonourable intention can be laid to the charge of either party. We are not afraid of asserting that the slightest idea of corruption was equally foreign to both. The two officers who signed the convention had both grown grey in the service of honour, and though one might have been more successful in negotiation than the other, they were equally incapable, the one of proposing, the other of listening to any derogatory proposal.

Immediately after the convention was concluded the fort of Langörn was delivered up to the Russians, together with the other works which were only to remain provisionally in their hands; and there was a cessation of hostilities. The Russians employed the interval, until the stipulated time, in strengthening their position, and, above all, in posting numerous pieces of artillery in such a situation as to command the approach to the port, and prevent the arrival of succours. These batteries were provided with furnaces for making the balls red-hot.

The event proved all these precautions to have been superfluous. The stipulated period expired—the fortress surrendered. The Russians had hardly enough troops to occupy it and to superintend the disbanding and sending away the Swedish garrison. Those who were natives of Sweden were sent prisoners towards the provinces contiguous to Russia. The Finlanders obtained passports and permission to reside (*billets de séjour*) in their own homes. The breaking up of the ice made it necessary the last battalions should be transported in boats. The garrison at the time of its surrender amounted to 208 officers and 7386 non-commissioned officers and soldiers.

A mutiny, excited by some malcontents, occa-

sioned for a short time some anxiety during the armistice, but it was of brief duration.

On the $\frac{\text{26th April}}{\text{8th May}}$ the Russian flag was hoisted on the walls of Sweaborg, with a salute of 101 guns. The *Te Deum* was chanted on the Square of Wargön, near the monument by which it is adorned.

The surrender of this great military dépôt prodigiously augmented the resources of Russia. The following is a list of the principal prizes which fell into their hands; 58 pieces of brass ordnance, 1975 iron guns, 9535 cannon cartridges, 3000 barrels of powder, 10,000 cartouches, 340 projectiles, nearly 9000 stand of arms, with many other weapons; two frigates, 6 xebecs, a brig, 6 yachts of war, 25 gun-boats, 51 others called yawls, 51 barks, sloops, &c., 19 transports,* an immense dépôt of naval stores, and a considerable magazine of provisions.

Admiral Cronstedt had stipulated for himself the power of proceeding to Sweden to justify his conduct to the King; and it was only by the strongest persuasions he was induced to abandon his intention, so strong was his conviction of having done right. A short extract from the report he

* Almost all these vessels were ready to put to sea.

addressed to his sovereign may not be devoid of interest.

"Sweaborg," said he, "in its present state, unfinished, in many respects imperfect, and essentially depending upon its maritime advantages as a means of defence, loses a considerable portion of its strength in winter, when it is accessible on all sides." He then proceeds to mention "the great extent of the works to be guarded compared with the strength of the garrison—the number of recruits and of sick, the want of officers, who only amounted to one to a hundred men, and one to each bastion—the no less important deficiency of artillerymen, of whom there were only two to serve three guns—the consumption of one third of the powder in store in sixteen days' cannonade, the excessive exhaustion of the garrison from the necessity he was under of keeping them incessantly at work, for the daily service, in various operations required for strengthening the fortifications, and in continually breaking the ice before the most accessible points." He also alleges the want of sheltered magazines and habitable casemates, the fear that the fleet and the naval stores would be set on fire, and, finally, the hope he still had of preserving everything to Sweden should Sweaborg be succoured in time.

Whether these assertions are well founded or

not, let us respect the past career of an honest man. Let us only compassionate his unfortunate destiny, which cast upon him a burthen which appears to have been too great for his unassisted strength.*

* General Dobeln, Messrs de Both, Duriez, Hierne, and others, have published observations on the surrender of Sweaborg. The importance attached to the event has led to the drawing up of the statement contained in these pages, possibly too lengthy. They are, however, less so than the above-mentioned publications, and we can assure the reader they are not less authentic. A Swedish orator, General Cardel, called the surrender of Sweaborg a psychological problem. We flatter ourselves we have resolved it.

CHAPTER IV.

EVERYTHING naturally assumes a new aspect after the capture of Sweaborg and the approach of spring, which completely altered the character of the war. A new epoch appears to be opening upon us; let us then pause and take a rapid review of the past.

The early days of the Russian invasion were distinguished by masterly arrangements in the marches and disposal of the troops, and by a degree of energy and perseverance only to be met with in the people of northern countries, when surrounded by icy frosts and deep snows. As their detachments advanced at the same time towards the south, the centre, and the north of this vast country, they appeared to be the heads of so many formidable columns, to which common report assigned an exaggerated degree of strength.

Count Bouxhoevden skilfully continued to maintain this illusion longer than could have been hoped in an enemy's country. If he committed a fault in presuming too much upon an error which had been so favourable to him, he was punished for it by the battle of Revolax.

The prolonged blindness of the Swedish generals on that head may justly provoke surprise. Their forces were certainly limited, yet by adopting from the first a different system of warfare—one fitted for a country cut up like Finland, and which they would there have found it easy to carry on—they would probably have succeeded sooner in giving a check to the rapid advance of the Russian troops. Western Finland might have been disputed inch by inch until the spring, when it might have become a La Vendée or Calabria. The events which subsequently took place in the north afford a proof, though a tardy one, of the truth of this supposition.*

* General Tibell, the Minister of War, proposed to the King of Sweden that the general commanding his army should be ordered to risk a pitched battle *à outrance*, before abandoning the southern part of the country. The king contented himself with answering that Count Klingsporr had his instructions. (*Vide* Krigs-Vetenskap's Acad. Handl. 1818–1821.) These instructions will be found in the Appendix at the end of this volume, and might certainly serve to justify

The garrison posted in the fort of Swartholm was a useless sacrifice of means. It was very easy to see that this small maritime post could not fail to fall before the Russian troops, without even retarding their march. The troops stationed there might have been much more usefully employed, by causing them gradually to fall back from one position to another along the coast line, as far as Abo. They would have clogged the march of the Russians; and if any assistance had been afforded them

Klingsporr before a court-martial, as having followed the *letter* of his instructions; but however conscious a historian, who is himself a soldier, may be of the importance of the first of military laws — obedience, he cannot but distinguish between what is purely the literal observance of orders so as to be justifiable before the law, and the duty of a chief uncontrolled by a colleague, being his own master, and having the command of an army. His first duty was, and always must be, the defence of his country, and that not only according to the instructions he received, but according to the means he had at his disposal, and the resistance it was possible for him to offer; and how precise soever the instructions might be with which Klingsporr was furnished, they still left him some latitude — some power of action. These instructions also prove how dangerous it is that military administration should be in the hands of a civilian. Count Sagerbring, by whom they were drawn up, was a man of great ability; nevertheless we may safely say, that none of his countrymen will be in error in attributing to his counsels the so-scrupulously timid conduct of Count Klingsporr in the commencement of the campaign.

from Sweden, they might have obliged the dépôts left at Hangö-udd and Abo to evacuate those places; —they might even have preserved Abo from occupation by the Russian troops, and secured for the Swedes an easy access to Southern Finland. As a last resource, they would have fallen back in perfect safety towards the archipelago of Aland, for the Russian general would hardly have ventured to push on a handful of soldiers beyond the sea of ice which separated it from Finland.

The obstinate perseverance with which Count Bouxhoevden never ceased to urge his lieutenants to drive the *corps d'armée* of Count Klingsporr beyond the Gulf of Bothnia, is worthy of all praise. It was, without doubt, the means of obtaining the dissolution of the enemy's forces then present on the theatre of war. But was there not also a degree of presumption in attempting it with such feeble means? If he had posted a few battalions less at Abo, or even before Sweaborg, he would have left a sufficient force to Generals Toutchkoff and Boulatoff. The march of Prince Bagration upon Abo with the greater part of his troops was a useless measure. They were not ignorant the whole province of Abo had been evacuated; and it was evident that the detachment of General Chepeleff, and some battalions arriving from Bjorneborg

by the coast road, would have been quite sufficient to occupy a country thus left without defence. Bagration, Toutchkoff, Raievsky, and Boulatoff, uniting their forces, or acting in concert, would have overwhelmed General Klingsporr's corps before he was able to effect its concentration. On the other hand, if the Swedish general had endeavoured to obtain better information, he might easily have gained great advantages before the tardy reunion of the feeble Russian columns. A successful engagement would have enabled him to return to Tammerfors; and not only would the evacuation of Abo have immediately followed, but also the headquarters and troops of the Russians, posted in the angle formed by the Gulfs of Finland and Bothnia, would, no doubt, have hastened to abandon their position. So true is it, that after a war is over critics discover easily what the masters of the art ought to have done. In calculating at a distance the resources of the two belligerent powers, the struggle might have appeared in the eyes of Europe —and with some show of reason—as if it were merely the old story of the weaker party forced to succumb, under the overwhelming force of the stronger; but now, when the strength of the two parties had been really and honourably tested in the field, and the forces present on both sides were

accurately known, a close observer might discover sufficient reasons for considering the means they possessed were not so unequally balanced: in fact, that they did not preponderate unduly on either side.

Russia, hardly at rest in the West, was still engaged in an expensive war at the opposite extremity of the empire in Asia, and on the banks of the Danube. She had to conquer or defend in Finland, a country with which she was imperfectly acquainted, inhabited by a then hostile population, and accessible to the enemy on every point. The country possessed so few local resources that her army could only be supplied with provisions from the Russian provinces, and those among the least productive in that vast empire. She was to overcome by means of her superior strength, and the nature of the country forebade that strength to be maintained except by the most expensive means. Sweden, as the ally of England, would incontestably become the mistress of the seas, and she was already in the enjoyment of unusual commercial prosperity and abundance. A treaty, concluded on the 8th of Feb. 1808, assured to her a subsidy of 100,000*l.* per month, and this sum was further augmented by many very considerable contributions from private individuals. A conscription decreed

by the King reinforced the army with more than 50,000 men, without opposition, and without regard to the illegal nature of the measure;* and, lastly, the peninsular position of Sweden rendered her almost inaccessible except on the Norwegian side, where the localities and the facilities for making the most of her means of defence were all in her favour. Gustavus IV. was fully aware of the military advantages this situation might lead to. After the example of Charles XII. he resolved to attack the Danish States, and then, with the assistance of an English auxiliary corps, to display a superiority which in his opinion could not fail to be decisive. In Finland, where he must expect to meet with the greatest opposition, he determined merely to keep the war alive, feeling that from the very nature of things his hopes must *there* be confined within limits he considered too narrow. Events will show, that by this vacillation and continual change of plan this Prince himself had no

* In his proclamation authorising this levy, the King based it upon the ancient laws, and upon the act for providing for the safety of the kingdom passed under Gustavus III. He wished to have carried the number of this militia up to 100,000 men, but was obliged to submit to a considerable reduction on account of the expense of clothing and feeding so great a multitude.

small share in producing the reverses experienced by Sweden.

The Emperor Alexander was no less distinguished by energy of character than by moderation, —a most rare quality in one thus placed at the summit of greatness and power, and he had offered, even after the commencement of the war, to convert the hostile proceedings to which he had been forced to have recourse, into a purely precautionary measure, if the King of Sweden would cease to pursue a system of politics diametrically opposite to that adopted by the greatest Continental Powers. But without considering either the circumstances of the time, or the dangers which threatened the kingdom, the Swedish monarch persisted in his personally hostile resolutions, and was upheld by his cabinet. The friendly relations with England became more and more intimate, M. d'Alopœus, the Russian minister, was arrested at Stockholm, in defiance of the law of nations. The Danish minister, M. Moltke, was threatened with similar treatment, and was summoned to declare within twelve days what were the intentions of his Government. The minister, thus provoked, replied by a declaration of war; and was ordered to quit Sweden without delay. The King paid no attention to the

remonstrances of the whole of the corps diplomatique against such unheard-of proceedings.

Arrangements were immediately made for the Swedish army to invade Denmark. It was formed into three general divisions. The first, consisting of about 11,000 men, without reckoning the reinforcements furnished by the military organisation of Sweden, was stationed in the southern provinces, and destined to make a descent upon Zealand; 14,000 British troops arrived at Gottenburg in the beginning of May, under General Sir J. Moore, and it was the intention of the King they should form part of this expedition. The second general division, under the denomination of Army of the West, was to cover the Norwegian frontier, from the Straits of Swinesund as far as Herjdalen. The strength of this force hardly exceeded 10,000 men fit for active service. A reserve of from 5000 to 8000 men was collected in the province of Orebro, in the centre of Sweden; 3000 or 4000 men were to reinforce the army of Finland.*

The squadrons of the great fleet and of the flotilla were to carry 4000 or 5000 troops, and were preparing for sea in the ports of Stockholm and Carlscrona with all possible expedition.

* The regiments of Jemtland, Helsing, Westro-Bothnia, some cavalry, and artillery.

To these great preparations for war was added the most determined disregard of any conciliatory proposal. The Swedish Cabinet did not condescend a reply, and the Emperor of Russia felt himself at last constrained to alter the character of the measures he had pursued until then. He disdained to retaliate upon the Swedish ambassador the violence offered to M. d'Alopœus, and ordered every arrangement should be made to allow of his leaving Russia without encountering the slightest inconvenience. Some time afterwards his Imperial Majesty published a declaration on the $\frac{16}{28}$th March, by which he informed the European powers that he considered the portion of Finland formerly called *Swedish* as a province conquered by him, and that it had been for ever annexed to the Russian crown.

CHAPTER V.

THE summer campaign of 1808 opened unfavourably for the Russian arms. Hardly was the Gulf of Bothnia free from the winter ice, when a small naval expedition, conducted by Lieutenant Kapfelmann, left the shores of Sweden on the $\frac{\text{24th April,}}{\text{6th May,}}$ and reached in a few days the most southerly point of the islands of Aland. Excited by an ecclesiastic, and some of the civil authorities, the inhabitants of the archipelago rose *en masse*. Some Cossack posts on the great island were surrounded and made prisoners after a desperate resistance, and 120 Chasseurs, under Major Jéréméieff, shared the same fate at Finsby and Brändo. Emboldened by this *coup-de-main*, the islanders, with an innumerable and constantly increasing fleet of boats, surrounded Kumlinge, the island nearest to the mainland, occupied by Colonel Vouitch and 600 Chasseurs of the line. All possibility of retreat was cut off by the nature of the ground, a mere mass of barren

rocks; still this brave officer contrived to take so strong a position that he kept his enemies at bay during eight days. After that time he was compelled to surrender, having no means of escaping from this novel species of blockade, and all his provisions being consumed. By this event the Swedes regained an important possession.

The name of Aland is given to the whole group of islands, shoals, rocks, and islets, amounting to some hundreds, lying in the Gulf of Bothnia, between the southern point of Finland and the Swedish province of Uppland. The principal of these islands, which is 635 square versts* in extent, and about 100 versts in circumference, is intersected by rocks, lakes, and gulfs, and consists partly of forests and partly of arable land. The dwellings are very numerous, but isolated; the population amounts to 12,000 souls, and they are all seamen born. The islands of Aland are reckoned to cover a space of 1151 versts square. They formerly composed a small kingdom, and served as a rendezvous to the pirates who infested the northern seas during the middle ages.

It is very difficult for large vessels to navigate in these dangerous latitudes, but the coasting

* 104 versts to a degree of 69½ English miles, or nearly 3 versts to 2 English miles.

trade in smaller vessels is very active. The capital of Sweden receives from the islands of Aland much that is useful and even necessary.

The breaking up of the ice, and the power of navigation on the western side of the Gulf, take place several weeks before the shores of Finland are clear in the spring.

The principal of the stormy passages separating the various groups of islands are the Lumparen, the Schiftet, and the Delet; the ports, the creeks, and the roads are innumerable, as are also the shoals and sunken rocks. These islands are the natural station for the departure of all expeditions on either side of the Gulf, and their loss was still more to be regretted than that of the feeble garrison, which may almost be said to have been given up to the enemy.

General Tibell, Minister of War, proposed at this time to Gustavus Adolphus to reinforce his army in Finland, and to send orders to General Klingsporr to carry on his principal operations through the Savolax, along and towards the mouth of the Kymen, so as to menace the communications of the Russian army in the interior and towards the west of Finland. The King did not relish this proposal, alleging that it would require the employment of too large a force, and that, consequently,

for the sake of reconquering a province, Sweden would be left without troops to defend herself in case of invasion by other enemies who then menaced her; and also, that this plan presupposed complete success in the course of one single campaign, a success which his Majesty considered very problematical.

The recapture of Aland caused the King to form another plan. It was to make these islands, and the numerous parts of Sweden on the Gulf of Bothnia, serve as stations whence one or several descents could be made on the shores of Finland, and by these means a diversion in favour of Klingsporr might be effected. He did not conceal from himself how difficult it would be to arrange these expeditions with the General at so great a distance, but he considered this a subordinate question, when compared with the necessity of keeping a great number of available troops near the capital of the ancient kingdom.

In consequence of this royal decision, the Swedes were busily employed in placing the islands of Aland in a state of defence, in forming a militia there, and preparing in every way for future operations.

On his side Count Bouxhoevden was not less active. The garrison of Sweaborg was reinforced

by a portion of the regiments of the 17th division, and some marines. As soon as the navigation was open, a number of transports carried them abundance of provisions and ammunition under convoy of a Russian squadron. Every effort was made to arm and man the galleys taken from the Swedes; the fortified capes of Porkala-udd and Hangö-udd received garrisons; batteries were planted to command the entrance of the port of Abo, and the whole of the south-western coast was covered with watch-towers and telegraphic stations.

The necessary arrangements to secure the tranquillity of the country, and to preserve good order in the public administration, were not lost sight of. The oath of submission was required in the provinces occupied by the Russians; the postal communications were reopened; the comparative value of the various coinage in circulation was decided by law; the municipal assemblies and the fairs held at certain fixed periods were adjourned or authorised according as it suited best the local or political convenience; the pensioners of the Swedish Government were paid by the Russian Government with the most scrupulous exactness; all vagabonds, as far as possible, were taken up and employed in the public works; the soldiers disbanded at Sweaborg were furnished with similar employment; and

in consequence of the insurrection in the islands of Aland, and in some of the parishes of the north, it was considered necessary to take a precaution of great importance, namely, the successive disarming of the inhabitants. Count Bouxhoevden showed himself possessed of the highest administrative talents.

Whilst both parties were thus engaged in endeavouring to make arrangements for the future in the south, hostilities had recommenced in the north: let us now for a time follow the course of the events which took place in that direction.

General Raievsky had just succeeded General Toutchkoff in the command of the troops in the north-west. While he awaited the development of the operations of General Barclay de Tolli in the Savolax, and the arrival of some reinforcements which he expected, he had resolved to keep his ground as long as possible on the left bank of the Gamle-Carleby, and had for that purpose guarded with great care his line of communications, by placing detachments at Oravais, at Vasa, and at Lillkyro.

After Marshal Klingsporr had held rejoicings at Uleaborg on account of the victory over Boulatoff at Revolax, he removed his head-quarters to Brahestadt, drove a Russian post out of Himango, and

extended his brigades along both banks of the rapid river of Kalajocki, after which he caused a floating bridge to be thrown across the Rauman-Elf at Alavierto.

Both parties were thus fully occupied, and for several weeks they confined themselves to skirmishing and marauding attacks, all serious engagements being effectually prevented by the commencement of the thaw and the breaking up of the ice in the rivers and torrents.

On the $\frac{\text{20th May}}{\text{1st June}}$ Klingsporr detached a strong party under Colonel Fiandt, for the purpose of destroying a magazine of the Russians at Perho. The march of the troops was secretly effected under cover of the vast forests in that part of the country; they took the road by Lesti-Capel and the village of Kinnula, and at the end of eight days arrived at Perho, surprised a Russian post, and took the magazine. The arms of the prisoners were distributed among the inhabitants, and the Swedes then continued their march upon Witasaari; two days afterwards, near Saarjerfvi, they carried off two considerable convoys of provisions, which had only a feeble escort; the whole country rose rapidly in insurrection, and by this one well-conducted stroke of partisan warfare, General Raievsky lost twenty-five days' provisions, his troops were suddenly

reduced to the slender allowance of a pound and a half of bread in the day, and this in a country whose resources were so exhausted he could hope for but little if any assistance from it.

The Swedish army was now three times as numerous as the Russian, and the concentration of his brigades showed that General Klingsporr would not long remain inactive. The torrent of Gamle-Carleby had been until then a considerable stream, but could now be forded, and under all these circumstances, General Raievsky considered it a matter of urgent necessity to contract his line still further by a retrograde movement. He consequently directed five battalions towards Lappo, with some cavalry and nine pieces of artillery, under the orders of Generals Kosatchcovsky and Kniper, enjoining them to maintain that post, situated at the junction of four roads. The town of Vasa was entrusted to General Demidoff, with two battalions and 200 Cossacks of the Guard; the 24th Chasseurs were despatched from Koivisto towards Saarjerfvi, with orders to make a forced march to Lindulax; and the main body at the same time, $\frac{6}{18}$th June, occupied a position at Lillkyro; while the advanced guard, under General Yankovitch, remained at Ny-Carleby.

As soon as Klingsporr was informed of the re-

treat of the Russians, he lost no time in advancing by Pyhajocki and Himango to Lochto, on the $\frac{3rd}{15th}$ of June. He threw a bridge over the Sikajocki-Elf, and fixed his head-quarters on the $\frac{11th}{23rd}$ June at Jacobstadt, and his advanced guard at Soklot. His first brigade was posted at Pyhajocki, his second at Sundby, his third at Lapplax, and his fourth at Maringais. Fiandt was reinforced and stationed at Ofvervetel.

The position of the advanced guard of the Russians at Ny-Carleby was covered by a *téte de pont.* It was of great importance to the Swedish general this post should be carried, for it covers the roads of Vasa, Lillkyro, and Lappo; he therefore determined to cut off the advanced guard. Two brigades, under General Adlerkreutz and Count Gripenberg, were ordered to attack it in front; troops landed from boats menaced it on the left; and some light infantry, who had crossed the river on the right, completed the dangerous situation of the Russians. General Yankovitch had to encounter a sharp and prolonged attack, in which several hundred men were killed on both sides. He resisted the charge without difficulty in front, and succeeded in maintaining his position, but he did not think it right to expose himself to another attack, and consequently at nightfall on the $\frac{12}{24}$th of

June he set fire to the bridge, and collecting his troops together at Jokas, he retired in tolerably good order on Munstala and Wero, where he again posted himself on the $\frac{13}{25}$th.

But whilst the Swedes were thus making themselves masters of the passage and of the town of Ny-Carleby, Vasa was the scene of a far more serious affair. The attack was designed to take place simultaneously with that just described on Ny-Carleby: a force of 1400 men of the Swedish regiments of Westro-Bothnia and Jemtland, commanded by the Adjutant-general Bergenstråle, had been embarked at Umea in Westro-Bothnia, and in two days had traversed the Gulf; on the $\frac{13}{25}$th June the troops landed without obstacle at the village of Haukmo, which was not occupied, and received every assistance from the inhabitants. The Swedish general only allowed a few minutes' rest to his men, and proceeded with all possible despatch to the city of Vasa, where General Demidoff was stationed with about 1500 Russians and six guns. Deceived by false intelligence, the general proceeded towards Smedby, with the intention of going to meet the enemy, a small body of whom were in fact upon that road, while the principal column was marching by Quevolax; and though on discovering his mistake Demidoff lost no time in retracing his

steps, Bergensträle had already taken advantage of the time thus gained to occupy the city of Vasa, where the Russian general had only left some artillery and a small guard, more for the purpose of restraining than of defending the town. It was necessary to regain possession, and an obstinate conflict began from street to street, and from house to house: for several hours it was a perfect massacre, when Bergensträle, heading a charge with the bayonet, had the misfortune to be wounded and made prisoner. From that moment the Swedes lost all order or concert in their movements, and at last their ammunition, of which they had but a scanty supply, began to fail: they were put to the rout, dispersed, and hotly pursued; some of them succeeded in reaching their boats, and others fled towards Oravais. The scattered fugitives, after wandering about for some days, succeeded in rejoining General Klingsporr's army, and were formed into a sixth brigade under the orders of Colonel d'Essen: one gun, 17 officers, and 250 soldiers, fell into the hands of the Russians, and 400 men belonging to both sides lay lifeless in the streets of Vasa. The town suffered much, for the troops were so exasperated at the inhabitants having made common cause with the Swedes, that it was a considerable time before the Russian general was

able to restore order: and though we are far from justifying the excesses which took place in spite of all his efforts, we are not afraid of asserting that it was owing to General Demidoff the city of Vasa was not destroyed, and that the obloquy cast upon his name was quite undeserved.

While this was going on in the North-west, General Barclay de Tolli was advancing from the Russian posts of Nyslot and Wilmanstrandt upon Piexmaki and Jorois, towards Kuopio, in the province of Savolax, with the new division, consisting of 14 battalions, 5 squadrons, a company of pioneers, and 24 guns. Every inch of ground was disputed by the 5th brigade of the Swedish army, about 2000 strong, and commanded by Brigadier Sandels; but the Russians were so superior to him in number, he was obliged continually to give way, and finally to abandon the passage of a bridge at Wipara, and the fortified posts of Joris and Warkhaus. The Russians continually harassed his troops in the front and on the right, and Sandels at last determined to fall back towards Kuopio, first taking the precaution of destroying the magazines and some military buildings at Warkhaus; some of his heavy artillery he was compelled to abandon. In the course of his retreat he burned a number of bridges, and de-

fended himself for several hours at the passage of the isthmus on which the town of Kuopio is situated, and by this means he gained sufficient time to get all his military baggage beyond the great lake of Kalavesi without any considerable loss. He posted himself on the bank opposite to Toyvola, and General Barclay occupied Kuopio on the $\frac{7}{19}$th of June.

The defence of this point was entrusted to Major-general Rakhmanoff, who was ordered to hold it with five battalions, some cavalry, and a demi-battery; and as soon as these measures had been arranged, General Barclay de Tolli hastened with the rest of his troops to assist in carrying out the general plan of the operations in the north-west provinces, whose one end and aim was to drive General Klingsporr beyond the Gulf of Bothnia. By the $\frac{10\text{th}}{22\text{d}}$ of June General Barclay had already pushed on his advanced guard as far as Koivisto, and had himself reached Rautalamby with the rest of his army; but his movements had been anticipated by Sandels, and before abandoning the western bank of Lake Kalavesi, he had detached some light troops to burn two great bridges across the straits forming the lake of Kivisalmi, for the purpose of retarding the progress of the Russian

general, as several days were consumed in replacing them, owing to the want of all local resources in that part of the country; and in the meanwhile the Russian troops were obliged to cross the water in some small boats, and make the best of their way to Lindulax.

Sandels was perfectly aware of the importance of preventing a junction between the fresh troops commanded by Barclay de Tolli, and those under Raievsky, who were holding their ground against Klingsporr, and a diversion on Kuopio appeared to him with good reason the most likely means of effecting his object. He attacked General Barclay on the $\frac{10\text{th}}{22\text{d}}$ of June, from a considerable number of small skiffs and fishing-boats he had collected at Toyvola for that purpose; and although repulsed with some loss, through the exertions of the Chasseurs of the Guard under Colonel Potemkin, he made another and more vigorous attempt a few days afterwards, not actually upon Kuopio, but on Warkhaus, where his Carelian Chasseurs came up with and destroyed a considerable convoy of provisions; and on the $\frac{15}{27}$th a thick fog having arisen on the lake, Sandels considered it a favourable opportunity for attempting the recapture of Kuopio: accordingly a number of boats, from every possible

direction, and almost unperceived by the Russians, were despatched to the rocky and woody shore, where they were stationed.

The Swedes suffered some loss from the Artillery of the Guard under the command of Lieutenant Korobine, but they could not be prevented from landing and advancing on the broken ground of the peninsula, as far as the point of Fagernäs, a little to the south of Kuopio. They were immediately charged by the Chasseurs of the Guard and the regiment of Nizovsky, and the Russians appeared on every side fighting like lions for several hours, until the Swedish general found it necessary to sound a retreat, after the loss of many boats and a large raft loaded with artillery, which were sunk by the fire of the Russian guns. Colonel Potemkin gained much credit on this occasion, as did also two French officers, the Comtes de la Garde, and de Rastignac, no less distinguished on the field of honour than their companions in arms—those companions who were destined some years later, to restore them to their country, and to the service of their legitimate sovereign.

General Barclay de Tolli was still striving to overcome the difficulties of establishing a good and solid passage across the Straits of Kivisalmi, when he received the news of the danger to which the

post of Kuopio had been exposed. He was not aware of the exact strength of Sandel's force, which appeared all the more considerable from his having collected around him a number of armed peasants, who served for the *coups de partisan* which took place almost daily. General Rakhmanoff's troops, exhausted with their continual necessary vigilance, were insufficient to guard a long line of river, and also the road running along the shores of the lake of Kalavesi from Nyslot to Kuopio, a distance of about 125 versts (about 85 miles). It was the only road by which provisions could reach them; and the capture of the convoys at Warkhaus proved how much it was exposed. These important considerations induced General Barclay quickly to retrace his steps. In the night of the $\frac{17\text{–}18\text{th}}{29\text{–}30\text{th}}$ of June he had rejoined General Rakhmanoff at Kuopio, and lost no time in establishing a chain of small posts between Paukarlaks, Lappvick, Warkhaus, and Wehmasmäki, along the lake, the whole line being intrusted to General Sabanoff. General Barclay thus gave up the idea of carrying out the plan formed by Count Bouxhoevden, confining himself to reinforcing General Raievsky, and to re-establishing the connexion between the two forces, by detaching two regiments of infantry under Colonel Vlastoff by Saarjerfvi to Lindulax;

and he had soon reason to rejoice at having, on his own responsibility, ventured to form a resolution on which depended not only the safety of his own detachment, but perhaps of the whole army. As early as the $\frac{18}{30}$th of June the Swedes made a night attack to the right of Kuopio, by means of a continually increasing number of boats and combatants, under the protection of two rafts converted into floating batteries; and at the same time they attacked and alarmed several other points in the position of the Russians near the town. Musket-shots, shoutings, and the roar of artillery, were heard in every direction, in the midst of the rustic and so lately peaceful dwellings of the inhabitants of Kuopio. The victory was undecided until the morning, when the Russians were able to look about them, and soon discovered that the enemy had been unable to make themselves entirely masters on any one point: they had not succeeded even in making the attack in good order. The Chasseurs of the Guard and the regiment of Reval, kept prudently in reserve by General Barclay, suddenly charged the Swedes with the bayonet, and the safety of Kuopio was for the third time due to the valour of these regiments. About 1500 men altogether were killed.

Amongst other measures of safety formerly

adopted on the frontier of Russian Finland, there was a small fleet of gun-boats at Wilmanstrandt, securing the sovereignty of Nyslot, Carelia, and Kalevesi,—a chain of very extensive lakes, lying in a direction from south to north, and extending from the 61st to nearly the 64th parallel of latitude. They empty themselves into the Lake Sadoga and the Gulf of Finland by the rivers of Serdobal, of Voxa, and Kymen, all obstructed by cataracts. They bear different local denominations, and the greater part of them communicate with one another by straits, some of which are navigable; the others are separated by barren and rugged heaps of granite rocks. An idea occurred to the Russian staff of transporting the lightest of these gun-boats from Lake Sayma into Lake Kalavesi, the principal impediment being the getting them across a tongue of land several versts in length, and also through a difficult passage to the south of Wark-haus. Russian determination and patience over-came all natural obstacles, and on the $\frac{\text{23d June}}{\text{5th July}}$, seven gun-boats, sometimes for a short time launched on the lakes, at others again carried on dry land by men, or dragged by horses, at last reached the Kalavesi and floated on its waters. The numbers of this real freshwater navy were gradually augmented, until the port of Kuopio

ceased to be exposed to the audacious attacks of Sandels, and its possession was finally secured to Russia, by two batteries posted on the shores of the lake.

We left General Raievsky at the moment when his lieutenants had been successfully engaged at Vasa and Ny-Carleby, but day by day his situation now became more perilous and annoying. The breaking up of the ice in the Gulf of Bothnia, had obliged him to weaken still more his little army by posts of surveillance, which were quite indispensable along a coast-line accessible from every point; and for that purpose Count Orloff-Denisoff, with his Cossacks of the Imperial Guard, and some infantry, had been posted in the environs of Kasko and Christinestadt; when suddenly an insurrection, fomented by secret emissaries, burst forth at once to the south and the north of these two cities. The communication Orloff-Denisoff kept up with Vasa was first intercepted, and shortly afterwards his Cossacks, failing on this occasion in the watchfulness that usually distinguished them, allowed themselves to be surprised by the insurgent peasantry, and seventy men of this picked corps were taken or massacred in their quarters. Their chief, after having rallied his people, avenged them upon those instigators of the revolt who fell into his hands,

and resolved to concentrate his troops at Lappfierdt, where he was joined by some companies formerly in garrison at Bjorneborg, and these troops became the nucleus of a small body which acted apart from the rest, during the remainder of the campaign. Count Bouxhoevden urged him to maintain his position upon the coast, so as to cover the province of Abo on the north, and to protect the road leading from Vasa towards Tammerfors and Southern Finland, by means of a post at Kauhajocki; and indeed it was of the utmost importance, for Tammerfors and Tavastheus were at that time the principal dépôts of provisions for the Russian army in Finland. From the time of the insurrection of the Swedish colonies, composing the population of all the coast to the south of Vasa, that town had ceased to be a *point d'appui* for General Raievsky's left. He was menaced in front by the force of Klingsporr, already far superior to his own; put to extreme inconvenience in the matter of provisions; and when at last disappointed in the hope he had entertained of the powerful co-operation of General Barclay de Tolli, it was not surprising he should feel extreme anxiety for the security of the point of Lappo which protected his principal communications; especially as everything denoted a determination on the part of

the Swedish general to continue to act vigorously on the offensive, instead of proceeding in the slow and cautious manner he had done until then.

Klingsporr detached reinforcements to General Sandels, and on the $\frac{16}{28}$th of June he pushed on an advanced guard as far as Neder Harma, having posted his brigades at Gamle-Carleby, Jacobstadt, Jutas, Aravaïs, and Ysterby. Fiandt, with his flying corps, formed the extreme left at Lindulax.

Raievsky then resolved to concentrate the main body of his troops upon Kuortane, in order to protect Central Finland: accordingly he detached, under Major-general Kniper, some more companies to reinforce Count Orloff-Denisoff, and caused Vasa to be evacuated on the $\frac{\text{19th June}}{\text{1st July}}$, allowing his advanced guard to remain at Lappo, while the main body took up its position at Salmi, two short marches farther south. At the same time, and with the view of opening the way for the troops that had been detached from Rautalamby towards Lindulax, by General Barclay, Colonel Koulneff was despatched in that direction with a regiment and two squadrons of cavalry, not being aware at the time that a fortunate event had just occurred, rendering this precaution superfluous. Colonel Vlastoff, after having completed his difficult passage of the lakes, arrived on the $\frac{\text{19th June}}{\text{1st July}}$ from Saarjerfvi to Möt-

tönen, where he found there was still a bridge to be reconstructed; the next day he effected a passage in the face of the enemy, and came up with Fiandt, who had taken up a position covered with abattis, in a spot where the great roads of Gamle-Carleby and Vasa separate. The Swedish officer made a desperate resistance, and the nature of the ground, broken and thickly wooded, prevented any but a straggling encounter; the firing continued briskly for some hours, and Fiandt appeared to have gained some advantage, when at last he ventured into a small plain; the Dragoons of Finland, under Major Prittwitz, seized the opportunity for a successful charge. Vlastoff supported his cavalry with a reserve of the regiments of Azoff, and as on former occasions the bayonet decided the day, putting the troops of Fiandt to the rout: they almost all fled in complete disorder towards Perho, to which place their commander retired with those of the fugitives he had been able to collect in the woods, and a portion of his corps who had been driven back in the direction of Vasa. Though victorious, Colonel Vlastoff had lost 250 men in this encounter, and shortly afterwards placed his troops in immediate connexion with General Raievsky's right.

On the $\frac{\text{21st June}}{\text{3rd July}}$ the construction of the bridge of Ny-Carleby was completed, and Klingsporr had

despatched an advanced guard to Vörö: he caused all his army to cross the river in the direction of Lappo, and lost no time in reinforcing Fiandt as soon as he heard of the check he had received at Lindulax.

Colonel Fiandt was again attacked at Perho on the $\frac{\text{29th June}}{\text{11th July}}$, by the detachments of Vlastoff and Koulneff united, under the command of General Yankovitch, and after fighting for eight hours he was compelled to retreat towards Gamle-Carleby as far as Sarensilda; at the same time that General Raievsky, with a view of assisting the fortunate movement of his right, and also for the sake of concealing the inferiority of his numbers as long as possible, returned to Lappo, where he dislodged two battalions of Chasseurs of Carelia, who were there unsupported.

This *coup-de-main* succeeded beyond his hopes, and had the troops been able to engage in pursuit, the enemy's battalions might have been entirely destroyed, or at least dispersed; but the Russians were completely overpowered and paralysed by the intense heat, which they felt the more from its contrast with the excessive cold of the winter.

General Raievsky wished to avoid any serious engagement at that time, and did not advance beyond Lappo; nevertheless this demonstration re-

tarded the occupation of Vasa. The Swedish generals imagined the voluntary abandonment of that post was a trap laid for them, and would not enter the place until the $\frac{25\text{th June}}{7\text{th July}}$; at last, however, Marshal Klingsporr made all his troops move towards Kauhava, forcing the advanced troops of the Russians to retreat from thence.

General Raievsky's corps had assumed a favourable position in front of Lappo. A Swedish advanced guard crossed the stream that flows at Kauhava, and advanced on them under the orders of Brigadier Aminoff, supported by two brigades of about 3500 men and 16 guns, under General Adlerkreutz, the attack being made upon broken ground, which obliged the Swedes to form a long line of riflemen in front. On approaching Lappo, Aminoff was able to discover the attitude of the Russians: a plain covered with growing corn extended beyond his front, some Chasseurs occupied the wooded heights in front and on the right; the troops were drawn up parallel with a small stream which flowed behind them; and some masked batteries covered the roads of Salmi, and the considerable village of Lappo.

The 2d and 3d Swedish brigades were ordered to attempt this position, under the orders of Colonel Döbeln. They attacked the batteries in front and

were repulsed with loss, when Döbeln, taking advantage of the windings of the road, brought forward some guns. A long engagement ensued, without any decided advantage on either side; and Adlerkreutz, to make an end of it, detached some battalions against the extreme left of the Russians, hoping to put them in confusion: but it was a movement that took some time to execute, and before it could produce any result, and in the hottest time of the action, the bridge near the village of Liutari, just behind the centre of the Russians, and on which they depended for their means of retreat, was suddenly set on fire by the insurgent inhabitants of the country; the fire soon communicated to the village, and but for a happy forethought of General Raievsky, the safety of the whole Russian corps would have been compromised by this unexpected event. He had fortunately the day before caused a morass behind his right to be sounded and examined; it had always hitherto been considered impracticable, but he had ascertained that it was so dried up in consequence of the excessive heat that it could, if necessary, bear the weight of his men, and so furnish them with a means of retreat. By his order his whole line faced about, the manœuvre being executed with as much regularity as if they had been upon parade, and the

burning village covered his retreat, which was effected without any great loss; the Russian artillery crossed the morass upon a road made of fascines they had taken the precaution of providing themselves with, and was successively followed by the rest of the troops. They were pursued by the Swedes until they reached the defile of Tistenjocki, and the close of the day obliged them to stop; but both parties had to lament the loss of several officers of distinction,* and 500 men were killed: the armies appeared as if they were being gradually consumed in small parties.

General Raievsky returned to his former position at Salmi, two short marches from the scene of the battle he had just lost; he was in hopes of being able to remain there, and by means of Lindulax, whither he caused the detachments of Yankovitch to retreat, of being able to maintain the connexion he had lately established with the corps of General Barclay: but having been warned that Klingsporr was preparing to dislodge him, by acting upon his line of communications towards Alavo, through the cross-roads, he took the resolution of abandoning Yankovitch to himself for a short time on the road from Saarjerfvi to Kuopio,

* Among them were Messrs. de Blum, Gestrin, Ramsay, and Captain Aminoff, killed in the first attack of the Swedes.

and of continuing his own retrograde movement in the direction of Tavastheus; he reached Alavo on the $\frac{7}{19}$th of July.

On their side, the heads of the Swedish army, after the success they had gained at Lappo, thought it would be right for the present to confine themselves to retaining this central post, which, by enabling them to avail themselves of the cross-roads, facilitated the connexion between the different parts of their army, and the loss of which, by lengthening or breaking the line of communication of the Russian force, would deprive it of the power of acting together, without which a whole army is feeble. To attack it at that time would have been a certain triumph, but Klingsporr flattered himself he should receive some considerable reinforcements from Sweden; the recapture of Vasa would facilitate their arrival; and the King of Sweden continually promised and projected diversions in Southern Finland, giving Klingsporr reason to believe that he had reached the point when he might await the course of events: he therefore contented himself with driving back Vlastoff, who had succeeded General Yankovitch, upon Saarjerfvi, and with despatching various detachments in the directions of Lappfierdt, Bjorneborg, and Tammerfors. Whether he was influenced by the motive we have just attri-

buted to him, or that an excessive circumspection prevented him from risking the fate of Finland in a decisive action—whether the courageous appearance and the steady defensive measures of General Raievsky made him overestimate the strength of that officer —or whether, in fact, he was afraid of advancing farther into the interior of the country, with the corps of General Barclay de Tolli on his left at Kuopio, Marshal Klingsporr would not venture to attack the position just taken up by the Russians at Alavo. But, though unmolested by the Swedish commander, the very existence of this corps was nearly endangered by an enterprise of apparently very trifling importance, and from which no considerable results could have been anticipated, the individual who caused the danger being merely a non-commissioned officer. The circumstances were as follows. Root, a native of Finland, was a serjeant in a company of the regiment of Bjorneborg called the company of Ruovési, from the name of the manor-house of the place where it was habitually quartered, and he was despatched with a handful of determined men to harass and obstruct Raievsky's line of communication; they were only forty in number, but well acquainted with the localities, and were conducted by their intelligent leader along bye-paths and hidden roads from Lappo to Wirdois, a small town

situated at the northern extremity of a long chain of lakes, known by the name of Washivési and Ruovési, or lakes of Tammerfors. The Russians had a dépôt there of provisions and ammunition, constantly kept supplied by the boats employed in the internal navigation of the country. Root did not venture to expose himself to an encounter with 200 men, but he seized upon some boats, which took him and his party to Visuvési, where a large strait serves as a passage to the great road from Tammerfors to Vasa, burnt the bridge, and then proceeded as far as Ruovési, where he destroyed another no less considerable.* He then posted himself in a small island, collected all the boats and even the smallest skiffs he could find on the shores of the lake, and making frequent excursions, he carried off, or pillaged, a number of convoys of provisions, some on the lakes, some on the roads in their neighbourhood. These successes made Root more audacious day by day: he arranged ambuscades, surprised small posts, stopped couriers, reinforced his party with insurgent peasants, and above all with some of the soldiers formerly in garrison at Sweaborg, who had been disbanded and were living in their homes. In this manner he multiplied his attacks with admirable skill, until with constantly

* The bridge was 100 toises in length.

increasing boldness he at last determined to make an attempt upon the town of Tammerfors, on the $\frac{11th}{23d}$ July, and was repulsed, with difficulty, by two Russian companies, that were in garrison there, under Major Youdinieff of the regiment of Pétrovsk.

In the course of a few days he had contrived to place General Raievsky in a state of real inconvenience and distress, separating him completely from the rest of the force, and leaving him without couriers or orders from his superiors; without exact notions how matters were going on around him; and, above all, short of provisions.

Under these circumstances General Raievsky determined on holding a council of war, and making known his situation to his principal officers. It was held at Alavo, and was composed of Generals Demidoff, Yankovitch, and Kosatchkovsky, Colonels Ericson, Froloff, Stegmann, Tourtchaninoff, and Koulneff. General Raievsky's address deserves to be given at length, the more so as it draws a faithful picture of the existing state of things, and will assist in forming a more precise idea of the preceding events.

"Gentlemen,—Having called you together to hold a council of war, it is necessary before asking your opinion that I should make known to you the reasons which have induced me to resort to such a

measure, and also to inform you of the circumstances in which we are placed, as far as they are known to me.

" On the 2d of this month we were attacked by the enemy with a superior force, and the fire which broke out behind our line, and sound reason itself, compelled us to abandon our ground; thanks to your courage, and the excellent arrangements you made, we met with but little loss. You are not ignorant of the reasons which induced me to retreat to Alavo, and I am sure you will all bear witness, that I was induced to do so by prudence, not by fear of the enemy; and the necessity of the measure has been shown by the news we have just received of the destruction of the bridges on the road. I am now about to offer to your consideration the points on which I wish for your advice.

" Firstly,—The report I have received from Captain Laptieff will show you that the direct road to Tavastheus is intercepted, and that, even if it were possible for us to replace the bridges that have been destroyed, as our convoys have been stopped, we have not sufficient provisions remaining even to enable us to reach Tavastheus.

" Secondly,—Even should supplies have been sent us by water to Windors, conformably to the

orders of the Commander-in-chief, am I justified in supposing that the marauding parties who infest the lakes will permit them to reach us?

"Thirdly,—The last intelligence I have received from the Commander-in-chief is dated the 3d of this month. On that very day, after the battle of Lappo, I despatched a courier to his Excellency, containing a report of all that had happened, and requesting to be authorised to approach nearer to Tavastheus, as I considered the weakness of my army would prevent my being able to sustain an attack of the enemy, much less to act on the offensive, according to my former instructions. The time in which I expected an answer has elapsed, and I must suppose the courier has fallen into the enemy's hands, or that he has been obliged to turn back, not having been able to pursue his journey, as the bridges no longer exist. To wait any longer at Alavo would expose us to the necessity of consuming the slender stock of provisions still remaining, and which might be sufficient for us until we could reach the nearest magazines at Ivaskyla.

"Fourthly,—If I could be certain of receiving supplies, I should then feel no doubt that my presence here would prevent the enemy from bringing the whole of his troops to bear upon Tammerfors, while my being obliged to retreat will

give him the power of spreading over the country, and of more and more augmenting his force.

"Fifthly,—By remaining here we deprive Tavastheus and Tammerfors of a powerful support. It is possible that the enemy, leaving but a small force at Lappo, may secretly make a serious attack on Tammerfors. You are as well aware as I am how impossible it is for us to obtain exact accounts, and how little we can venture to despise those brought us by the inhabitants. Be so good, gentlemen, as to weigh maturely what I have said, and let each of you faithfully let me know his opinion thereon."

The protocol of this meeting offers no diversity of opinion. The corps of Raievsky hardly consisted of 3000 men capable of bearing arms, and while they were still in deliberation they heard of the destruction of another convoy by the enemy at Kurn, and the loss of two more taken on the Ruovési. The destitution of the soldiers caused a relaxation of discipline, by disposing them to form marauding parties; and all these considerations together determined them to retreat upon Tavastheus.

Count Bouxhoevden had just then considered it necessary all the troops acting in the North-west and Central Finland should be placed under a

single commander, and as it was impossible he should himself be so far removed from his head-quarters at Abo, which, as we shall soon see, were incessantly exposed to danger, his choice fell upon General Kamensky, who had obtained a well-merited reputation by several brilliant exploits during the campaigns of 1806, and 1807, in Prussia. He gave up the command he had held until then, and with some difficulty succeeded in rejoining General Raievsky's corps on the $\frac{12}{24}$th of July. But before giving an account of his operations, and of the means which were placed at his disposal, it will be necessary to carry back our attention to the south-easterly point of the seat of war.

We have said that Count Orloff-Denisoff, after having overcome the insurrection for the moment, had taken up his position at Lappfierdt, and that he sent smaller detachments to occupy the cities of Christinestadt and Kaskö on the coast, and Kauhajocki, at the distance of three marches on his right.

His activity and vigilance were severely tried on all these points. On the $\frac{18}{30}$th of June a squadron of the enemy's galleys came to lie in ambush in the isles near Kaskö, and by continual little attacks spread alarm all along the coast. On the $\frac{\text{23d June}}{\text{5th July}}$

several large vessels from the .Swedish ports of Sundsval, Hernösand, and Gefle, carrying some troops, took the town of Christinestadt during the night. Orloff-Denisoff was so fortunate as to force the enemy to return to their ships, but a few days afterwards he learnt that a large body of insurgents, armed and led by M. Riddarhjerta, a Swedish officer, had broken the bridge on the Finnström, near Nerpes, to prevent the excursions of the Cossacks towards the north. He hastened thither, and dispersed the insurgents; but he had hardly done with them when he received intelligence that another and more dangerous attack had been made on Christinestadt by a detachment of nine sail of Admiral Helmstjerna's flotilla, under the command of Major Martin, who had already occupied the town, and was keeping possession of it under the protection of the heavy artillery of his gunboats, rendering any attack on the part of Count Orloff too hazardous to be attempted: all he could do was to endeavour by a feigned retreat to draw the enemy further on land. His stratagem was successful, and the Swedes being unexpectedly attacked, were obliged to take refuge in their boats with the loss of 100 prisoners and seven small guns mounted upon two-wheeled carts,—a kind of artillery found very useful by the Swedes in the course of

this war. The loss of the Russians in these various encounters amounted to several hundred men.

About this time a Swedish advanced guard resumed the occupation of Vasa, and not only detached troops to the support of the insurgents, but furnished them with four guns, which were immediately posted at the entrance of the bridge of the Finnström. Orloff-Denisoff thought it necessary to dislodge these dangerous and too vigilant neighbours, and attacked them suddenly on the $\frac{8}{20}$th of July, obliging them to retreat with a loss of almost 200 men in the direction of Vasa and Kaskö, and retaking the latter town. The greater part of the fugitives were received on board two Swedish corvettes. Count Orloff returned to his former position of Lappfierdt, sending reinforcements to the post of Kauhajocki, then held with two battalions by Major Yagodine; but in spite of the additional troops he was driven out of that place a few days later, and compelled to retire upon Lappfierdt. This attack was made by a detachment of Klingsporr's army, at the same time with an attack by another detachment against Pielax and Tjöck on the coast-road. The engagement on that point continued until the next day, and the enemy taking advantage of the diversion thus afforded, succeeded in again effecting a landing at Christinestadt, and

driving off a post of cavalry: the Swedish troops made themselves masters of the town for the third time; and for the third time also they were driven out by Major d'Essen, with a part of the 2d regiment of Chasseurs and the Cossacks of Kisséleff. Major Sjömann, chief of the Swedish squadron, was taken prisoner.

In the meanwhile Orloff-Denisoff had proceeded to the assistance of Yagodine, towards Kauhajocki, and met the enemy pursuing that officer near the village of Manilla, halfway between Lappfierdt and Kauhajocki. By means of a night attack he restored affairs to their former state, thus compelling Colonel Von Otter to abandon the posts he had lately seized. It was, however, but for a few days; the Swedish colonel was reinforced by General Döbeln on the $\frac{\text{21st July}}{\text{2d Aug.}}$, and again made himself master of Kauhajocki.

Count Orloff-Denisoff's health had been so much affected by the excessive fatigue he had undergone in this campaign, where it must be acknowledged he had distinguished himself in the most brilliant manner, that at his own request he was succeeded by General Chepeleff.

CHAPTER VI.

The Russian navy took advantage of the very first opening of the navigation to effect a diversion in favour of the army of Finland. A squadron, under the orders of Admiral Bodisco, with about 2000 troops of the line on board, anchored, on the $\frac{10th}{22d}$ of April, at the island of Gothland; the troops were immediately landed, and Wisby, the capital of that important island, was occupied by the Russians. It was intended reinforcements should be sent to enable them to retain possession of the town; but this was prevented by the active measures taken by the enemy, who despatched a fleet from the port of Carlscrona, where it had been fitted for sea, and had taken on board four battalions and some artillery; and the Swedish admiral, Baron de Cederstrom, proceeded as quickly as possible to the island of Gothland, and landed his troops in the neighbourhood of Sandvick. After

some days had been spent in hostilities and negociations, the commander of the Russian squadron was induced to accept the terms of the Swedish admiral, who offered him a free retreat, and imposed no conditions, except that his troops should not bear arms against Sweden for the space of a year. Accordingly, on the $\frac{6}{18}$th of May, the Russians re-embarked, and returned to their country; affording, by the failure of this expedition, another signal proof that naval officers do not make good generals, or conduct military operations with skill, under circumstances foreign to their habits and experience, however distinguished they may be on the element to which they are accustomed. Had this expedition been conducted with more judgment, it would no doubt have exercised considerable influence on the course of the subsequent events. However, under all circumstances, the distance of Gothland would make its occupation of far less importance to the affairs of Finland than a similar expedition for the purpose of recapturing the islands of Aland. The manner in which the Swedes succeeded in regaining possession of this archipelago from the Russians, and the advantages they hoped to derive from them, have been already detailed in the preceding chapter; it is, therefore, unnecessary to recur to them here.

chosen for the purpose, as all the reinforcements for the Russian flotilla were obliged to double this salient point: but it had the inconvenience for the Swedes, that the coast was so rocky and dangerous, the least rising of the wind made it requisite the ships should stand out to sea. Nauckhoff very soon found it would be necessary to fall upon another plan; and, therefore, left some frigates and other light vessels at anchor in a channel named the Jungfrusund, at the southern point of the coast-islands of Kimito and Dragsfierdt, and posted batteries on the nearest reefs.

Just then Admiral Helmstjerna and General Vegesack received positive orders from the King of Sweden to retake the town of Abo; and Lieutenant Miakinine having gone there to revictual the division of the flotilla under his orders, the enemy thought the opportunity propitious, and contrived, unperceived, to reach the point of the main land that juts into the sea a short march to the south of Abo, and near the village of Lemo. At the same time, a smaller detachment in row-boats was directed on Ingo, and alarmed the coast-posts of General Toutchkoff (3d). Vegesack landed on the $\frac{7}{19}$th June with about 2000 men, rapidly threw up at Lemo an epaulment to cover his return, and without loss of time pushed along the great road which

goes from Helsingfors to Abo. Colonel Vatkovsky, the head of the regiment of Libau, was detached to oppose the Swedish general, and obliged him to slacken the rapidity of his march.

A warm engagement took place at the village of Ytter Lemo, and this gave time to Lieutenant-general Baggohufvud, holding temporarily the command of Prince Bagration's division, to bring forward two more regiments and some squadrons of dragoons to the scene of action. For eighteen consecutive hours both parties fought with the most determined courage, and the carnage was terrible; the nature of the ground, covered with almost inaccessible rocks and a thick forest, rendering it impossible the troops should engage otherwise than in a straggling and irregular manner. At last a fortunate accident decided the victory in favour of the Russians: their generals, Baggohufvud, Toutchkoff (1st),* and Borozdin, and Colonels Vatkovsky and Tchoglokoff, rushed upon the enemy at the head of their men, and the Swedes were driven back to their epaulment, and regained the ships under the protection of their guns. The loss was about equal on both sides, and amounted to 500 men; it was a sixth of the number engaged.

* General Toutchkoff was present at the battle as a volunteer.

Amongst the killed were several Russian officers, and Colonel Ramsay of the Swedish army.

The Swedes had reckoned on the co-operation of the peasants, usually collected in great numbers just at that season at Abo, on account of the great annual fair; and with such assistance their enterprise would probably have been attended with different results: but Count Bouxhoevden had happily foreseen the danger that might accrue from so large an assemblage, and the fair had been adjourned. It was this circumstance alone that saved the Russian head-quarters, for only a few companies could be left to protect them. Count Bouxhoevden did not leave the town until the arrival of some more troops from the neighbouring cantonments; but he succeeded in reaching the field of battle in time to be present at the happy termination of the engagement, and to be a witness of some of the heroic exploits of the day. The Russian flotilla had made every exertion to reach the landing-place; but it was necessary to go so far round, in order to double several islands, that it did not arrive until after the action was over. The Swedes returned without accident to the stations of Nagu and Korpo.

It was just at this time the King of Sweden became at last convinced of the difficulty he would

find in invading Zealand, and of the insufficiency of his means to carry out his ill-concocted plan against the capital of Denmark. The English general, Sir John Moore,* had returned to England with the auxiliary force under his command after a warm altercation with the King; and from that time forth Gustavus determined to direct in person the operations against Finland: he accordingly repaired to his flotilla, then at anchor near the island of Korpo.

Several persons of distinction accompanied the Swedish monarch; amongst others was Vice-admiral Rayalin, who, under his direction, wrote several most captious and annoying letters to Count Bouxhoevden, until the latter, after a reply full of dignity, declined continuing a correspondence he considered, with reason, so ill-judged and improper.

* Various works, published in Sweden after the revolution of 1809, give some curious details concerning these transactions; but the party-spirit that pervades the greater part of them will not allow of our trusting implicitly to their veracity, the more so as the marked repugnance of the English to take any part in the distant expedition to Finland, and their no less strong objections to an attack on Norway or Zealand, may have probably been in some measure owing to the great demand at that time for troops in Spain. Sir John Moore was not inclined to undertake anything beyond the defence of Sweden. The King was desirous of employing him in conquest.—*Author's Note.*

The King was convinced the setting up of his standard would be immediately followed by a general insurrection in his favour; and he commanded Admiral Helmstjerna to advance towards the coast of Finland. An attempt was made to carry away some vessels from the port of Nystadt, and that small town narrowly escaped destruction from the cannonade that ensued. Nadenstadt and other places on the coast north of Abo were harassed with frequent alarms; and the Swedish boats kept the Russian troops in a continual and most fatiguing state of excitement, by carrying off picquets, forming marauding parties, &c.: in one of these skirmishes they carried off a gun.

Although the recent success at Lemo had preserved Abo for the time, yet the situation of the Russian head-quarters was far from being secure, for the whole of the troops at the disposal of Count Bouxhoevden in that direction hardly amounted to 5000 men; and the detachments necessary to keep guard over the coasts and the nearest islands, and also over some of the parishes that appeared ill-disposed towards Russia, absorbed nearly half of them. Count Bouxhoevden had earnestly solicited a reinforcement; and at last he obtained permission to recall the troops employed on the southern coast as far as the Kymen, and to concentrate them

on the points he considered the most exposed to danger; and a body of fresh troops, under Count Wittgerstein, was promised, to occupy the posts whence the others were withdrawn. It was evident the present juncture was favourable to Sweden; and it cannot be doubted that, had *one* vigorous effort been then made by the Swedes coinciding with the successes of Klingsporr, a most disastrous turn might have been given to the affairs of Russia; but—

> "There is a tide in the affairs of men,
> Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune:
> * * * *
> And we must take the current when it serves,
> *Or lose our ventures.*"

The King allowed the favourable moment to pass—never to return. During two months he did little else than go through the form of daily landing troops on one spot or another, in a manner that could not possibly serve any good purpose; and the inhabitants of the country were too prudent to allow themselves to be drawn into an insurrection, involving much danger to themselves, unless attended with far better hopes of success than were then apparent.

His Majesty was present at an encounter be-

tween the flotillas of Admirals Helmstjerna and Lieutenant Miakinine, first on the $\frac{20\text{th June}}{2\text{d July}}$, near the island of Krampo, and two days afterwards in the Sound of Bockholm, near Abo. The Swedish fleet consisted of 130 vessels, and the Russians of 32; but this inferiority in number was fully compensated by some batteries having been posted on the surrounding islands, and also by General Konovnitzine having stationed a number of riflemen upon the heights commanding the scene of action, a channel of no great extent. A breeze, to the disadvantage of the Swedes, sprung up just in the hottest time of the engagement; and, in spite of the strenuous efforts of Admiral Helmstjerna to break the Russian line, victory was undecided. The Swedish flotilla returned to Lappialo, having sustained considerable damage; while, on the side of the Russians, Miakinine was wounded, and his division, being quite incapable of pursuing the enemy, it returned to refit, under the batteries posted by General Suchtelen to command the approach to Abo. Captain Selivanoff took the command of the Russian gun-boats.

This action did honour to the flags of both nations. The Swedes called it by the qualified term of *demonstration*, and, in fact, the transport-

ships and the land force accompanying the flotilla, were too inconsiderable in number to produce any serious results.

Shortly after this affair the king went to the Jungfrusund to inspect the second squadron of his flotilla, and afterwards returned to the great island of Aland, to hurry by his presence further preparations that were going on. His last voyage performed in his yacht, the Amadis, was a continued series of adventures. He encountered a violent storm, and was obliged to remain some time in a small harbour of refuge called Huso-hamn, formed by rugged and uninhabitable rocks; for a considerable time he lay there weather-bound, and when he at last succeeded in getting out, his yacht struck upon some rocks, and he was exposed to imminent danger. At last he again reached Aland, and fixed his head-quarters at the village of Grelsby, where he remained until the following September.

The coasting navy of the Swedes was then stationed as follows:—At Aland there was a frigate and two galleys; at Pargas and Sando, near Jungfrusund, 6 galleys, 2 yachts, and 48 sloops; at Kakskar, an advanced guard of 7 sloops; at the Jungfrusund, a reserve consisting of a frigate, 4 galleys, and 22 sloops; at Hangö-udd, 2 cutters; and 44 armed boats, 7 cutters, and 142 transports,

without any fixed port, but employed in cruising about, or in any other duty for which they might be required. They numbered in all, 288 vessels.

On the Russian side, the 3d, 4th, and 5th divisions of the flotilla had successively quitted Sweaborg, and made their way among the small islands towards the Gulf of Bothnia. Their collective force amounted to a brig, a yacht, 2 hemmans,* 15 sloops, 58 yawls, and a proportionate number of vessels for the transport of provisions and ammunition. Four battalions of infantry, under General Monkhanoff, were embarked on board these vessels; their naval commander was Count de Heyden, a Dutchman in the service of Russia.

The importance of the Jungfrusund has already been noticed; the Swedish admirals had done their utmost to fortify the passage, and the Russians had made many fruitless attempts, either to force their way through or to set fire to the enemy's ships; at last they discovered that a narrow sound, separating the island of Kimito from the mainland, and which had hitherto been considered impracticable, might be cleared out so as to allow of a passage to those of the Russian ships which drew the least water. The engineers were immediately set to work; it was a very laborious undertaking, and re-

* A kind of large galley in use in the Baltic.—*Ed.*

quired great perseverance to overcome all the obstacles to be met with, but it was well worth all the trouble bestowed upon it, and was crowned with perfect success. The Swedes soon perceived what the Russians were doing, and determined to use their utmost endeavours to prevent their getting through the passage. Messrs. Jönsson and Sölfvenarm, with two divisions of the vessels under their command, anchored in a small opening of the channel of Relaks called Tavastenskär; but while they were assiduously engaged in striving to fill it up, or at least render it impracticable, Count Heyden forced his way through in row-boats during the night, from the $\frac{8}{20}$th to the $\frac{9\text{th}}{21\text{st}}$ of July, and a sharp engagement ensued. The Russians, supported by the troops, and by the guns posted on the shore by General Toutchkoff, drove back their enemies, but they had soon to encounter them again in a new position between the islands of Holmo and Grano, near Sagu-Sandö: Helmstjerna speedily reinforced this advanced guard with the greater portion of the squadron of the Jungfrusund. Count Heyden had been wounded, and was succeeded in the command by Captain Dodt, who was resolved to strain every nerve to accomplish an enterprise so well conceived, and hitherto so well carried out by his predecessor. Several masked

batteries had been posted on the shore to aid the success of the Russians, and Count Bouxhoevden with his staff repaired to Kimito to witness the combat. Both sides were so well prepared for the attack, that it was entirely owing to chance the Russians took the initiative. The victory was long and obstinately disputed, and the vessels on both sides manœuvred with sail and with oar as troops might do on a field of battle; until the Russians, supported by a party of gun-boats carefully reserved for that purpose, compelled the right of the Swedish squadron under Colonel Jönsson to give way, and even succeeded in taking in the rear a battery posted upon the rocks of Röfvaren in the centre of the enemy's line, and of which it formed the principal strength. The Russian flag was hoisted there by Captain Skerletoff of the regiment of Minsk; the island of Sandö was attacked at the same moment,—the passage was narrow, and the Russians hurried across, some in boats, whilst others, unable to wait for their turn, threw themselves into the water and swam to land. All the fire of the Swedish line was unable to contend with that from the guns posted on the beach under the direction of the artillery officers, Sorger and Demidoff, and with the simultaneous attack of the whole flotilla in three columns led by Dodt.

Still the Swedes held out until Colonel Jönsson received a mortal wound, and they decided on retreating after burning the abattis which had protected them on the island of Sandö. The action had lasted four hours and victory remained with the Russians, to whom thenceforth the Gulf of Bothnia was open. Admiral Helmstjerna made a fruitless attempt to renew the combat, but finding it impossible he retreated during the following night to Korpolandet, unpursued by the Russians, who had so completely exhausted all their ammunition they were not in a condition to follow him.

Count Bouxhoevden had stationed himself upon a rock during the battle, and from thence had directed the general plan of the engagement, at once naval and military; but now everything appeared at an end, and he returned to Westenskär, a country house, where he had fixed his head-quarters for the time being. He was just going to sit down to table, when he accidentally cast his eyes over the landscape, and observed several considerable groups of Swedish infantry actually within musket-shot,—in fact, his house was already almost surrounded by them. He ordered Count Anselme de Gibory to oppose all the resistance he possibly could with the feeble guard under his command, and was

constrained to fly, and seek for safety on board the victorious fleet.

The sudden apparition of these troops was owing to an act of flattery; a vice often productive of as much mischief in camps as in courts. On the departure of the Commander-in-chief for Kimito, an officer on the staff thought it would be proper he should be accompanied by a guard of honour, not for safety, for it was hardly possible there could be any danger on the road between Kimito and Abo, but as a mark of respect; he accordingly for that purpose, and without the knowledge of the generals, withdrew several parties of the Cossacks posted on the beach, leaving it for a considerable distance undefended. Colonel Palen had been detached from Jungfrusund by the Swedish Admiral, with orders to proceed to the island of Kimito and endeavour to effect a descent behind the Russian batteries, and the ill-judged withdrawal of the Russian troops allowed him to land about 1100 men without opposition, and to advance unperceived with them nearly as far as Westanskär. He heard on the road of the loss of the battle of Sandö, as well as of the unprotected state in which the Russian head-quarters had been left, and he was suddenly fired with the idea of seizing the persons of the generals,—a task of apparently but

little difficulty, and by so brilliant a *coup-de-main* repairing the reverses sustained by the fleet. But he hesitated for a moment, and in that moment the glorious opportunity was lost. Instead of a sudden and vigorous charge, so as to overpower the Russians almost before they were aware of their danger, he lost time in drawing up his troops and preparing for a regular attack, and the soldiers who had just fought and conquered at Sandö had time to arrive. Colonel Gibory had at first been driven from Westenskär, though not without exciting the astonishment of the Swedes by his desperate and unexpected resistance; but in the meanwhile Count Bouxhoevden's aide-de-camp, Captain Neidhardt, had hastened for assistance, and returned accompanied by Count Ivélitch with two companies. Generals Konovnitzine and Toutchkoff arrived shortly after and placed themselves at the head of the troops, and in less than an hour they were able to turn the tables upon Palen. He was compelled to retreat to his ships with the loss of more than 400 men, the greater part being militia from Stockholm and recruits from Pomerania.

In this double battle the Russians took two stand of colours, ten guns, and several hundred prisoners; the killed and wounded on both sides amounted to above 1500 men, and the fleets had

both sustained so much damage, that it was some time before they were again in a condition to act against each other.

As the reader is probably but little acquainted with the localities and the particular kind of warfare we are describing, we may be permitted to devote a few words to the history of the new arm so often mentioned in these pages, belonging exclusively neither to the land nor to the sea, and combining both services.

The coasts of Sweden and Finland are very peculiar, being surrounded by a perfect dædalus of rocks, shoals, and islands of all dimensions, very unfavourable for the navigation of large vessels, but perfectly well suited for those of a small size, and after the ravages committed by the Russians on the coast of Sweden during the former wars, when their galleys, under the command of Count Apraxin, in 1719, actually appeared under the walls of Stockholm, the necessity became apparent of forming a navy suited to the defence of the coasts. The idea originated with Marshal Ehrenswärdt, a man of great genius, and his plans were worked out by Chapmann, who devoted to the subject all the force of his talents as a shipbuilder and naval engineer. Great opposition was made, and the subject long debated in the Diet, but at last the flotilla was

decided upon, and in 1760 the first was organised, differing but little from what it is at present.* Marshal Ehrenswärdt gave it the name of Fleet of the Army (*armeens-flotta*), probably in order to mark the difference existing between it and the navy, properly so called. As early as 1762 it was successfully employed on the Frisch-Haf, and the Russians found it necessary to adopt similar vessels instead of the heavy galleys before in use. From that time forward the flotilla became an integral part of the military condition of both nations.

Without incurring the reproach of partiality, a Russian may be permitted to offer a tribute of praise to the conduct of his countrymen at the battle of Sandö. It appears the more merited from the circumstance, that their inferiority was not only in numbers, but also in the imperfect construction of many of their vessels, hurriedly put together at Cronstadt; neither were these disadvantages redeemed by the experience of the crews, most of whom were recruits little accustomed to naval exercise, while of the Swedes, on the contrary, most were familiar with the sea, and many were experienced seamen, natives of their islands.

It did not, however, appear as if the great Rus-

* This was written in 1827.—*Ed.*

sian fleet were destined to contribute as much to the glory of its flag as the flotilla. A squadron of nine vessels, nine frigates, and several smaller vessels, had gone out of Cronstadt during the first fortnight of July, under the command of Admiral Kahnicoff, and on the $\frac{25\text{th July}}{6\text{th August}}$ it anchored at the cape of Hangö-udd. Several Swedish frigates were at that time separated from the fleet of Nauckhoff at the Jungfrusund, and Kahnicoff, encouraged by some prizes made by his cruisers, formed a project of overwhelming by numbers this Swedish force. The wind favoured the design,—but whether from irresolution, or from one of the many causes which interfere with the intentions of a seaman, he put off the enterprise for some days; the enemy was warned of the danger, and the opportunity was lost. Very soon afterwards the whole Swedish fleet, consisting of ten ships of the line and six frigates, was joined by Admiral Hood with two ships of the line, and came to offer battle to the Russian Admiral. His fleet only carried 990 guns, while the Anglo-Swedish carried 1102. Kahnicoff, whose crews were little experienced, considered it prudent to avoid an unequal struggle; besides which his instructions forbad his doing so: he wished to retreat, and crowded all sail to reach Baltisch Port in Esthonia. The enemy gave chase, and he found

himself compelled to sacrifice one of his vessels, the Vsevolod, which was a bad sailer. Although heroically defended by Captain Roudneff against the two English line-of-battle ships, she was boarded and taken, but the vessel was so much damaged that Admiral Hood could not carry her away, and consequently set her on fire. The Anglo-Swedish fleet, of which Sir J. De Saumarez took the command, established a blockade before Baltisch Port, and kept the Russian squadron shut up there under the protection of some coast-batteries until the autumn. A violent storm having then obliged the enemy's squadron to go to a distance from the shore, the Russian fleet was enabled to return and winter at Cronstadt.

Although the army of Finland was thus deprived of the powerful support of a naval force, there was one great advantage in the retreat of Kahnicoff to Baltisch Port; which was, that the enemy's ships almost entirely abandoned the open sea for the purpose of watching the blockaded squadron, and that during the rest of the season the Gulf of Finland was but little exposed, rendering the victualling of the army a matter of much less difficulty.

The order of events ought now to take us back towards the north, but in order to avoid such frequent interruptions, we will continue the account

of the operations which took place in southern Finland until the termination of the summer campaign.

After the Swedish flotilla had retreated to the island of Korpo after the battle of Sandö, a portion of that of the Russians proceeded to the north under the orders of Captain Selivanoff, with the intention of covering the coast between Abo and Bjorneborg, an undertaking attended with but little success. The remainder of the fleet, commanded by Admiral Messoiedoff, was employed according as circumstances rendered it necessary at the time, a portion in cruising about, and others in watching the south-westerly angle of the coast of Finland; and in the course of the season it had many encounters with the enemy's navy in that labyrinth of islands. In one of these combats on the $\frac{7}{19}$th of August, Captain Novochecoff at last succeeded in entirely dislodging the Swedes from the Jungfrusund. A large hemman* of the Russian flotilla was taken and retaken by a boarding party: the division of the Swedish flotilla which had guarded the strait, retreated to rejoin a squadron of the great fleet at Orö: and another battle, the most desperate during the whole campaign, took place near the island of Palva on the $\frac{6}{18}$th of September; it terminated in favour of the Russians.

* The Styrbjörn, captured at Sweaborg.

At last, in the beginning of September, Gustavus Adolphus imagined himself sufficiently strong to undertake a powerful diversion in Finland. Two brigades, under Generals Otto Cronstedt and Skioldebrandt, were to be embarked at the port of Gefle in Sweden, with orders to sail with a fair wind towards the southern part of Aland, where certain cruisers would point out to them the places, which his Majesty had judged the best situated for landing another division, which was to start at the same time from the great island of Aland. This last was intrusted to Generals Boye and Lantinghausen; and it was intended that under the convoy of Admiral Helmstjerna it should first occupy the island of Tefsala to the north of Abo, and then reconnoitre the coast, and receive further instructions. The troops destined for this double expedition were of the *élite* of the army and the king's guards; his Majesty went himself to Tefsala.

On the $\frac{4}{16}$th September General Lantinghausen made a forced reconnaissance at Katersund and Helsing, two Russian posts on the coast; he even pushed on as far as Winkala and Lokalaks. An injudicious and misplaced courage had induced some officers to try to defend these posts, which were solely intended for the purpose of observation, and a loss of life ensued, for which they would

have been more deserving of blame, if the necessity of multiplying these little posts, in a country like Finland, did not render it at times impossible to avoid fighting, and when a point of honour excited each officer, who was left to himself, to endeavour to maintain the post intrusted to him, without being able to judge of its relative importance. The staff was too well aware that the principles of the art of war do not consist simply in guarding roads, coasts, and villages, to deserve in general the reproach of not making the most of their forces. They were, in fact, usually disproportionate to the theatre of war, and to the singular conformation of a country which may be said to have been tormented by nature in the most whimsical manner.

Lantinghausen gained his object, he remained two days on the mainland, came to an understanding with some of the people, and obtained all the information he required concerning the Russian force. Prince Bagration had just resumed the command; he arrived in haste at the head of a central detachment stationed at Wemo to the north of Abo, and despatched General Tchoglokoff with some battalions to the great peninsula of Lokalaks, where Lantinghausen appeared inclined to stand his ground, but the village where he intended to defend himself was taken, and he himself met

with considerable loss before he was able to return to his ships.

A few days later positive orders arrived from the king, that the forces of Generals Boye and Lantinghausen should be united for a fresh expedition; and, accordingly, on the $\frac{14}{26}$th of September, they landed on the coast of Finland, in the neighbourhood of Helsing, with 4 or 5000 men, and took up their position at Wartsary, and Jarvenpae, from whence they had again, and without difficulty, dislodged the Russian posts.

Prince Bagration had not an equivalent force to oppose to them immediately; he therefore directed General Baggohufvud to draw the enemy into a narrow and fortified position near Himois, and to keep his ground there, until the arrival of the reinforcements he would despatch to that point, about 78 versts from Abo.* These orders were followed out to the very letter on the $\frac{15}{27}$th of September.

By this time Prince Bagration had become convinced that the expedition of General Boye was

* General Suchtelen had taken care to fortify several posts near Abo, so that the approach of the capital, where a reserve was concentrated, was rendered impossible to the enemy unless they had previously carried one or more of the posts in advance of it.

not merely one of the idle and unmeaning enterprises, so frequently undertaken by the Swedish troops, and hastened in person to Himois. He found the Swedes posted, not far from the farm of Wiais, near a thick forest, having a gulf on the right and a lake on the left; the principal corps was placed in the centre, and everything announced the intention of continuing the aggressive system they had commenced. The King was in camp, and Prince Bagration had reason to suppose a very large force to be at his disposal; he did not venture to await its arrival, but considering it necessary to prevent the further advance of the Swedes, he resolved to run all risks and give them battle, and not only this, but with the sudden determination by which he was characterised, he resolved to forestall an attack by falling himself upon the enemy. He divided his small force into three columns; the right under General Borozdin advanced along the lake to attack the enemy's left at the moment when four Swedish battalions, commanded by Colonel Lagerbring, had just begun to move with the intention of harassing the Russians. After an engagement which, lasted four hours, Borozdin succeeded in compelling his adversaries to retreat beyond Jarvenpae. He himself took possession of the village, and was soon after joined there by a

detachment of dragoons who had made a long détour to avoid the Swedes.

The centre under General Baggohufvud came as opportunely on the principal column of the Swedes, crowded together on the great road, and prevented them from forming. The Russian artillery threw them into disorder, and a prolonged cannonade followed, in which the Russian artillery proved itself very superior to the Swedish. In the meanwhile the Russian riflemen were gaining ground on the wings. General Boye imagined he could arrest their progress, by causing a strong battalion of infantry to advance rapidly on the interval between Borozdin and the centre column, and he very nearly succeeded, this troop having been on the point of reaching Himois and deciding the success in favour of the Swedes; but General Aderkas, chief of Prince Bagration's staff, threw a perfect cloud of riflemen among the surrounding rocks and woods, who poured upon them an unceasing and destructive fire, and their discomfiture was completed by a sudden attack by the Russian reserve: encouraged by this success, the Russians rushed upon the farm of Wiais, which was the key of the enemy's position, and carried it by assault.

The left, under the command of Major Beck, had been engaged during this time in climbing

over a chain of rocks so as to reach the rear of the Swedes, and now threatened to intercept the communication they kept up with their landing-place, the town of Helsing. Though the detachment of Major Beck was very feeble, Prince Bagration well judged the moral effect its appearance was likely to produce; and on witnessing the disorder in the enemy's ranks he made an alteration in the plan he had at first laid down, and directed Borozdin to push forward towards Helsing, without caring to keep up any close connexion with the other corps: this proceeding threw the whole of Boye's battalions into confusion, and they no longer attempted to defend their ground; he avoided Jarpilae and Aehais, sacrificed a rear-guard to gain time, and retired towards Helsing. Major Liders, with some squadrons of Russians, came up with them on a small plain, and a well-directed charge soon converted the retrograde movement of the Swedes into a precipitate and disorderly flight. At Helsing Boye again attempted to offer some resistance, in the hope of covering the difficult operation of embarking the troops, but the Russian artillery swept the ranks, and 12 officers, 350 men, and 5 guns, together with the military equipages and baggage of the enemy, fell into the hands of the Russians. Nearly 1000 men were killed,—a pro-

digious number, when we consider the number of the combatants.*

The King of Sweden arrived on board his yacht in view of Helsing just in time to witness all these disasters. He made an effort to rally his troops for another combat, but very soon the flames of the burning town, fanned by a land wind blowing off shore in the direction of his ships, alarmed him for their safety, and obliged him to accelerate his retreat. By a fatality, which appeared always to attach to his military arrangements, he had himself that very day, detached the greater part of his gun-boats on a cruise, and consequently he had no vessels to protect the re-embarkation of his troops, which took place in common boats and unarmed vessels. After having collected the remains of their army at Grönviksund, Boye and Lanting-hausen returned to the great island of Aland, and their troops formed the nucleus of the force placed by the King under the command of General Peyron, and called the division of Aland. His Majesty fixed his own head-quarters at the manse of Lemland.

The expedition which had sailed from Gefle met with no better fortune; many days were use-

* The whole of the troops Prince Bagration was able to get together at Helsing amounted to less than 4000 men.

lessly consumed in seeking for the cruisers who were to deliver the final instructions, until at last the squadron was overtaken by a violent storm, completely dispersed, and compelled to take refuge, in detached parties, in the various ports of Sweden. The artillery commanded by Captain Jernskiöld met with a still worse fate, it was wrecked on the coast of Finland and totally lost. A few companies of infantry landed at Vasa and joined Marshal Klingsporr.

The King attributed the reverses at Helsing principally to the infantry of his Guard, and as a punishment he deprived them of their colours and their privileges. It was an ill-timed act of severity, tending to alienate the soldiers, and to wound the honour of many distinguished families; and it cannot be doubted that it contributed not a little to the success of the revolution by which, a few months later, the unfortunate Gustavus lost his crown.

The enterprise we have just described was the last attempted by the troops intended to act against Southern Finland. Their unfortunate destiny appears to have led to their always being employed on ill-arranged and isolated operations, which could lead to none but the most disastrous results.

The skill shown in the distribution of the troops, and the general system adopted by the

Russian Commander-in-chief during this campaign, stand out in strong and most favourable contrast with the disastrous and ill-advised measures of the Swedes; and though we give due credit to the merit of the Russian officers in general, and the valour of the troops, an impartial observer cannot but acknowledge the glory of the battles of Limo, Lokalaks, and Helsing, to be principally due to the chief of the army. His general arrangements were excellent, his detachments drawn up behind small posts of observation, which formed a feeble but continuous chain along the coasts, and, above all, clear and precise instructions were given in which Count Bouxhoevden, *beforehand*, released the chiefs from all responsibility, and directed them each to march straight upon the enemy wherever they might find him, in whatever strength, and with whatever result.

Here terminates the summer campaign in Southern Finland, where nothing further of importance took place till after the end of 1808. The King of Sweden prolonged his stay at Aland until the $\frac{\text{20th October}}{\text{1st November}}$, and the greater part of his flotilla returned to the ports of Sweden in the course of the month of November; but their misfortunes were not yet at an end, a contagious distemper broke out on board the flotilla, and was

communicated to the stations where they lay, causing general and widely-spread desolation.

Before finishing this chapter, we think it right to mention a circumstance but little known, though it had great influence on the subsequent events still to be narrated of the campaign. Towards the end of the month of July the scarcity of the means of transport, and even of provisions, became so evident that the Minister of War, who had so well, and hitherto so successfully, directed the arrangements under very difficult circumstances, for a moment despaired of being able to replace the large dépôts and transports of provisions that had been taken or destroyed in Central Finland. The Emperor shared the anxiety of his minister, and considered it advisable a scrupulous examination should be made of the different corps of the army, of their effective strength, their respective means of action, and the localities where they were placed.

Marquis Palucci was charged with this important mission; he visited the whole of the stationary posts and of the mobile detachments distributed on the theatre of the war. The report presented by this officer, who had had the opportunity of judging of the whole force—of the connexion between the various operations parcelled out over so great an extent of country, and of the efficiency of each body

of troops—was not and could not be satisfactory; and a memorial was in consequence drawn up in the War-office in St. Petersburg with the intention of prescribing to Count Bouxhoevden a plan of operations modified according to existing circumstances. He was to act on the defensive, to temporise, with the sole object of getting over the time till the month of October with as little inconvenience as possible; as the winter season would then diminish the advantages afforded by the country to the Swedes, and at the same time would permit the Russians again to act on the offensive with a probability of success; besides which the ice would then be capable of bearing sledges, thus greatly facilitating the formation of new dépôts of provisions, the arrival of recruits, and the reorganisation of the troops; and these considerations acquired additional weight from the circumstance that an epidemic malady had appeared among the regiments defending the North, and who were unfortunately unprovided with field-hospitals. The men were worn out with their daily round of duty, and the whole army, including the 4th division, about to be placed at the disposal of the Commander-in-chief, hardly amounted to 37,000 men.

According to the plan drawn up at St. Petersburg, the defensive line of the Russians was to

extend along the course of the river Kumo, and from the point of Yttero, by Hvittis, Tammerfors, Ohrovesi, Ivaskyla, Koivisto, Rautalamby, Kuopio, and Kemie: the troops were to be distributed as follows on this extent of country, more than 500 versts (350 miles) in length.

On the south coast there were to be 6000 men.

The central corps, stationed at Tavastheus, to despatch or support detachments in the various directions diverging towards the north, 8000 to 10,000 men.

The extreme left, in the neighbourhood of Bjorneborg, about 5000 men, and a similar number on the right, destined, by acting near Kuopio, to cooperate in their movements with 2500 men of the 4th division, which were advancing from Carelia under Prince Dolgoroucki.

This long line had an internal curve, which they proposed reinforcing with two intermediate corps of 5000 men each, to the right and left of Tavastheus, the one at Tammerfors, and the other at Koivisto and Ivaskyla.

The sole object of this plan was to gain time, to oppose the progress of the enemy, to harass them if the opportunity should offer, and to keep the country already occupied in a state of submission, so as to prepare for the winter campaign.

The Emperor Alexander approved of the proposed plan, but he judiciously considered that, from his distance from the scene of events, it would be better not to give it his final sanction without consulting the Commander-in-chief and the staff, who had hitherto been successful in conducting the operations. Palucci, therefore, received orders to proceed to head-quarters, where the plan was to be discussed. When he arrived, the Jungfrusund had just been taken from the Swedes; Count Kamensky had been appointed to command the corps opposed to Klingsporr; reinforcements had successively arrived; and requisitions to the people had procured provisions, highly paid, it is true, but far more abundant than could have been hoped for.

All the circumstances were changed or modified, and a counter-project was drawn up at Abo; the Emperor gave it his sanction, and the aggressive operations we are about to describe were the immediate consequences of it, affording results most satisfactory to the Emperor.

CHAPTER VII.

The Russian army had received reinforcements in the course of the month of August. A new division, consisting of about 9000 men of all arms, under Count Wittgenstein, had taken the place of the troops distributed in the South along the Gulf of Finland; another, of nearly 8000 men, commanded by Prince Demetrius Galitzin, had been ordered to march towards Central Finland, for the purpose of supporting whichever of the three corps, Bagration, near Abo; Toutchkoff (1st), near Kuopio; or Kamensky, near Vasa and Gamle-Carleby, might most require their assistance: and another column of about 4000 men had marched from Serdobal, under the orders of Prince Dolgoroucki, the Emperor's aide-de-camp, and was advancing on Carelia on the extreme right of Toutchkoff's division. The aggregate number of these troops, including the regiments which had already

been engaged in the war, and 3000 men employed in the flotilla, amounted towards the end of August to 47,547 infantry, 8000 cavalry, and 186 guns.

The army of Marshal Klingsporr at the same period amounted to about 17,000 men and 40 guns. About 4000 of these, under General Sandels, were opposed to General Toutchkoff at Toyvola, opposite to Kuopio; and about as many more, including De Gyllenbögel's irregular corps, were posted in the neighbourhood of Christinestadt, under the command of General Döbeln; of the remainder, under the orders of Klingsporr himself, and General Adlerkreutz, his lieutenant, some were posted near Lappo, and others distributed in small detachments in various directions.

The Swedish forces assembled in the islands of Aland might amount to from 6000 to 9000 men; the notions on that head were, and probably always will be uncertain, as much from the exaggerated reports that were current, as from the incessant marching and countermarching, of all the troops immediately under the personal command of the King; and this uncertainty extends to all the corps posted on the western coast of the Gulf of Bothnia, which might have proceeded to Finland, and constantly appeared on the point of doing so.

The daily increasing advantages enjoyed by the

Russians in the means of transport and otherwise, had allowed the corps under Count Kamensky, especially intended to serve against Count Klingsporr, and oblige him to retreat into Lapland, to be gradually augmented until it consisted of 10,000 men, 1200 horses, and 46 guns. The Russian General had joined the main body of his corps on the $\frac{12}{24}$th of July, after his fortunate escape from an attempt of the Swedish serjeant Root to carry him off. He judged it necessary to continue the retrograde movement determined upon the day before, in the council of war held by his predecessor, to enable him to keep nearer to his dépôts of provisions, ammunition, and reinforcements; and the Russians consequently retreated in two columns towards Tavastheus, as far as Kumulax and Kumois: he however detached some battalions, under Colonel Vlastoff, towards Saarjerfvi, and Colonel Sabanieff towards Ohrovesi, that a demonstration of offensive measures might mask his retreat.

As early as the $\frac{2d}{14th}$ of August, Count Kamensky was able to advance with his troops by Jamsa and Saarjerfvi upon Ivaskyla, where he arrived on the $\frac{5}{17}$th. His advanced guard, under Colonel Vlastoff, composed of six battalions, seven guns, and some cavalry, was stopped at Karstula by a Swedish detachment under Colonel Fiandt, drawn up between

two lakes, in a position it hardly appeared possible to attack. Vlastoff succeeded in turning it on the $\frac{9\text{th}}{21\text{st}}$, and, after reiterated efforts, he found he had made some little impression on his adversary. The Swedish troops immediately fell into disorder, and Fiandt, completely overpowered, was obliged to retreat, only having been able to rally one-third of the corps of 1500 men he had when the attack began. A number of the fugitives who had escaped under cover of the woods rejoined him at Lindulax.

Whilst the Russians were executing this movement, which so directly menaced the communications on the left of Marshal Klingsporr, he had himself formed an idea of giving to the centre of the Swedish army the same strategical position as that occupied by his right wing, and for that purpose he had resolved to concentrate four brigades at Alavo, a point to which Colonel Sabanieff was then directing his steps, having been detached, as above mentioned, on Ohrovesi. He had just reached Wirdois, and Colonel Ericson, at the head of a third detachment marching by Estävi and Toysa, had succeeded on the $\frac{28\text{th July}}{9\text{th August}}$ in dislodging a feeble advanced guard of the Swedes, provisionally posted at Alavo. Two days afterwards a junction took place between the troops of Sabanieff and Ericson.

Adlerkreutz was charged with carrying out the

plans of his chief, and he accordingly attacked the Russian army on the $\frac{5}{17}$th of August. In the battle that ensued more than 1000 men were killed, besides many wounded; amongst others, Colonel Ericson of the Russian army, and the Swedish Colonel Count Cronstedt. The Russians were obliged to yield to the superior force of their adversaries, and retreated in the direction of Tammerfors and Herranen. Ericson was in hopes he might there have obliged the enemy to cease their pursuit; but, finding himself turned by a regiment embarked on the lake of Tulijocki, he continued his retreat, burning on the road the village and bridge of Herranen. The bridge was almost immediately rebuilt.

The news of Adlerkreutz's aggressive movement reached Kamensky, at the very time his advanced guard had just beaten Fiandt at Karstula. The retreat of Ericson in the direction of Ruovési, left the road between Alavo and Ivaskyla quite unprotected, and the very large force which had driven back this detachment, gave every reason to believe that the future progress of Adlerkreutz in Central Finland might be attended with serious consequences; and, therefore, with the intention of checking his progress, Count Kamensky determined to leave the advance on Lindulax, and the pursuit of Colonel Fiandt, to the advanced guard

under Colonel Vlastoff, while he proceeded himself, with his principal corps, to endeavour to act upon Alavo by Ivaskyla.

If Count Kamensky's resolution was quickly taken, it was no less rapidly executed; he lost no time in carrying out his newly-conceived design of giving battle to the enemy, who had at first imagined themselves capable of making him give ground, merely by menacing his communications. He advanced without delay, and on the $\frac{13}{25}$th of August he was within reach of Alavo with his principal column, his rapid march having only been interrupted by a skirmish at Etsari on the $\frac{8}{20}$th of August. One of his battalions having imprudently entered a defile, a Swedish battalion, under Colonel Borgenström, turned them by paths unknown to the Russians, completely shutting them up in it; and though they forced their way with the bayonet, it was not without considerable loss. In the meanwhile, Vlastoff had pursued Fiandt as far as Lindulax, which he abandoned.

When Klingsporr found Kamensky had determined upon an aggressive system of operations, directed on the superior angle of the roads leading to Gamle-Carleby, he must have been conscious of the fault he had committed, in temporising at the moment he might have crushed the enfeebled corps

of Raievsky, more especially as he would be placed under extreme disadvantage from being obliged to act on diverging lines, while the movements of the Russians, on the contrary, tended to concentrate theirs all on one point. It is true the extreme right of the Swedes had been reinforced by an irregular corps of about 1200 men, recruited at Aland by Colonel Gyllenbögel; but this reinforcement had not prevented them from being driven back as far as Lappfierdt by Colonel Bibikoff,* after a battle near Omossa. General Ouchakoff had approached Kauhajocki, whilst Ericson, having joined Sabanieff, had gained ground on Adlerkreutz towards the centre of the line.

Klingsporr had then the double fear of being beaten on every side, and of seeing his communications compromised. He resolved to concentrate his force in the environs of Ruona and Kuortane, judging that from that central point he would have the power of attacking Kamensky near Ivaskyla; or, should he consider it expedient, of supporting Fiandt, near Lindulax, against the detachment of Vlastoff.

With regard to his extreme right, the Swedish general felt very great repugnance to the idea of causing it to fall back. He considered, with reason,

* He had succeeded Gen. Chepeleff, who had fallen sick.

that by abandoning a great extent of coast on the Gulf, he weakened his power of communicating with Sweden,—a power that was most valuable, nay indispensable to him, not only because his army drew their subsistence from the mother country, but also that he constantly hoped reinforcements from thence would be sent him, according to the promises of the King; and although the campaign had been active on that coast, and attended with considerable loss of life, the constantly recurring skirmishes had until then led to no result, except an advance or retreat of a few marches.

A reinforcement of Swedish troops landed in Finland at Christinestadt, in the beginning of August. It was composed of six battalions and a battery under the orders of General Vegesack,* and immediately proceeded to join the troops commanded by Döbeln and Gyllenbögel. Colonel Bibikoff and Anselme de Gibory were not aware of their arrival, and on the $\frac{17}{29}$th of August they made

* General Vegesack had been ordered to land at Bjorneborg, but he was driven further north by stress of weather, and, not to lose time, he thought he might venture to depart from the very letter of the instructions he had received, and land at once. It is affirmed that the King reproached General Vegesack with having, by this act of disobedience, caused the failure of his whole plan for reconquering Finland.—*Author's Note.*

an attempt to retake Lappfierdt. It failed before so superior a force, and the lives of 16 officers and 300 men were uselessly sacrificed. Vegesack and Döbeln pursued the Russians for three or four marches in the direction of Bjorneborg.

The Swedes were thus extending their right wing towards the south, just at the time Kamensky had begun active operations in the north. After having occupied Alavo he was informed that Count Klingsporr, on hearing of his approach, had caused the troops to retreat rapidly from Herranen, and had assembled on the $\frac{19\text{th}}{31\text{st}}$ August four brigades (about 8000 men) at the bridge of Ruona, near Kuortane. The Russian General, resolved to fight Klingsporr in this position, recalled the detachments of Ericson and Sabanieff, advanced to Kauhalamby, and after a sharp engagement there marched on to Majenpä. The Swedish advanced guard was driven back as far as the channel of Ruona, formed by a torrent flowing from the little lake of Nissalamby, to the more considerable one of Kuortane.

The main body of the Swedish army was posted on some commanding heights, the right was covered by the lake of Kuortane, the centre by the smaller lake of Nissalamby; the left was posted behind a stream of water, and sheltered by a rampart of earth

provided with redans. A salient height, whose approach was defended by abattis, further protected the left wing, and swept the point where the roads of Lindulax and Alavo meet. In the night of the $\frac{\text{20th August}}{\text{1st Sept.}}$ Count Kamensky raised a battery at Ruona, in front of the right wing of the Swedes; he hoped by this measure not only to paralyse the enemy on that side, but also to succeed in turning the little lake of Nissalamby, and thus to be able to reach the left wing under the protection of an unceasing cannonade. His whole force amounted to about 20 battalions and 5 squadrons; altogether about 9000 men.

At break of day on the $\frac{\text{21st August}}{\text{2d Sept.}}$, the Russian General caused his columns of attack to advance in double-quick time upon the village of Sippola. The post was vigorously disputed, and Kamensky threw back his left, and afterwards advancing towards the retrenchments and abattis of the enemy's left, he renewed his attacks, though repeatedly repulsed, with the most determined perseverance, until he found his soldiers were becoming perfectly exhausted, and he felt he had no longer hopes of success, unless from the appearance of a detachment he had despatched the day before to Salmis. It was intended these troops should have passed by Witala and Koursy, and have

turned the lake of Kuortane and the position of Ruona, but they had unfortunately lost their way in some impracticable ground. The Swedes in their turn strove to take the utmost advantage of the circumstances that had occurred; they descended from the fortified heights on which they were posted, fell suddenly on the right wing of the Russians, and drove them back on Sippola, a distance of about two versts. Night separated the combatants, each party having regained its original position at the expense of heavy losses.

Count Kamensky, after this desperate attempt, gave up all hopes of forcing Klingsporr in his formidable position, and determined to fall back and have recourse to some other measures. His baggage and artillery were already on the road to Alavo, when the vigilant eye of General Koulneff perceived that the fires of the bivouacs were badly kept up; and he also thought certain movements in the Swedish army looked as if they were silently effecting a retreat. He immediately sent to inform Count Kamensky of his suspicions; the retrograde movement was arrested, the Russians retraced their steps, and found the enemy had abandoned the field of battle.

A general sometimes decides on abandoning the field after a doubtful battle, and has afterwards

great cause to regret his precipitation. Such would no doubt have been the case in the present instance, had not the vigilant activity of Koulneff preserved Kamensky from falling into this error simultaneously with Klingsporr. The troops met again at Salmis; the right wing of the Swedes was posted near the village, and their numerous artillery swept the plain in front of their left and their centre. An attempt in front was again repulsed, but Kamensky lengthened his line; manœuvring his right, he turned the Swedish left, and made them give ground almost without resistance. Klingsporr retreated in good order by Tistenjocki to Lappo, where he arrived on the following day.

The loss of both armies in these battles was about equal, and amounted to nearly 2000 men. The troops on both sides were sinking with fatigue, and Marshal Klingsporr would probably have had no difficulty in maintaining his position at Lappo for some time. He had intended doing so, but all his plans were altered by the intelligence he just then received of the discomfiture of Colonel Fiandt. Fortune was resolved to prove she does not always favour the brave; and this officer, who had before performed prodigies of valour, was then retreating by forced marches from Perpo to Gamle-Carleby, after having been twice defeated by Colonel Vlas-

toff. Count Klingsporr's principal line of operations was exposed to danger by the retreat of this detachment, and that, too, just at the time when Döbeln and Vegesack had advanced in a southerly direction by the coast road, to within two marches of Bjorneborg, after their success at Lappfierdt; and Klingsporr felt the detachments they commanded would be exposed to the greater risk, from the doubts he entertained of being himself equal to another battle at that moment. He was anxious to collect his scattered forces, and intimated to the two generals his desire that they would fall back with forced marches to Toby, near Vasa. Fiandt was reinforced with some troops arrived from Tornea and Uleaborg, and enabled to take up a position at Dunkors; and Klingsporr himself drew nearer to Vasa, by Neder Harma and Lillkyro, and fixed his head-quarters at the latter place on the $\frac{27\text{th August}}{8\text{th September}}$.

Three days afterwards, when the Swedish General felt certain of being rejoined by Vegesack and Döbeln, he determined to evacuate Vasa, where he had all his military stores and provisions; but in spite of all the efforts of the Swedes to effect the operation speedily, partly by land and partly by sea, they could not prevent Colonel Bibikoff, now freed from his adversaries, from advancing rapidly upon Vasa, and obtaining possession of a magazine

and a great quantity of cattle,—about the most valuable prize he could have taken in that country, and at that moment.

Count Kamensky did not hurry in his pursuit of Klingsporr; he allowed him full time to collect his detachments, and to replace the bridge of Huacko, and several others in the neighbourhood of Gamle-Carleby, imprudently burnt by Fiandt after his defeat at Perho. On the $\frac{31\text{st Aug.}}{12\text{th Sept.}}$ Klingsporr retreated on Wöra and Mursala, and his army took up a fortified position at Oravais; Jutas, on the left, was occupied by the first brigade, which had been detached.

Count Kamensky had detached General Kosatchcovsky by Kauhava, towards Ny-Carleby, with the view of compelling Klingsporr to retreat by manœuvres on his flank. He hoped thus to gain ground, without having recourse to the general engagements which cost so many lives, though from the nature of the country they were never decisive. When the Russian detachment reached Kauhava, they found the bridge destroyed by which they were to have crossed one of the tributary streams of the Carleby-Elf: it was replaced by a floating bridge of rafts, and Kosatchcovsky attacked Jutas. Döbeln, always active and always present where glory or danger was concerned, hastened to

the support of the post, and the Russian General was compelled to fall back upon Neder Harma: he there placed his left in connexion with the main body Kamensky had caused to approach by the coast road from the neighbourhood of Oravais.

Whilst Count Klingsporr was hesitating whether he would fight in a position which was certainly locally advantageous, he received intelligence of the destruction of a considerable bridge across a wide torrent at Himango. Colonel Fiandt had been seized with a panic and had set it on fire, without reflecting that it was situated on their principal line of communications. Gripenberg's Finland brigade was immediately detached, for the double purpose of repairing the mischief done by that ill-advised act, and also of replacing the shattered detachment of the unfortunate Fiandt; he was really an officer of merit, and of undoubted courage, but his energies then appeared to have given way, under the continual reverses he had encountered.

Count Kamensky soon became aware he had reckoned too much on the detachments sent to the two Carlebys, under Generals Kosatchcovsky and Vlastoff, but an alteration in his plan, so as to allow of their being reinforced, would have caused a delay quite incompatible with his energetic disposition. He, besides, reproached himself with not

having gained more advantage from the prolonged retreat of Marshal Klingsporr, feeling assured that, had he acted with greater vigour, he might have cut off the detachments from the Swedish General's right wing; and with the hope of repairing what he considered his error, Kamensky resolved, in spite of all the local difficulties, once more to measure his strength with that of his adversaries. He had striven by means of demonstrations to make them give up their post at Oravais, but in vain,—in fact the destruction of the bridge at Himango compelled them to maintain themselves there at any risk.

A small squadron of gun-boats, equipped at Uleaborg, protected Klingsporr's right, posted near the sea upon some rocky heights, which were considered inaccessible. His centre was defended by strongly constructed batteries, and extended over a plain, carefully cleared of everything that could interfere with the effect of the artillery; a stream of water, and a small morass ran all along the front of his line, as far as the extreme left, where an almost impracticable abattis extended, until lost in a thick forest. Such was Klingsporr's position, long since chosen by him, and prepared for his army.

The charge of approaching the Swedish left and endeavouring to turn it, devolved upon Koulneff, at the head of the Russian advanced guard; his

battalions marched without check to the point of attack, and very soon found themselves engaged in it to the last man. Count Kamensky sent them repeated reinforcements, until little by little almost the whole Russian force had followed them. As the ground only allowed them to act in the manner of light infantry, it was not possible to avoid a dangerous dispersion of the troops; the heat and ardour indispensable to all sudden attacks could not be maintained, the ammunition began to fail, the fire to slacken, and, in spite of their numbers, the troops sustained but feebly a combat—to them so disadvantageous and so destructive. The Swedish Generals, Adlerkreutz and Vegesack, were not long in becoming aware of the state of things, and presumed the favourable moment had arrived when Kamensky might be completely defeated; they rapidly descended from the heights, and in a few moments had routed more than 7000 Russians, dispersed like light infantry over a great extent of ground. Nothing could restrain them; the Swedish battalions of Vegesack had been in reserve, guarding the centre, and the Russians fled before the bayonets of these fresh troops, who pursued them for the distance of five versts. Vegesack's success would have been complete had he known where to stop, but Fortune was resolved to prove that valour

itself may sometimes become the fatal cause of a defeat, and even lead to the disastrous termination of a long and glorious campaign.

Count Kamensky's hopes at that critical moment rested solely upon the arrival of a reserve of four battalions he had directed, at the commencement of the attack, to push on from Vasa to Oravais. It arrived—and everything was changed. Kamensky addressed a few words of encouragement to the men, and then rushed forward at their head: the troops caught his enthusiasm — the Swedes were routed in their turn—both parties faced about, and the Russians—mingled—confounded with their enemies, forced their way into the midst of the redoubts and batteries of the Swedes.

Oravais was taken.

This battle lasted fourteen consecutive hours. The last cartridges had been consumed on both sides, and above 2000 men were left on the field. Night, and the complete exhaustion of the Russian troops, favoured the retreat of the Swedes.*

This was the most desperate battle during the whole campaign, and the carnage was very great;

* The Russian troops present at the battle of Oravais were — eleven battalions of the regiments of Permo, Sevsk Petrovsky, Mohileff, and Lithuania, the 3d and 5th Chasseurs, two squadrons of Hussars of Grodno, two of Polish Lancers, and twenty guns. The Swedes had ten battalions of the

indeed on both sides it was a perfect massacre. The Swedes lost several of their best officers, and we may truly say the *coup de grace* was given at Oravais, to a body of troops distinguished by intrepidity, patriotism, and fortitude, under the most unfavourable circumstances.

Klingsporr retreated with all speed towards the bridge of Ny-Carleby, destroying it as soon as he had crossed the river; and the next day ($\frac{4}{16}$th August) he took up his position at Sundby, with the intention of causing his hospitals and stores to be removed from Jacobstadt. But he was so closely followed by Koulneff's cavalry, which had been able to ford the Carleby-Elf, from the waters having been unusually and accidentally low, that he was compelled to retreat as far as Gamle-Carleby.

Count Kamensky immediately turned his attention to the means of transport across the various streams that intersect the country in every direction. He at once threw a bridge at Permo, and on the $\frac{8}{20}$th he forded the river of Esserö, but on the next day his advanced guard fell into an am-

regiments of Uppland, Westmanland, Savolax, Savolax Chasseurs, Carelian Militia, three squadrons of Dragoons of Nyland and Carelia, and twenty-one guns, besides the artillery of the flotilla and some pieces of position.

buscade laid by a young Swedish officer, M. de Stiernskantz: by this stratagem the rapid pursuit of the Russians was for a time retarded, and an essential service rendered to the Swedish army. Their retreat was covered by Colonel de Gyllenbögel, at the head of the irregular troops bearing his name—a very difficult task, but executed with great skill and judgment.

As soon as Count Bouxhoevden felt secure affairs in the south were in a prosperous condition, he quitted his head-quarters at Abo, with the intention of directing in person the great operations for which he had made preparations in the north. As we have already shown, the activity of Kamensky had forestalled the arrival of his chief, and Bouxhoevden was able without difficulty to fix his head-quarters at Gamle-Carleby on the $\frac{13}{25}$th September.

He was, however, perfectly ignorant of the state of affairs in the Savolax and Carelia. General Toutchkoff's troops had been successively withdrawn to reinforce Kamensky, reducing him to play a very secondary part; he was separated by the Kalavesi from the inaccessible position Sandels had taken up at Toyvola; and he had confined himself to gradually improving the means at his disposal for crossing the lake, causing daily alarms to his antagonist, and making reconnaissances in

Carelia. A miniature naval war was carried on, by means of some armed sloops and a great number of boats; it was a sort of naval tournament, where courage, skill, and subtlety were in turn displayed. A narrow passage, some islets, a commanding rock, were often the object and the prize of an audacious attempt or of a sanguinary struggle.

Several trifling descents, which Palucci effected in Carelia, could not prevent Sandels, always active and enterprising, from carrying alarm into this country, as far as the ancient frontier of the Russian empire. One of his detachments, under the conduct of Major de Malm, penetrated by Joensu and Pelgärvi as far as the town of Ruskiala, and menaced the city of Serdobal, situated on the western shore of Lake Ladoga. The principal advantage General Sandels gained from these incursions was the possibility of extracting some means of subsistence from a country naturally poor, and which was day by day becoming in a worse position from the devastating effects of the war. At last Prince Dolgoroucki's Russian column, which penetrated successively by Taypale and Kaavi, put a stop to this state of things. Sandels disputed with him the possession of Carelia, and did not think proper to abandon his post of Toyvola until the $\frac{17}{29}$th of September, in order to draw near Idensalmi, which is

about six marches from the north. Toutchkoff crossed the Kalavesi, and effected his junction beyond this lake with Prince Dolgoroucki.

As we have already said, it was impossible Count Bouxhoevden should have received information of these recent events. Under this uncertainty, and with a view of obtaining ulterior advantages, which he could hardly hope to gain at that advanced and unfavourable season by the force of arms, he resolved to try negociation. Marshal Klingsporr had the most powerful reasons for acquiescing in the proposal; he consented to an interview with Generals Suchtelen and Kamensky at Lockto, and to the conditions of an armistice concluded on the $\frac{17}{29}$th of September.

The Swedes, in virtue of this act, ceded to the Russians the free passage of the Gamle-Carleby, and some miles of broken ground towards the north, on the coast road. They reserved to themselves a fortified position at Himango, and a line of neutral ground was marked out between the two armies.

In the east, it was stipulated General Sandels should abandon the defiles of Palois, always considered impregnable; and that he should cause his troops to retreat northward, as far as Idensalmi. The church of that town was to serve as the line of

demarcation between his corps and the troops under the command of Generals Toutchkoff and Dolgoroucki; so that the one army would occupy the defile to the north, and the other to the south of the church.

Should the armistice not be approved, it was to be signified in the space of ten days; and in the meanwhile an exchange of prisoners was to be effected.

The Emperor Alexander was at that time in Germany. This armistice was submitted to the Council of the Empire, appointed to the direction of affairs during his absence, but it was not approved. Orders were despatched to Count Bouxhoevden directing the resumption of hostilities.

It was undoubtedly at that time to the interest of the Russian army that the conquest of Finland should be completed. Even according to the intentions of Count Bouxhoevden, the armistice was only to be of a temporary nature, but the short time it had lasted had sufficed to procure them all the advantages which had led to their concluding it. The great local difficulties had been overcome without fighting, and the opportunity had been gained of forwarding supplies to the corps of Kamensky and Toutchkoff (1st). This last-named general signified his disapproval of the armistice as early as the $\frac{7}{19}$th

October, and on the $\frac{15}{27}$th he attacked the defile at the north of Idensalmi: the action was sharp, but unfavourable to the Russians; the inferiority of numbers in Sandels' brigade being compensated by the superiority of his ground. The Russians lost 350 men and Prince Dolgoroucki, a general of the highest promise, and scarcely thirty years of age.

The nature of the ground at Idensalmi did not render it possible to turn either the position of the Russians or that of the Swedes. Toutchkoff (1st) and Sandels had both intrenched themselves carefully, and then remained in sight of each other, without the possibility of anything of importance taking place until the moment when the Russians hoped some fresh successes of Kamensky would menace Uleaborg and Sandels' line, and compel him to abandon his ground: for several hundred versts there is an uninterrupted defile. The Swedish General tried to surprise the Russians, but the attempt was not successful, and he was repulsed with loss.

One of the motives that induced Marshal Klingsporr to conclude the armistice at Lockto, was the intention he had formed of proceeding to the capital of Sweden. He gave as his reasons his advanced age, and the failure of his health, which had suffered from the fatigues of a very active campaign, but he had also a political object. The

General hoped, in a personal interview, to prove to the King how completely illusory were all hopes of reconquering Finland. He flattered himself he might induce him either to conclude peace, or to consent that his army, which had been driven back on Lapland, and was exposed to privation of every kind, should be permitted to fall back upon Sweden.

The Swedish Marshal had consequently given over his command to General Klercker, and departed for Stockholm, followed shortly after by his staff. These Generals were received by the public with enthusiasm, and by the Monarch with the favour merited by their services; nevertheless his determination was inflexible: far from consenting to the evacuation of Finland, he caused more troops to march towards that country, although assured it was already destitute of the means of subsistence; and orders were despatched to General Klercker to reconquer Finland, or to defend *à outrance* the small portion of it he still occupied. The Swedish General had then about 13,000 men under his command, including the detached corps of Sandels; the artillery consisted of 37 pieces, his cavalry only amounted to 500.

Count Bouxhoevden had flattered himself the marked superiority of General Toutchkoff's

force would have triumphed over some local difficulties. Count Kamensky was only to signify his disapproval of the armistice, and resume the offensive, when the progress of his colleague in the Savolax should render it possible for a transversal communication between them to take place, so as to combine the movements of the two columns on Uleaborg. But the unexpected resistance of Idensalmi obliged Count Bouxhoevden, in spite of the difficult passage of the torrents, and the fortified position of Himango, to attempt along the Gulf the operations acknowledged to be impossible in the Savolax.

On his side General Klercker, foreseeing that the suspension of arms would not long continue, resolved to forestall the declaration to that effect by the Russians. On the $\frac{19\text{th}}{31\text{st}}$ October the two armies found themselves again in sight of each other.

Count Kamensky's success was from the very first as rapid as it was unhoped for. That position of Himango, which had exercised the talents of the Swedish engineers for several months, and which was considered an obstacle of the greatest importance, was abandoned without striking a blow. It would be difficult to explain the motives of this sudden retreat, except by the advanced age of the

Commander-in-chief of the Swedish army, combined with the general discontent among the troops, and the scarcity of provisions.

Count Kamensky had prepared a bridge of light rafts during the armistice, and also the means of carrying it. His advance was stopped at the torrent of Sippo, near the village of Kurikka, and his bridge was thrown, under favour of a brisk cannonade, on the $\frac{\text{24th October.}}{\text{5th November.}}$

Klercker fell back upon Kalajocki, where another river opposed a fresh obstacle. It was again crossed, after a short resistance of the Swedes, at Pitkais and Rachko. Manœuvring incessantly with his right wing, Kamensky reached in the same manner Ypperi, and met with no check until he reached Wirel, where Klercker repulsed the advanced guard two several times, on the $\frac{\text{30th October}}{\text{11th November}}$ and $\frac{\text{31st of October}}{\text{12th of November}}$.

The torrent of Pyhajocki is one of the most considerable among those that water Northern Finland. In order to cross the southern branch, Count Kamensky took advantage of the moment when an exchange of prisoners was being effected at the advanced posts, and the Swedes had in consequence neglected their usual precautions. However, the progress of the Russians would probably have been interrupted by the difficulty of crossing the prin-

cipal bed of the river, if the elements themselves had not come to their assistance. The frost suddenly set in, and formed a thin crust of ice over the river, and the Russians very soon brought it into a state fit for allowing of their passage. The means of proceeding were well known, and habitual with the northern nations,—some straw was shaken over the thinly-frozen surface, water was continually poured upon it, and with the assistance of some planks a road was soon contrived, allowing the brigades of Generals Kosatchcovsky and Ouchakoff to bear upon the extreme left of the Swedes. General Klercker returned with all speed to Brahestadt.

The occupation of Pyhajocki was doubly important, from its enabling a transverse communication to be at last established between the right and left columns, and Count Kamensky hastened to secure it by directing the brigade of General Ericson by Wihandi on Frantzilla. This movement threatened entirely to cut off the detachment of General Sandels, and Klercker immediately sent him orders to retreat upon Uleaborg. Another Russian detachment, directed by Count Kamensky on Pulkilla, by Happajervi, found the crossway impracticable.

Forced by these skilful and rapid manœuvres to

retreat without fighting, General Klercker abandoned Brahestadt, and fixed his head-quarters at Sikajocki, about two marches from his former position. His brigades occupied Salo, Palo, Savolax, and Paljocki; his advanced guard remained at Piehangi. This hasty retreat, the privations endured by the troops, the marauding parties they had to encounter, and above all a dreadful epidemic, which raged in the Swedish army, reduced the main body in a few days to 6000 men. During the last eight days the cold had become excessive; the lakes, several torrents, and the sea close to the shore, were covered with ice, and all navigation was suddenly interrupted. Several Swedish vessels, loaded with provisions, were in sight, without being able to land their stores. The means of transport failed, and the troops, condemned to the fate of Tantalus, suffered the greatest privations actually within sight of abundance.

Under the pressure of so many calamities, the Swedish Generals, after holding a council of war, demanded an interview with Count Kamensky, to treat for the evacuation of the remainder of Finland. A suspension of arms was granted them for two days, on condition the Russians should occupy Brahestadt, and that the Swedish advanced guard should retreat to Olkijocki; it was on the $\frac{4}{16}$th of

November. This proceeding was the means of saving the wreck of this unfortunate army. They had suffered fearfully from the cold, and a sudden thaw, which took place from the $\frac{6}{18}$th to the $\frac{7}{19}$th, was likely to have involved still more disastrous consequences. The ice of the river Sikajocki suddenly gave way with a tremendous crash, carrying away a large wooden bridge which formed the sole means of retreat for the Swedes. Huge masses of rock and of ice were carried down by the torrent, and at one time lay in heaps between its rocky sides; at others, the course of the stream being obstructed, the waters rushed down in cataracts, carrying all before them, and appearing likely to sweep away the banks altogether. This terrible convulsion only lasted a few hours, but it obliged the Swedes to make the most unheard-of efforts in order to repair, even in part, the mischief it had occasioned.

Posted with their backs to the river, this handful of brave men, who had escaped all the dangers of the campaign, had not the slightest chance of escape, if they had been attacked by Count Kamensky at that critical moment. But the laws of honour were not infringed by that general; he faithfully kept his word, and disdained to gain an advantage which would have dimmed the lustre

of his fame. He quietly allowed the stipulated time to pass before the resumption of hostilities, and the delay permitted the Swedes to escape from the total ruin that threatened them. A new convention was soon after concluded at Olkijocki, when the chiefs of the Swedish army engaged successively to evacuate all the territory they still occupied in Finland. They proceeded to fulfil their engagement according to a regularly determined system, and went into cantonments extending along both banks of the Tornea. The Swedish head-quarters occupied the city of that name on the $\frac{\text{23d November.}}{\text{5th December.}}$ Bouxhoevden fixed his at Uleaborg, and the advanced guard at Kemi.

The armistice, at first agreed upon until the $\frac{15}{27}$th of December, was indefinitely prolonged. Notice of the resumption of hostilities was to be given four days before they were actually recommenced.

The campaign was successfully terminated, and Kamensky, covered with glory at having brought it to so happy a conclusion, now resigned the command of his troops on account of his health: it devolved on General Toutchkoff (1st).

Count Bouxhoevden, to whom Russia was indebted for so magnificent a conquest, quitted the army of Finland at the same time, having requested

his recall. He was succeeded by General Knorring of the infantry. Nothing but peace was left him to conquer.

Those whom the passion of glory has led to make themselves familiar with military history may still, perhaps, find some subjects for meditation in this rapid sketch of events, but little known, though of so recent occurrence. They will see that it does not always require a numerous army to decide the fate of nations, and develope the resources of military science. They will recollect many instances, when the most memorable exploits were performed by a small number of brave men; and acknowledge that glory does not always follow the encounters where the most blood is shed. What horrible afflictions have been caused in the world,—what wounds to humanity inflicted in a single day,—in battles which, at the end of a few years, are not thought worthy of a place in the remembrance of the soldier or the statesman! This handful of combatants, fighting for the rocks of an icy country, was hardly in point of number equal to a single one of the corps drawn up on the vast fields of battle of Austerlitz, Borodino, Leipzig, and many others. But although the war was carried on beyond the polar circle, it prevented not the display of intelligence, valour, perseverance, and great military

genius. A witness of all the events of this war, and of the numerous difficulties of every kind it presented, the author will not venture to constitute himself a judge of the errors that may have been committed. He acknowledges such an examination may frequently be useful, but he considers it one better suited to those who have made the art of writing a particular study. He contents himself with offering a narrative as exact as possible, and he will consider his leisure hours to have been usefully employed if a historian, or a writer endowed with more talent than he possesses, can make use of some of these pages in works better than his.

CHAPTER VIII.

CAMPAIGN OF 1809.

NEGOCIATIONS had been commenced at Erfurth towards the latter end of 1808. The object of them was a general pacification, but the proposals of the Emperor Alexander failed before the rival interests of the French and English cabinets, and on the 15th of December, England announced the rupture of all diplomatic relations.

Gustavus Adolphus had not been cast down by his reverses. The recent events at Bayonne, the preparations of Austria, and the successive invasions and haughty pretensions of Napoleon, led him to hope that a favourable change must very speedily take place in the politics of Europe. Unmoved by all the miseries resulting to Sweden from this disastrous war, the King only thought of preparing for another campaign.

However, the accounts presented to him in the course of the month of October, ought to have been sufficient to damp his ardour, for they showed the expenses of the war to have amounted in 1808 to fourteen millions of crowns. The English subsidy hardly covered one-third of this sum, enormous for Sweden; and the English ministers, seeing the failure of all his enterprises, and hoping nothing from his alliance, were far from lending a favourable ear to his solicitations that they would increase the subsidy: on the contrary, they themselves urged his detaching himself from their alliance, and endeavouring to conclude a separate peace. The King was excessively displeased with this proposal; he considered it a reflection upon his honour, and his resentment, already excited by the unpleasant altercations he had had with Sir John Moore, and Mr. Thornton the English minister, upon whose recall he had insisted, now knew no bounds. He was on the point of laying a general embargo upon all the English vessels, then in great numbers in the Swedish ports; and it was not without the greatest difficulty, and the most earnest entreaties on the part of the ministry and commercial world of Sweden, he was prevailed upon to revoke this rigorous and most impolitic measure, against the only ally that remained to Sweden.

He was equally determined upon another point. Nothing could induce him to convoke the States-general. He was convinced of the affection of his people, and probably felt uneasy at the idea of the deliberations of a numerous assembly, which are sometimes attended with stormy and tumultuous demonstrations: his will alone, the patriotism of the Swedes, and the dangers to which their country was exposed, appeared to him all that was required to give a general impetus to the population, and rouse them to assist him in successfully prolonging a struggle, whose termination was already fixed by Providence.

To cover the deficit, remedy the penury of the moment, and provide for the expenses of another campaign, estimated at twenty-six millions,* the King had recourse to an extraordinary contribution of five millions of crowns. He ordered fresh levies of troops, hastened the preparations for war, and caused the regiments to march in every direction, with more ardour than method or military skill. He thus hoped to be able to get on until the spring, considering that Sweden was sheltered by the Gulf of Bothnia from any attacks as long as the winter

* This sum is considerably more than double the amount of the metallic currency then circulating in Sweden, Finland not included.—*Author's Note.*

lasted; and so it might indeed have been, had not the elements themselves taken part with the Russians; added to the feeling in Russia of the absolute necessity of hastening the termination of a war, which appeared otherwise likely to drag on for an indefinite period.

The month of January, 1809, was characterised by weather of unusual severity, and the whole of the Gulf of Bothnia was covered with solid ice. This phenomenon is rare; and it allowed the Russian Government to form a plan remarkable for its boldness and magnitude, viz. the invasion of Sweden, and an attempt upon its capital.

An attack was projected at the same time by the Danes. They proposed crossing the ice with which the Sound was covered, but the apprehensions from that quarter were but of short duration; a violent storm dispersed the ice in the Straits, and the Danes contented themselves with sending proclamations into the south of Sweden, by means of small balloons.

The danger from Finland was nearer and more real, for the Commander-in-chief there, General Knorring, had long been preparing an expedition destined to reconquer the islands of Aland, and he received orders from St. Petersburg, directing him to make his operations coincide with two

others, of the boldest conception, but perilous execution.

According to this plan, Count Chouvaloff, to whom the Emperor Alexander had entrusted the command of the corps holding at Uleaborg the key of Northern Finland, was to declare the existing truce to be at an end, drive back the remains of the old army of Finland to the western coast of the Gulf of Bothnia, and penetrate by Tornea and Pitéa into Westro-Bothnia. General Barclay de Tolli, with about 5000 men, assembled at Vasa, was at the same time to cross the Gulf by the passage of the Quarken, then completely frozen over, and land on the opposite coast at Umea, where the Swedes had their dépôts and their reserves.

For the purpose of accelerating this plan, the Emperor dispatched to Finland Count Araktchéieff, Minister of War, with directions to accompany the expedition against Aland, and then to induce the General to advance upon Stockholm. The months of January and February had been allowed to slip away without anything being done, and there was now no time to be lost in preparations and arrangements.

On the $\frac{1st}{13th}$ of March, 30 battalions, 4 squadrons, 600 Cossacks, and 20 guns, composing the corps of Prince Bagration, assembled at the island

of Kumlinge; a long train of sledges, loaded with provisions, fuel, brandy, and other necessaries of all kinds, in quantities sufficient for a month's consumption, followed the army into this icy solitude, as destitute of any resources as could be the sands of the desert. One of the means of defence adopted by the Swedes had been a forced emigration of all the inhabitants of the islands, beginning with those close to the coast of Finland, and extending to the islands of Aland, properly so called. All the habitations were pulled down or burnt, and nothing was spared in the general destruction except the churches. An extent of above 140 versts was thus rendered desolate.

When Döbeln was informed of the concentration of troops, and the preparations made by the Russians in the province of Abo, he could not doubt the islands of Aland must be the object they had in view, and sent to inform the King of his suspicions. The object of his report was to prove to him the insufficiency of the means devoted to the defence of the archipelago, and the uselessness of sacrificing a fine body of troops; he represented also the calamities which would fall upon the people, and which must be the inevitable result of a defence rendered impossible by the very season of the year. General Tibell supported Döbeln's view

of the case with the utmost energy, but in vain. Gustavus, while living among the Alandais, by whom he had been enthusiastically received, had promised he would never abandon them; he considered his word pledged, and addressed to General Tibell, his Secretary of State in the Military Department, an autograph letter, in the following terms:—*

"*Haga, 6th March*, 1809. 9 P.M.

"Aland must be defended; it is of the greatest importance for the sake of retaining a military position beyond the Gulf. The army must, therefore, be concentrated to allow the necessary reinforcements to be dispatched to Aland.

"Your affectionate

"GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS."

This letter was one of his last acts of sovereignty leading to any important result.

The main body of the Russian army was divided into five columns, under the command of Generals Strogonoff, Demidoff, Sassonoff, Knorring, and Toutchkoff, and the reserve was commanded by General Alexieff.

The first of these columns was to proceed by

* The original letter was in Swedish.

Ludd-oe, Lembard, and Jumala, to Eckero. The cavalry, under General Koulneff, had orders to turn the principal group by the south, and by a forced march reach the shallow waters now covered with ice, between the island of Eckero and the rocks of Signal-Skär; the second column was advancing by Klementsby and Jomalaby, on Hammarland and Postadt; the third, from Stentorp to Emnas, Encarby, and Biorstrom; the fourth and fifth, united, were to take possession of Bordo-Kapel, from which place they were to act separately, the one towards Markus-Bole, and the other upon Gotha-Kapel.

Unless any unexpected obstacles should occur, six days' march, reckoning from the starting-point at the island of Kumlinge, were to put the Russians in possession of all the archipelago. The plan was carried out with but very slight alterations. No obstacles were presented by the ice, the snow was not even deep, and there was no difficulty in avoiding or turning the fortified places.

Döbeln was too experienced a soldier to be deceived by the apparent ease with which resistance might have been offered on some points, and he felt the great danger there would be in allowing himself to be surprised on the Signal-Skär by the columns which were turning it. As early as the

$\frac{3d}{15th}$ of March, Davydoff, surnamed in 1812 the *réveille matin* of the French army, had carried the Swedish posts which guarded the approach of the small island of Botöm, and pushed on to Stentorp, where Koulneff soon followed him with his cavalry.

There was a degree of excitement in the cold but perfectly still air, which was very favourable to the Russians in beginning their march. The weather was fine and clear, and it is difficult to describe the effect produced by the animated and picturesque spectacle exhibited, as far as the eye could reach, on those vast plains of crystal, interspersed here and there with huge rocks of granite; the simultaneous development of the Russian columns, the flashing of their arms in the sun, the numerous transports following them in admirable order, the enemy's battalions retreating before the superior force, or opposing from island to island a partial and feeble resistance. It was a sight never to be forgotten,

On the $\frac{4}{16}$th of March the Russian advanced guard occupied a chain of posts on the great island, extending from Saltvick by Castelholm and Emnas to Jomala. The cavalry of the extreme left had seized at Degerby a squadron of gun-boats entangled in the ice, and which the rapidity of General Koulneff's movements had prevented the Swedes from setting fire to.

struction his conduct was bringing upon their unfortunate country.

General Döbeln received this intelligence at a moment of perplexity. He had observed the rapid march of the Russians and the development of their columns with great apprehension, for he was embarrassed with the quantity of stores, &c. at that moment under his charge, and which it was impossible for him to evacuate, though he was apparently in immediate danger of being completely surrounded by the Russian force. He was in hopes the occurrence of so important an event in Sweden might make some alteration in the proceedings of Russia, and despatched to General Knorring the information he had received, with a request for an interview. Generals Suchtelen and Araktchéieff were present at the conference, and an envoy despatched by the new Swedish Government, who declared their willingness to conclude peace, even intimating their intention of purchasing it by considerable sacrifices. Döbeln strove to obtain the consent of the Russian generals to a suspension of arms, but circumstances rendered this hardly possible. The Russian troops must either conquer Aland or retrograde; and in carrying out the plans they had so successfully begun they had everything to gain, both in a military and political point of

view. The promises of Sweden were vague, and could not counterbalance the certain advantages that must result from continuing the operations. Knorring refused to bind himself by any agreement, at a moment when nothing was clear or determined; all, however, was granted to General Döbeln that was possible, with a due regard to the interests of Russia. He was to be allowed a free retreat, and guaranteed from any annoyance, except from the columns that had been detached from the two wings of the Russian army, and who might have already advanced, or might advance at a later period, on the part of the Gulf of Bothnia between Sweden and the islands of Aland. Under such circumstances, General Döbeln had no choice but a prompt retreat, and on the $\frac{5}{17}$th of March almost the whole of his force was assembled at Eckero, the last of the great islands towards the west. After having set fire to the division of the flotilla wintering at Marstrandt, and given up several dépôts to the plunder of his soldiers and the inhabitants, the Swedish General laid down an order of march calculated to enable them to effect the passage of the Gulf of Bothnia. The cavalry at the head formed his advanced guard, and cleared the way for the battalions that followed, formed into vast hollow squares, and inclosing a multitude of sledges loaded

with provisions and clothing. The field artillery was disposed at the angles of the squares. The line of march had an imposing appearance, and it was effected in good order. The main body of the Swedish army was harassed by some Cossacks, who were the only Russian troops that came up with it, and tried, but in vain, to break the line: they only succeeded in picking up a few stragglers.

The rear-guard of Döbeln was less fortunate. Koulneff had marched by Ytternäs, and doubled the point of Hammar-udd, almost without allowing any rest to his men. He reached the Swedish rear-guard on the shoal, now covered with ice, between Eckero and Signal-Skär. His Cossacks and hussars attacked it, carried away two howitzers and a great number of stragglers. They, however, failed in an attempt against the regiment of Sundermania, forming the principal corps of the rear-guard under the orders of Major Engelbrechten. This officer made a good stand, but he was guilty of a great error, too often committed by the brave: he wished to fight when he should only have thought of marching. He lost time by suspending his movements several times, and while each moment increased the distance between him and Döbeln he gave the Russians time to obtain reinforcements; at last he began to parley, and thus destroyed his last hope. Engelbrechten

was harassed at every step, and was soon convinced it would be impossible for him to succeed in crossing this frozen plain, extended before him as far as the eye could reach. Still he could not make up his mind to yield to a handful of cavalry, who had in vain endeavoured to throw his troops into disorder, and the Russian infantry was still at a distance. General Koulneff was convinced this was the consideration that retarded his success, and a stratagem occurred to him that could not fail to produce due effect on his antagonist: he caused the prisoners who had been taken, to retrace their steps, and form on the ice at a distance. They advanced slowly, by his orders, towards the column of Engelbrechten, and a snowdrift coming on favoured the illusion; the hoped-for result was gained, and the Swedish troops surrendered.

Koulneff found his prisoners exceeded in number the troops he had to guard them. Nevertheless he reached on the same day the miserable habitations of the coast pilots, on the rocky station of Signal-Skär. His march had lasted eight days, and this was the first shelter he had met with. A regiment of infantry joined him there.

The possession alone of the islands of Aland would have amply repaid all the expenses of this short expedition, but the Russians gained the

further prizes of thirty guns, a fine military hospital, five ships of war they had prevented from being burnt, a quantity of provisions and stores, and 3000 prisoners. The losses sustained by the Russian troops were very trifling.

The first object was attained, but General Knorring's task was not yet accomplished: he was to combine a decisive operation with the enterprises of his lieutenants in the north, and to conquer Peace on the actual soil of Sweden. On the $\frac{7}{19}$th of March he gave General Koulneff orders to follow the traces of Döbeln's corps on the Gulf of Bothnia, from Signal-Skär to Grisselhamn. The squadrons and about 600 Cossacks commenced their march during the night of the $\frac{7}{16}$th to the $\frac{8}{20}$th, and they soon fell upon the tracks left by the recent march of the Swedes. In eight hours this cavalry crossed on the ice the stormy Gulf, where a few weeks before floated the proud flag of England and the standard of Gustavus IV. Koulneff, on advancing to the shore, found it lined with riflemen, who defended its approach. But he was not easily repulsed; difficulties only excited him to greater exertion; his mind was fertile in expedients, and stratagem was his especial genius; he employed it successfully on the present occasion. The costume of the Uralian Cossacks of the Imperial Guard was

at that time different from the rest of the army; they were excellent marksmen, and armed with long guns. Koulneff made them dismount, as well as a portion of the other cavalry, who, indeed, would have had extreme difficulty in acting, on account of the masses of ice lying in irregular heaps; at the same time that these very obstructions gave Koulneff the advantage of being able to conceal from sight the true strength and composition of his corps, and to show apparently several heads of columns. The Uralian Cossacks having carried some wooded heights, Koulneff took advantage of this circumstance to send a flag of truce, and the officer employed had the address to obtain the cession of the little port of Grisselhamn, with a radius of about two versts. A truce between the advanced parties was at the same time agreed upon, and prolonged from day to day.

Koulneff, who appeared, from the small number of his troops, as if he might easily have been thrown back upon the Gulf of Bothnia, or even might have been totally destroyed, had succeeded by his boldness and his skill in stratagem in obtaining a footing on the mainland of Sweden, at only a few marches from Stockholm. He expected to be strengthened by the whole of Bagra-

tion's corps, and maintained his position until the $\frac{9th}{21st}$ of March; but in the meanwhile General Knorring had yielded to the representations of Baron Lagerbring, who was the bearer of assurances from the new government, that the cession of the whole of Finland would be admitted as the basis of their negociations with Russia.

A violent southerly wind had arisen, disturbing the ice on the Gulf of Bothnia, and giving cause to fear it might break up in a few hours. Knorring was alarmed for the safety of his army: he was a talented and experienced general, but was rather wanting in the adventurous spirit, without which success in war never can be complete. He calculated the risk till he was afraid of trusting anything to chance. He gave up a glorious undertaking too easily, though not certainly without a very plausible motive.

Koulneff was recalled from Grisselhamn to Aland; and an armistice was definitively agreed upon for the purpose of treating for peace, in which the corps of General Barclay de Tolli was to be included. No stipulations were made with regard to General Chouvaloff's, as the distance he was at, in the neighbourhood of Tornea, prevented the Commander-in-chief from receiving

any news of what was going on in that direction.

General Knorring, a few days later, recalled the remainder of Prince Bagration's corps in Finland. The defence of the islands of Aland was entrusted to Count Demidoff, by a special order from the Emperor Alexander.

CHAPTER IX.

Let us now turn our attention again to the North. General Barclay de Tolli quitted the town of Vasa on the night of the $\frac{4}{16}$th to the $\frac{5}{17}$th of March. It was intended his troops should take Umea, in the province of Westro-Bothnia, and fix themselves almost in the centre of the Swedish detachments dispersed along the coast, from Tornea as far as Hernosund. They assembled on the $\frac{6}{18}$th, at the islands of Rehplot and Bierko, which are those that advance the farthest into the sea, near the passage known under the name of the Quarken.

The measures taken to secure the success of this expedition, were much the same as those adopted in the one to Aland; the passage of the Quarken, however, though of less extent, was attended with more difficulty than the former operation had been.

After a toilsome and difficult march the Russians reached a group of rocks on the $\frac{7}{19}$th, and bivouacked there that night. The next day the guides lost their way in the midst of the frightful masses of ice and snow, confusedly heaped together by the storms of the winter. They appeared bewildered by the desolate appearance of everything around them, and were unable to find the stakes placed at distances, in the manner of landmarks, to direct the march of the troops, by the officers who had been sent beforehand to reconnoitre; and before long they had to depend upon the compass as their only sure guide. The sledges were continually stopped by wide chasms, either requiring to be crossed like rivers, or rendering so great a détour necessary, that there was the greatest danger of their being entirely lost in those trackless wastes. The horses stumbled and lamed themselves on the ice; the infantry was exhausted with the labour of walking; and, although every moment of time was precious, General Barclay was continually obliged to halt and allow his men to rest. The weather was intensely cold, but the air was still; had it been otherwise—had a snow-drift come on, a common occurrence in these regions, it must infallibly have proved fatal, and the troops and their brave commander must alike have

perished. But they were spared that danger; and Barclay de Tolli, happily for the glory of Russia, lived to lead her armies to victory at a later period.

On the $\frac{8}{20}$th of March, after a journey resembling in its details the narratives of the intrepid explorers of the Polar regions, General Barclay reached a lighthouse called the Gaden. It is situated almost in the middle of the Quarken, at the southern point of a chain of rocks extending northward, and again separated from the mainland by shoal water, known by the name of the Western Quarken. A certain number of the troops were destined to follow this route as far as Cape Estnäs, to the north of Umea; they reached it next day, and advanced rapidly by Téfte and Tafle on the coast-road, thus cutting off the only communication between Umea and the Swedish troops in the north. General Barclay himself, after three more bivouacs on the ice, attacked the town of Umea on the $\frac{12}{24}$th.

It was then occupied by from 1000 to 1200 men, under the orders of Count Cronstedt. The scouts of the Swedish General had not only failed in discovering the march of General Barclay's troops, but they had not even supposed it to be practicable; and Umea was in a state of perfect security. No

measures had been taken for evacuating the spare artillery and military stores, accumulated in the arsenal. Count Cronstedt, however, defended the approach of the town for some time, until he became convinced of the numerical superiority of the Russians; he then was unwilling to expose the inhabitants, and the handful of soldiers he had under his orders, to certain destruction, by opposing a perfectly useless resistance; and after some brief negociations he retired without opposition upon Hernosund, where General Klercker had at that time his head-quarters.

It was a hazardous enterprise, and may with truth be compared to the passage of the Belt by Charles X., but it did not lead to the important results that had been anticipated. De Tolli had scarcely had time to provide the necessary subsistence for his men, and gain information concerning the localities and the enemies by whom he was surrounded, when a courier arrived bringing news of the truce concluded at Aland, and orders to return to Vasa; and he was again in that town on the 20th March / 1st April.

But the apparition of these troops, even for so short a period, on the Swedish shores, was of the greatest advantage to General Chouvaloff, though at the farthest extremity of the scene of war. He did

not fail to make the most of all the circumstances, and his operations in the north were attended with complete success.

The King of Sweden, since the year 1808, had united under one command the troops defending the provinces of Herjdalen and Jemtland opposed to Norway, and the remainder of the troops of Finland, still amounting to 7075 men. It was called the Army of the North, and entrusted to General Gripenberg. The army of Finland had often extreme difficulty in providing itself with the means of subsistence; it was repeatedly reinforced by Swedish regiments, and as often weakened again by their recall: a strong advanced guard, distributed along the rivers of Kemi and Tornea, occupied positions which in the fine season could not be attacked without considerable risk, and the main body was disposed in extensive cantonments. The almost total want of forage had obliged the chiefs to reduce as much as possible the number of their horses; a few were retained by the staff, and those of the artillery were distributed at a distance, under military supervision, among the inhabitants charged with feeding them; but this circumstance contributed essentially to paralyse the slightest attempt to move the troops. During a considerable portion of the year the post is carried in this country by

reindeer, who feed upon moss. Count Chouvaloff announced the resumption of hostilities on the $\frac{6}{18}$th of March. The Gulf of Bothnia, and the rivers flowing into it, were still covered with ice, and this facilitated greatly the attempts that were made to turn every position, and drive Gripenberg back towards Lutea and Pitéa, by threatening to advance directly upon Kalix. The Swedish General was perfectly aware of the danger, and made great efforts to assemble his dispersed troops; but a sudden attack was made upon his advanced guard on the $\frac{11th}{23d}$, before he had any certainty of succeeding in his endeavours.

General Ericson, detached by General Chouvaloff, had made himself master of Tornea, almost at the moment Gripenberg heard of the occupation of Umea by General Barclay de Tolli. He hastily called a council to deliberate upon their situation, when it was unanimously agreed, that further resistance would only serve to plunge their unfortunate country into fresh calamities, and occasion additional reverses to Finland.

While Count Chouvaloff was pressing upon Gripenberg in front, his cavalry, commanded by Anselme de Gibory, following on the ice the line of coast, was turning the Swedish force at every step, and in every position. De Gibory, conjointly with

Baron de Tuyl, a colonel on the Russian staff, entered into negociations with the Swedish General, who at last signed at Kalix, on the $\frac{13}{25}$th, a convention, in virtue of which the battalions of Finland were to be disbanded, and the whole of the country extending from Tornea to Kalix given up to Count Chouvaloff, with all the arms, artillery, and stores of every kind.

The Finlanders returned to their country after having taken an oath not to serve against Russia.

General Count Wrede had been appointed by the Regent to the command, until then held by General Klercker; and he protested warmly against the transactions at Kalix. After General Barclay had quitted Umea, Wrede detached Count Cronstedt with some troops to Pitéa, with a view of saving a portion of the artillery and baggage-train Gripenberg had agreed to deliver up to the Russians; but the greater portion of it was already in their hands.

This event was very severely animadverted upon in Sweden, and considered almost in the light of a defection to the enemy. The garrison of Stockholm was anxious to show that their injurious opinion only regarded some of the chiefs, and did not in any way attach to the brave army of Finland in general: they were most eager to show their

respect to Generals Klingsporr and Adlerkreutz, in whose honour they gave splendid fêtes. The military spirit manifested at these banquets, the state of excitement of the capital, the presence of the rebel army (called the Army of the West), which formed the garrison of Stockholm, and, above all, the democratic sentiments, which invariably prevail during great political commotions, all contributed to occasion fresh delays in the negociations for peace then going on between Sweden and Russia, greatly to the disadvantage of the first of those powers.

The Regent had successively dispatched several persons of importance to St. Petersburg, and on the side of the Emperor Alexander, M. d'Alopeus proceeded to Stockholm; but his stay there was short, being only for the purpose of complimenting the new Prince chosen by the nation.

The presence of the Emperor in Finland gave him the opportunity of conferring numerous benefits on his new subjects, and of exhibiting the winning manners and the amiable disposition which endeared him to everybody; but it had less direct influence on the progress of the negociations. Although the fundamental points were agreed upon, still the deciding on the northerly limits of the country to be ceded to Russia, and the possession

of the islands of Aland, which Sweden was unwilling to give up, afforded subjects for ample discussions; and these were prolonged until the month of May, when they gave occasion for a fresh rupture.

Almost at the very moment, the Diet convoked at Stockholm pronounced that Gustavus IV. had ceased to reign; and whilst this prince, possessing rather the great qualities of a knight of old, than those of a king, was signing the act of his abdication, and consenting to expatriate himself, Russia was once more under the necessity of declaring the truce to be null that had been agreed upon at the islands of Aland the $\frac{\text{23d April}}{\text{3d May}}$, 1809.

Since the convention of Kalix, Count Chouvaloff had occupied the left bank of the river Skeleftea, of which the Generals Döbeln and Cronstedt guarded the right. On the $\frac{\text{3rd}}{\text{15th}}$ May the ice in the Gulf of Bothnia was still in a sufficiently solid condition to permit the Russians to turn the position of a Swedish corps of 700 men, who were cut off, and taken prisoners, with M. de Furumarck their Colonel. A sudden thaw favoured the retreat of the rest on Umea. Count Chouvaloff's great aim was the conclusion of a convention with the Swedes, and he was again so fortunate as to attain his object. It was signed by General Döbeln on the $\frac{14}{26}$th May,

and by that act the whole of the south of Westro-Bothnia was abandoned to the Russians. A suspension of arms until the $\frac{25\text{th May}}{6\text{th June}}$, and a line of demarcation between the cantonments of the two armies, were stipulated for. This line stretched from Bjerno, on the coast, to the mountains of Stöting, which form a part of the Norwegian Alps. The Russians occupied Umea on the $\frac{19\text{th}}{31\text{st}}$ May, and General Wrede established his head-quarters at Hernosund. Count Chouvaloff falling sick, was just then relieved by Count Kamensky in the command of the troops in the north.

The Russians had organised a small flotilla at Vasa and Uleaborg, with a view of seconding their future operations, and facilitating the arrival of provisions. They hoped by these means to remain masters of the northern part of the Gulf of Bothnia; but the appearance of four Swedish frigates, and several English men-of-war, soon frustrated their projects, and shortly afterwards the arrival of ninety-six sail of the flotilla, brought from the more southern ports by Admiral Cederström, rendered the superiority of the enemy in those waters too great to be encountered. They carried off the transports, entered the rivers, and spread alarm in the cantonments all along the coasts, and on the whole line of communication of the Russians. A

bridge thrown at Umea was destroyed on the $\frac{6}{18}$th of June, in spite of all the precautions taken to defend it. Wrede, who had advanced from the north, considered it a favourable occasion for attempting the passage of the Ore-Elf above Umea; but all his activity was unable to prevent the bridge from being almost immediately reconstructed. A detachment of 4000 Russians, under the orders of General Alexieff, immediately crossed the river, and proceeded towards the south by the coast-road. It was the only very practicable one in the country, and Count de Wrede retreated, from the fear of compromising the safety of so valuable a line of communication.

Up to that time the Russian army had stood alone, but a division of Danish-Norwegian troops then joined the extreme right of the corps of Kamensky, and co-operated with them. This division carried an intrenchment of the Swedes at Hjerpe, and were afterwards distributed in the provinces of Herjdalen and Jemtland. General Döbeln, so often named in this war, was then at Hernosund, and being detached against the Danes, he was not long in regaining from them a portion of the country they had occupied. The scarcity of provisions and local difficulties, which so often compelled both parties to suspend operations, again in this

instance induced General Döbeln to conclude an armistice with the Danes, until the $\frac{22\text{d July}}{3\text{d August}}$. Peace was shortly after concluded between Denmark and Sweden, and put an end to these hostilities.

The Duke Regent of Sweden had caused himself to be proclaimed King, under the title of Charles XIII., on the anniversary of the day when the dynasty of Vasa had first ascended the throne.* The first days of his reign were marked by a degree of activity, seldom met with in a person of his advanced age, and full occupation was given, both to the sovereign and to the States-General assembled at Stockholm, by the coronation, the appointment of a Crown Prince, the creation of fresh resources for the prosecution of the war, and the reopening of the negociations for peace. A congress of Russian and Swedish plenipotentiaries was assembled at Freidricksham; the representatives of Sweden were Counts de Stedinck and de Skjoldebrand, and it had been determined their acknowledged diplomatic talents should be supported by one last military demonstration: for it was thought that to yield passively, without having displayed some degree of energy, and shown the enemy that they still possessed power to resist, would not be consistent with the dignity of the new Government. A vast display of

* 6th June, 1523.

military force was to be made, and the *élite* of the troops to be employed on this occasion.

This operation, conducted at once by land and by sea, aimed at the destruction or total defeat of the isolated body of Russian troops which had penetrated into Westro-Bothnia, and which at that time consisted of from 6000 to 8000 men. The principal body, with Count Kamensky, occupied Umea and the two banks of the river flowing into the Gulf of Bothnia; the rest were posted along the coast-road from Kemi as far as Umea; and the advanced guard was stationed at Ava. Count de Wrede, opposed to Kamensky's front, had from 4000 to 5000 men under his command; and 6000 troops, under Count Wachtmeister, were embarked on board the ships. The naval force consisted of two line-of-battle ships, seven frigates, and about 300 armed vessels of every denomination; and Admiral Puke was commander-in-chief of the whole expedition.

He hoisted his flag, on the $\frac{18}{30}$th of July, on board the Adolph Frederick, at Graddö, and anchored, on the $\frac{\text{29th July}}{\text{10th August}}$, at Hernosund, where most of the troops were taken on board. The anchor was again weighed on the $\frac{\text{3d}}{\text{15th}}$ of August, and each of the large vessels took ten or twelve of the smaller ones in tow.

The plan determined upon by the naval and military chiefs of the force, was to make an unexpected descent on the rear of the Russian corps; for, in spite of the size of his squadron, the Admiral entertained hopes of surprising his adversary.

With this view he steered his course by the eastern side of the Quarken, and only took a westerly direction when he had run as far north as the rocks of Ratan, where the landing was to take place. A thick fog had been favourable to him up to that point, by assisting in concealing his motions; but when he arrived, it of course prevented the possibility of disembarkation. On the following day it had cleared off, so that the landing became possible; but his designs had then been discovered, and the first boats touched the shore on the $\frac{5}{17}$th, under the fire of the Russian Chasseurs commanded by Count Froloff.

In spite, however, of all difficulties, Wachtmeister succeeded in gaining a small peninsula with the greater part of his troops. Step by step he drove back the Russian Chasseurs as far as Djekneboda, where he hoped, by reaching the great coast-road, to destroy the connexion between the various bodies of the Russian troops: it is about 45 versts north of Umea. Count Kamensky was

still there: he had received intelligence of the attempt, by which he was exposed to such imminent danger; and though attacked at the same time in front by Wrede, who strove to force the passage of the Umea-Elf at Hokso, he would not allow himself to be put upon a wrong scent. He left some battalions under General Alexieff to contend with Wrede, enjoining him to retreat as slowly as he possibly could, and marched himself, without delay, at the head of what troops he could collect, to the menaced point of Djekneboda.

The time inevitably consumed in landing the troops, and the too systematic mode of proceeding he adopted, lost many precious hours to Count Wachtmeister, and nearly the whole of the $\frac{6}{18}$th passed away. On the following day, Kamensky was in a condition to attack them; and though he had no superiority of numbers, he had the greater advantage of indomitable energy, now doubly stimulated by the conviction that he must conquer or die.

It was a most obstinate struggle, and one-sixth of the combatants perished. The left wing of Wachtmeister was ill-defended; and a detachment under Colonel de Gibory took it in flank. At last, after several hours' hard fighing, the Swedes were all driven back to the small peninsula where

they had landed, and Kamensky had the audacity to summon them to surrender; but they were aware of the strength of their ground, with a narrow front bristled with cannon, and the two wings defended by the sea and the guns of the fleet. Kamensky made several attempts on the position of the Swedes, but without success; neither was he able to prevent Admiral Puke from re-embarking the soldiers and the whole of the artillery and baggage. Both sides had exhibited equal courage and determination, and the Russians had to lament the loss of General Gotovtzoff.

The detachment under General Alexieff, which had been left fighting at Umea with General de Wrede, had succeeded in keeping its ground: Kosatchcovsky came to its support, and received the command from Alexieff, who was wounded.

As a victory, Kamensky's success was merely negative; but he had escaped a defeat, and this was almost more than could have been hoped for under such circumstances. To the Swedes, the attempt was only productive of evil, and resulted in heavy loss of life; and after its failure Admiral Puke resolved to make no more partial attacks, but to land his battalions at Umea. General Wrede had just taken possession of the town, and the arrival of these fresh troops gave him a very decided

superiority over the Russian force, so that, in spite of all the natural obstacles of the country, he was enabled to drive back Kamensky towards the north. The loss of two convoys of provisions, taken by the Swedish cruisers, added to the many difficulties and privations suffered by this corps, whose isolated position was at all times very hazardous. Kamensky considered it so much exposed to danger that he at last yielded to circumstances, and resolved to shorten his long and ill-defended line, and to keep nearer to his dépôts of provisions and stores. On the $\frac{17}{29}$th of August he returned to Pitéa, without having experienced the slightest loss during his retreat.

The principal part of Westro-Bothnia thus again returned to the dominion of Sweden, in spite of the unfortunate termination of the battle of Ratan. The first military operation under the new reign, though unsuccessful, had led to advantageous results, and with these terminated the war, of which we have attempted to give a sketch. Peace was concluded at Freidricksham on the $\frac{5}{17}$th of September, 1809.

APPENDIX.

INSTRUCTIONS

Given by the King of Sweden at the commencement of the War to Count Klingsporr, Commander-in-chief of the Army of Finland.

We, Gustavus Adolphus, &c. &c. &c., to our trusty and well-beloved Count, Noble of the Kingdom, General of Infantry, &c. &c.

Whereas the political relations in general have taken such a turn, that, in spite of our constant endeavour to maintain the friendship and alliance which have so long existed between us and the Emperor of Russia, the measures adopted by that sovereign appear to threaten a speedy rupture; and whereas should this rupture take place in the course of the winter it would be a most embarrassing circumstance,

as it would be impossible to send reinforcements to Finland from Sweden, on account of the very imperfect means of communication; and whereas the army of Finland could not long resist with any advantage an enemy so superior in number, in the strong positions and defiles formed by the lakes and the morasses, while they are covered with ice, all the efforts on our side should be directed to saving all that can be saved of the army, throwing into the fortified places of Swartholm and Sweaborg as many troops as they can contain, and making the remainder retire towards Ostro-Bothnia with as much order as possible, until measures can be taken upon the opening of the navigation to reconquer the country: We, therefore, despatch Colonel Schenborn to prepare the necessary means of subsistence in the places by which the army of Finland will have to retire. We also command the officer whose duty it is, to furnish you as soon as possible with 91,000 crowns of the current coin, of which you will send 60,000 to Sweaborg and 6000 to Swartholm, for the pay of the garrisons in those places. You will give the surplus of the said sum to the Commissary-general of the Army of Finland, to be employed in the purchase of horses for the artillery at a fixed price, and in the payment of the troops who are on active service, until there shall be the means of sending you further sums for the last-mentioned purpose. But, as aforesaid, we consider the saving of the army, and providing for the safety of the fortresses, as the most essential point of the defensive measures to be pursued during the winter: nevertheless, we expect you will endeavour to check the progress of the enemy as much as it is possible,

and that you will not have recourse to retreat, until it becomes absolutely necessary. We, therefore, send you the following orders.

As soon as you are informed that on the part of the Russians proceedings are assuming a menacing aspect, or even sooner, if the commandants should consider it necessary for the purpose of carrying on the works indispensable for the defence of the places, you will take care to reinforce the garrisons of Sweaborg and Swartholm, so that the garrison of Sweaborg may amount to 6000 men, without reckoning the artillery of the army and navy, or the seamen who will be required for the future in manning the ships. Swartholm will have a garrison of 500 men, exclusive of those required for the artillery, which you will send there without delay.

We think it best the garrison of Sweaborg should be composed, in the first place, of the battalions of the regiments of the Queen Dowager and of Jagerhorn, which are already there; the officers and soldiers of these regiments, and those of the artillery, who are on leave, are to be recalled: 2dly, of 500 men of the regiment of Nyland, 500 from the government of Abo, 500 of the regiment of Tavastheus; these troops shall be ordered to bring their new military equipage: 3dly, of the reserved troops of these regiments, and the reserves of the Dragoons of Nyland, making a total of 1800 men: and 4thly, of the whole of the regiment of Adlerkreutz, amounting to 1800 men.

In assembling these troops, care must be taken that the order of march arrives first to those who are at the greatest distance; and whereas some difficulties might arise with regard to the regiment of Adler-

kreutz,* and to the supplementary soldiers of the other above-mentioned corps, if they learned at once the object of their being assembled, we command by the annexed letters, addressed to the governors of the provinces and to the commanding officers, that they do convoke them the same day, and as soon as possible, to the places where they are accustomed to be encamped, to be inspected in the same manner as we have ordered with regard to the other regiments of Finland. As soon as these troops shall be assembled in the prescribed order, you will cause them to march towards Sweaborg.

Supposing that the battalion of Jagerhorn's regiment (300 men), stationed at Lowisa, under the orders of Major Gripenberg, and the two newly-raised companies of the Chasseurs of Nyland, should be most available for forming the garrison of Swartholm, these troops shall be assembled and sent on their march in the manner prescribed above with regard to Adlerkreutz's regiment.

As soon as any movements shall take place on the frontier line, or you shall receive any news by which you can judge with any certainty of the true intentions of the enemy, you shall assemble in the environs of Tavastheus the rest of the troops dispersed in the southern part.

You shall take care, in sending these orders, to enjoin the holders of the military farms to provide the soldiers with forage and provisions for as many days, and on the same conditions, as they did some years ago, when, on being threatened with an invasion,

* Composed of volunteers.

orders were given to put the troops promptly in motion. The troops assembled near Tavastheus shall be divided into two brigades. The first will comprise the regiment of Bjorneborg, of 1000 men; its reserve and supplementary soldiers, 1250 men; Infantry of Nyland, 500 men; Chasseurs of Nyland, 130; Chasseurs of Tavastheus, 250; and 300 Dragoons of Nyland: a total of 3430 men, without reckoning the artillery distributed in the brigades.

We have assigned the command of this brigade to the Adjutant-general Colonel Palmfeldt, whose nomination we send to you, to be transmitted, if necessary, to him. In the same manner, and for the same purpose, we send you the nomination of the Adjutant-general Adlerkreutz, appointed to command the second brigade, which will be composed of a battalion of the infantry regiment of Abo, 500 men; reserve of the same, 750 men; a battalion of the regiment of Tavastheus, 500 men; Chasseurs of Tavastheus, 250 men, and the same number of Dragoons of Nyland: making a total of 2250 men, without including the artillery. The third brigade, commanded by Adjutant-general Count Cronstedt, will be composed of all the troops of the Savolax and Carelia. You will furnish him with instructions, and direct him to assemble all the troops as soon as the first hostile movements take place on the frontier. He will retreat to Jorois, where he will remain as long as possible; he will then continue his retreat by Kuopio, where the Chasseurs of Carelia will have orders to join him, and they will retreat together by Idensalmi towards Uleaborg.

This brigade, as well as that of the south, when it is obliged to retreat towards Ostro-Bothnia, shall carry away all the cattle and horses of the country, in order to deprive the enemy of all means of subsistence and of transport.

We also command Vice-admiral Cronstedt, commandant of Sweaborg, to employ without delay all the means at his disposal to put that fortress in a state of defence. He will require of you the necessary troops, and will call together as many seamen of Finland as he may require for manning 20 gun-boats, 2 hemmans, and 51 yawls. These vessels are to be made ready to put to sea at the opening of the navigation. If it should happen that the enemy should cross the frontier during the winter, and that the troops of Finland were obliged to retire, he is hereby directed to use every posssible means to defend the fortress, and sooner to burn the fleet and everything belonging to it than to deliver it up to the enemy.

With regard to the commandant of Swartholm, you will take care to give him the same instructions, in order that this fortress should also, without loss of time, be put in a state of defence, and that it should be defended to the last extremity. Major Gripenberg, commanding Jagerhorn's battalion, which will be in garrison at Swartholm, being the senior in rank, we herewith send you his nomination as commandant-in-chief of the place. You will not transmit it to him, but he will conform to the instructions and ordinances which subsist for the commandants of places in general.

As it would be impossible to save the squadron of the flotilla stationed at Abo if the Russians were to attack us in winter, we think it proper the said flotilla, with all its stores, shall be burnt, as soon as the enemy shall have crossed the frontier, and that the army shall have been compelled to fall back upon Ostro-Bothnia. We send you orders to that effect, which you will transmit at the proper time to the officer commanding the said squadron, who will put them in execution.

You will also take similar precautions, should it be necessary, for preventing the vessels of the flotilla at Christina and Warkhaus from falling into the hands of the enemy. You shall cause them to be set on fire as soon as the army in its retreat shall have passed those places. That done, you shall assemble the men actually on service of the volunteers belonging to these squadrons, and send them with the rest towards Ostro-Bothnia.

Lastly, as all the orders we have given you are founded on the intelligence that has reached us concerning the intentions of the Emperor of Russia, and that these may be afterwards changed, or may proceed more rapidly or more slowly than it is possible for us at present to foresee, we trust to your prudence to adopt such measures as you shall see best for carrying out the object specified above; and for preventing the enemy from taking possession of the magazines and stores which cannot be saved, you shall cause them all to be destroyed before the retreat is effected. If, however, the aggression should not take place until the spring, then different measures will become neces-

sary, and we will transmit to you further instructions in time.

We pray God to have you in his holy keeping.

Stockholm, 4th February, 1808.

(*Signed*) GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS.

C. LAGERBRING.

Russian Declaration against Sweden, February 10th, 1808.

JUSTLY indignant at the violence which England has displayed towards the King of Denmark, the Emperor of Russia, faithful to his character and to his system of unceasing care for the interests of his empire, notified to the King of Great Britain that he could not remain insensible of so unjust and unexampled an aggression on a sovereign connected with him by the ties of blood and friendship, and who was the most ancient ally of Russia. His Imperial Majesty informed the King of Sweden of this determination by a note, dated the 24th of September last, presented to the Swedish Ambassador. An article of the treaty concluded in 1783, between the Empress Catherine and Gustavus, and another in the treaty of 1800, between the late Emperor Paul and the present King of Sweden, contain the reciprocal and stipulated agreement to maintain the principle that the Baltic is a close sea, with the guarantee of its coasts against all acts of hostility, violence, or vexations whatever; and further, to employ for this purpose all the means in the power of the respective contracting parties. His Imperial Majesty, referring to those treaties, considered himself not merely authorised, but bound, to call upon the King of Sweden for his co-operation

against England. His Swedish Majesty did not disavow the obligation imposed upon him by the treaties referred to, but refused all co-operation until the French troops should be removed from the coasts, and the ports of Germany opened to English ships. But the question here was, the checking of those aggressions which England had commenced, and by which all Europe was disturbed. The Emperor demanded from the King of Sweden a co-operation founded on treaties, but his Swedish Majesty answered by proposing to delay the execution of the treaty to another period, and by troubling himself with opening the Dutch ports for England,—in a word, with rendering himself of service to that England, against which the measures of defence ought to have been taken. It would be difficult to find a more striking proof of partiality on the part of the King of Sweden towards Great Britain than this which he has here given. His Imperial Majesty, on the 16th of November, caused a second note to be delivered, in which his Swedish Majesty was informed of the rupture between Russia and England. This note remained two months unanswered, and the answer, which was transmitted on the 9th of January to his Majesty's ministers, was to the same purport as the former. The Emperor is, however, far from regretting his moderation. He is, on the contrary, well pleased to recollect that he has employed every means that remained to him for bringing back his Swedish Majesty to the only system of policy which is consistent with the interests of his states; but his Imperial Majesty owes it at least to his people, and to the security of his dominions, which is to a sovereign the highest of all laws, no longer to

leave the co-operation of Russia with Sweden a matter of doubt. Informed that the cabinet of St. James's, endeavouring to terrify Denmark into a concurrence with the interests of England, threatened that Swedish troops should occupy Zealand, and that the possession of Norway should be guaranteed to the King of Sweden,—assured, also, that his Swedish Majesty, while he left the Russian note unanswered, was secretly negotiating a treaty at London, his Imperial Majesty perceived that the interests of his empire would be very ill secured were he to permit his neighbour the King of Sweden, at the commencement of a war between Russia and England, to disguise his well-known sentiments of attachment to the latter power under the appearance of a pretended neutrality. His Imperial Majesty, therefore, cannot allow the relations of Sweden towards Russia to remain any longer in a state of uncertainty. He cannot give his consent to such a neutrality. His Swedish Majesty, therefore, being no longer doubtful, nothing remained for his Imperial Majesty but to resort to those means which Providence has placed in his hands, for no other purpose except that of giving protection and safety to his dominions; and he has deemed it right to notify this intention to the King of Sweden and to all Europe. Having thus acquitted himself of that duty which the safety of his dominions requires, his Imperial Majesty is ready to change the measures he is about to take to measures of precaution only, if the King of Sweden will, without delay, join Russia and Denmark in shutting up the Baltic against England until the conclusion of a maritime peace. He himself invites the King, his brother-in-law, for the last time,

and with all the feelings of real friendship, no longer to hesitate in fulfilling his obligations, and in embracing the only system of policy which is consistent with the interests of the Northern Powers. What has Sweden gained since the King attached himself to England? Nothing could be more painful to his Imperial Majesty than to see a rupture take place between Sweden and Russia. But his Swedish Majesty has it still in his power to prevent this event by, without delay, resolving to adopt that course which can alone preserve a strict union and harmony between the two states.

Russian Proclamation issued by Count Bouxhoevden to the Inhabitants of Finland, Feb. 18, 1808.

It is with the utmost concern his Imperial Majesty, my most gracious master, finds himself necessitated to order his troops under my command to enter your country, good friends and inhabitants of Swedish Finland. His Imperial Majesty feels the more concerned to be obliged to take this step, to which he is compelled by the transactions which have taken place in Sweden, as he still bears in mind the generous and friendly sentiments which the Fins displayed towards Russia in the last war, when the Swedish king engaged in an invasion of Finland, in a manner equally unexpected and unwarrantable. His present Swedish Majesty, far from joining his Imperial Majesty in his exertions to restore the tranquillity of Europe, which alone can be effected by the coalition which so fortunately has been formed by the most powerful states, has, on the contrary, formed a closer alliance with the enemy of tranquillity and peace, whose oppressive system and unwarrantable conduct towards his Imperial Majesty and his nearest ally, his Imperial Majesty cannot by any means look upon with indifference. It is on this ground, in addition to what his Majesty owes to the security of his own dominions, that he finds himself necessitated to take your country under his own protection, in order to reserve to himself due

satisfaction, in case his Swedish Majesty should persist in his design not to accept the just conditions of peace which have been tendered to him by his French Majesty, through the mediation of his Imperial Russian Majesty, in order to restore the blessings of peace, which are at all times the principal object of his Imperial Majesty's attention. Good friends, and men of Finland, remain in quiet and fear nought; we do not come to you as enemies, but as your friends and protectors, to render you more prosperous and happy, and to avert from you the calamities which, if war should become indispensable, must necessarily befall you. Do not allow yourself to be seduced to take to arms, or to treat in a hostile manner the troops who are committed to my orders: should any one offend against this admonition, he must impute to himself the consequences of his conduct; while, on the other hand, those who meet his Imperial Majesty's paternal care for the welfare of this country, may rest assured of his powerful favour and protection. And as it is his Imperial Majesty's will that all affairs shall pursue their usual course, and be managed according to your ancient laws and customs, which are to remain undisturbed as long as his troops remain in your country, all officers, both civil and military, are herewith directed to conform themselves thereto, provided that no bad use be made of this indulgence contrary to the good of the country. Prompt payment shall be made for all provisions and refreshments required for the troops; and in order that you may be still more convinced of his Majesty's paternal solicitude for your welfare, he has ordered several magazines to be formed, in addition to those which are already established, out

of which the most indigent inhabitants shall be supplied with necessaries in common with his Majesty's troops. Should circumstances arise to require an amicable discussion and deliberation, in that case you are directed to send your deputies, chosen in the usual manner, to Abo, in order to deliberate upon the subject, and adopt such measures as the welfare of the country shall require. It is his Imperial Majesty's pleasure that from this moment Finland shall be considered and treated in the same manner as other conquered provinces of the Russian empire, which now enjoy happiness and peace under the mild government of his Imperial Majesty, and remain in full possession of the freedom of religion and worship, as well as of all its ancient rights and privileges. The taxes payable to the crown remain in substance unaltered, and the pay of the public officers of every description continue likewise on its ancient footing.

List of the Troops of Russia under the Command of General Bouxhoevden employed in Finland.

1st Division.—Lieut.-Gen. Toutchkoff.

Infantry, Non-Commissioned Officers, and Privates	5264
Cavalry	587

Artillerymen not included for 19 guns.

2d Division.—Lieut.-Gen. Count Kamensky.

Infantry, Non-Commissioned Officers, and Privates	12,253
Cavalry	1,262

Artillerymen not included for 7 guns.

3d Division.—General Prince Bagration.

(*Including the Detachment under General Raievsky, acting towards Vasa.*)

Infantry, Non-Commissioned Officers, and Privates	7,670
Cavalry	1,107

Grand Total.

Cavalry and Infantry, including Officers of all ranks	26,168
Horses for the Baggage-train and other services	2,634

Artillery,—117 pieces of all calibres.

By the $\frac{4}{16}$th of September the Russian forces were augmented to,—

Including Cavalry, Infantry, Artillery, and Marines	44,263
Followers	2,708
Horses for the Baggage services	2,656

Artillery, including pieces of all calibres—186.

Coast Flotilla of Russia.

Yacht	1
Brig	1
Hemmans (large galley)	2
Gun-boats and Yolles	101
Both, Gun-boat with 2 guns	1
	106 sail.

Coast Squadron of Sweden.

Frigates	2
Galleys	12
Yachts	2
Gun-boats or Yolles	77
Cutters and Brigs	9
Armed Vessels	44
Transports	142
	288 sail.

List of the Troops of Sweden and Finland under the Command of Marshal Count Klingsporr, February 1808.

Artillery of Finland		800
Infantry of Abo		1,025
Colonist Battalion of the Regiment of Abo, called Rusthall's Battalion		500
Infantry of Bjorneborg		1,025
Colonist Battalion of the same Regiment, called Rusthall's Battalion		500
Infantry of Tavastheus		1,025
Chasseurs of the Regiment of Tavastheus		500
Brigade of Nyland.	Regiment of Dragoons	550
	Infantry of Nyland	1,025
	Chasseurs of Nyland	292
Regiment of Ostro-Bothnia		1,197
Battalion of Cajana		311
Brigade of the Savolax.	Dragoons of Carelia	200
	Infantry of Savolax	1,037
	Chasseurs of Savolax	1,184
	Artillery	133
	Chasseurs of Carelia	600
Regiment of the Queen Dowager		640
Regiment of Jagerhorn		640
Regiment of Adlerkreutz		1,800
		14,984
Supplementary Troops, or Vargering	Infantry	3,634
	Cavalry	375
		18,993

Treaty of Peace between Sweden and Russia, $\frac{5th}{17th}$ *September,* 1809.

In the Name of the holy and undivided Trinity! His Majesty the King of Sweden, and his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, equally animated with the desire of causing the advantages of peace to succeed to the calamities of war, and of re-establishing harmony and good understanding between their States, have to this effect appointed their plenipotentiaries; (namely,) his Majesty the King of Sweden, Baron Count Louis Bogislas; Christopher de Stedinck, one of the Nobles of the kingdom of Sweden, General of Infantry of the Swedish armies, Knight and Commander of the Swedish Orders, Grand Cross of the Order of the Sword, Knight of the Order of St. Andrew, of St. Alexander Newsky, and of St. Anne, of the first class; and M. Andrew Frederick Skjoldebrand, Colonel and Commander of the Order of the Sword; and His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, Count Nicholas Romanzoff, actual Privy Counsellor, Member of the Council of State, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Commerce, Senator, actual Chamberlain, Knight of the Orders of St. Andrew and St. Alexander Newsky, Grand Cross of the Order of St. Wladimir and of St. Anne, of the first classes, Grand Eagle of the

Legion of Honour of France, Knight of the Royal Prussian Orders of the Black Eagle and Red Eagle, and of the Royal Dutch Order of the Union; and M. David Alopeus, actual Chamberlain, Knight of the Grand Cross of the Order of St. Wladimir of the second class, and of St. Anne of the first: who, after the exchange of their respective full powers, found to be good and in due form, have agreed upon the following Articles:—

Art. I. There shall henceforth be peace, friendship, and good understanding, between his Majesty the King of Sweden and his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias. The high contracting parties will make it their chief study to maintain a perfect harmony between themselves, their states, and subjects, and will carefully avoid whatever may hereafter disturb the union so happily re-established.

II. His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias having manifested the invariable resolution not to separate his interest from those of his allies, and his Swedish Majesty wishing to give in favour of his subjects all the extent possible to the advantages of the peace, promises and engages, in the most solemn and binding manner, to neglect nothing which, on his part, may tend to the prompt conclusion of peace between him and his Majesty the Emperor of the French, King of Italy, and his Majesty the King of Denmark and Norway, by the means of the direct negociations already commenced with these powers.

III. His Majesty the King of Sweden, in order to give an evident proof of his desire to renew the most intimate relations with the august allies of his Majesty

the Emperor of all the Russias, promises to adhere to the continental system, with such modifications as shall be more particularly stipulated in the negociation which is about to be opened between Sweden, France, and Denmark.

Meanwhile his Swedish Majesty engages, from the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty, to order that the ports of the kingdom of Sweden shall be closed, both to the ships of war and merchantmen of Great Britain, with the exception of the importation of salt and colonial productions, which habit has rendered necessary to the people of Sweden.

IV. His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias promises beforehand to consent to every modification which his allies may consider just and fit to be admitted in favour of Sweden, with respect to commerce and mercantile navigation.

IV. His Majesty the King of Sweden, as well for himself as for his successors to the throne and kingdom of Sweden, renounces irrevocably and in perpetuity in favour of his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, and his successors to the throne and empire of Russia, all his rights and titles to the governments hereafter specified, which have been conquered from the Crown of Sweden by the arms of his Imperial Majesty in the present war; (namely,) The Governments of Kymenagard, Nyland, and Tavastheus, Abo, and Bjorneborg, and the Isles of Aland, Savolax, and Carelia, Wasa, Uleaborg, and part of West Bothnia, extending to the river of Tornea, as shall be fixed in the subsequent article on the debarkation of the soldiers.

The governments, with all the inhabitants, towns, ports, fortresses, villages, and islands, as well as all the

dependencies, prerogatives, rights, and emoluments, shall henceforth belong, in full property and sovereignty, to the empire of Russia, and shall remain incorporated with it.

To this effect his Majesty the King of Sweden promises, in the most solemn and obligatory manner, as well for himself as for his successors, and all the kingdom of Sweden, never to make any claim, direct or indirect, on the said governments, provinces, islands, and territories, all the inhabitants of which shall, in virtue of this renunciation, be relieved from the homage and oath of fidelity by which they were bound to the Crown of Sweden.

V. The Sea of Aland (Alands-Haf), the Gulf of Bothnia, and the rivers Tornea and Muonio, shall hereafter form the frontier between Russia and the kingdom of Sweden.

The nearest islands, at an equal distance from the mainland of Aland and Finland, shall belong to Russia; and those which are nearest to the Swedish coast shall belong to Sweden.

The most advanced points of the Russian territory, at the mouth of the river of Tornea, shall be the isle of Bjorken, the port of Renteham, and the peninsula on which the town of Tornea stands; the frontier shall then be extended along the river Tornea to the confluence of the two branches of that river near Kengis. It shall then follow the course of the rivers Muonio, passing in the front of Muonioniska, Muoniovfreby, Palajocus, Rultane, Enontekis, Kelottijofvi, Paitiko, Nuimaka, Raunula, and Kelpisjaure, to Norway, in the course of the rivers Tornea and Muonio, such as it has been described; the islands situated to the east of

the Thalwag shall belong to Russia, and those to the west of the Thalwag to Sweden.

Immediately after the exchange of the ratifications, engineers shall be appointed on each side, who shall proceed to the before-mentioned places, to fix the limits along the rivers Tornea and Muonio according to the above-described line.

VI. His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias having already given the most manifest proofs of the clemency and justice with which he has resolved to govern the inhabitants of the countries which he has acquired, by generously, and of his own spontaneous act, assuring to them the free exercise of their religion, rights, property, and privileges, his Swedish Majesty considers himself thereby dispensed from performing the otherwise sacred duty of making reservations in the above respects in favour of his former subjects.

VII. On the signature of the present treaty, information thereof shall be transmitted immediately, and with the greatest celerity, to the generals of the respective armies, and hostilities shall entirely cease on both sides, both by sea and land. Those acts of hostility which may be in the meantime committed shall be regarded as null, and shall not infringe this treaty: whatever may be during the intervening period taken or conquered on the one side or the other, shall be faithfully restored.

VIII. Within four weeks after the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty, the troops of his Majesty the Emperor of Russia shall evacuate West Bothnia and repass the river Tornea. During the said four weeks there shall be made no requisition of any kind whatever on the inhabitants; and the

Russian army shall draw its own supplies and subsistence from its own magazines established in the towns of West Bothnia. If during the negociations the Imperial troops have penetrated in any other direction into the kingdom of Sweden, they shall evacuate the countries they have occupied, in virtue of the before stipulated conditions.

IX. All the prisoners of war made on either side, by sea or land, and all the hostages delivered during the war, shall be restored in mass with ransom, as speedily as possible; but at the latest within three months, reckoning from the exchange of the ratifications; but if any prisoners may be prevented by sickness, or other cause, from returning into their country within the period specified, they shall not thereby be considered as having forfeited the rights stipulated above, they shall be obliged to discharge, or give security for, the debts they may have contracted during their captivity with the inhabitants of the country in which they may have been detained.

The expenses which may have been incurred by the high contracting parties for all the subsistence and maintenance of the prisoners shall be reciprocally renounced, and provision shall respectively be made for their subsistence and the expense of their journey to the frontiers of both places, where commissioners from their sovereigns shall be directed to receive them.

The Finland soldiers and seamen are, on the part of his Majesty the Emperor of Russia, excepted from this restitution with reference to the capitulations which have taken place, if they grant them a different right. The military and other officers, native of Fin-

land, who may wish to remain, shall enjoy that privilege, and the full exercise of all their rights over their property, debts, and effects, which they have now, or may hereafter have, in the kingdom of Sweden, on the footing of the tenth article of the present treaty.

X. The Fins now in Sweden, as well as the Swedes now in Finland, shall be at full liberty to return into their respective countries, and to dispose of their property, moveable and immoveable, without paying any duty of removal, or any other impost due on the like occasions.

The subjects of the two high powers established in either country, Sweden or Finland, shall have full liberty to establish themselves in the other, during the space of three years from the date of the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty; but shall be held to sell or alienate, during the said period, to any subject of the power whose dominion they desire to quit.

The property of those who at the expiration of the above term have not complied with this regulation shall be sold at a public sale, by authority of the magistrate, and the produce thereof delivered to the owners.

During the three years above fixed, it shall be allowable to all to make such use as they may please of their property, the peaceable enjoyment of which is formally secured and guaranteed to them.

They may themselves, or their agents, pass freely from one state to the other, in order to manage their affairs, without experiencing any obstacle whatever in consequence of their quality of subjects of the other power.

XI. There shall henceforth be a perpetual oblivion of the past, and a general amnesty for the respective subjects, whose opinions in favour of one or the other of the high contracting parties during the present war may have rendered them subject or liable to punishment. No trial shall hereafter be instituted against them on such grounds; if any process have been commenced it shall be annulled and superseded, and no new proceeding shall be commenced.

All sequestrations of property or revenues shall, in consequence, be immediately removed, and the property shall be reserved to the owners: it being well understood that such as become subjects of either of the two powers in virtue of the preceding article shall have no right to claim from the sovereign, of whom they have ceased to be a subject, the annuities or pensions which may have been obtained in virtue of acts of grace concessions or appointments, for preceding services.

XII. Titles, domains, archives, and other documents, public and private, the plans and charts of fortresses, towns, and territories, devolved by the present treaty to his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, including the charts and papers which may be deposited in the Surveyor's office, shall be faithfully delivered up within the space of six months; or if that period shall be found too short, at the latest within one year.

XIII. Immediately after the exchange of the ratifications the high contracting parties shall remove all sequestrations which may have been placed on the property or revenues of the respective inhabitants therein situated.

XIV. The debts, both public and private, contracted by the Fins in Sweden, and *vice versâ* by the Swedes in Finland, shall be discharged on the terms and conditions stipulated.

XV. The subjects of either of the high contracting parties, to whom inheritances may fall in the states of one or the other, may without obstacle take possession of the same, and enjoy it under the protection of the laws. The exercise of this right, however, in Finland, is subject to the stipulations of Article X., of which the proprietor shall either fix his residence in the country, or sell the inheritance within three years.

XVI. The duration of the treaty of commerce between the high contracting parties, being limited to the $\frac{17}{29}$th October, 1811, his Majesty the Emperor of Russia consents not to reckon its interruption during the war; and that the said treaty shall continue in force until the $\frac{1st}{13th}$ February, 1813, with respect to every thing not contrary to the dispositions of the commercial manifesto issued at St. Petersburg, January 1st, 1809.

XVII. The territories incorporated with the Russian Empire in virtue of this treaty, being attached to Sweden by commercial relations, which long intercourse, neighbourhood, and reciprocal wants, have rendered almost indispensable, the high contracting parties, desirous of preserving to their subjects these means of mutual advantage, agree to make such arrangements as may be necessary for consolidating them; in the meantime, until they come to an understanding on this subject, the Fins shall have the power of importing from Sweden ore, smelted iron, lime, stones for building, smelting furnaces, and in general all the other productions of the soil of Sweden.

In return, the Swedes may export from Finland cattle, fish, corn, cloth, pitch, planks, wooden utensils of all kinds, wood for buildings in general, and all the other productions of the soil of the Grand Duchy.

This traffic shall be re-established and maintained to the $\frac{1st}{13th}$ October, 1811, precisely on the same footing as it was before the war, and shall be liable to no interruption or burden, with the reservation of such restrictions as the political relations of the two states may render necessary.

XVIII. The annual exportation of 50,000 schetwerts* of corn, purchased in the ports of the Gulf of Finland, or of the Baltic, belonging to Russia, is granted to his Majesty the King of Sweden, free of the export duty, on proof being shown that the purchase has been made on his account, or in virtue of his authority.

Years of scarcity, in which the exportation shall be prohibited, are excepted, but the quantity in arrear in consequence of such order may be made up when the prohibition shall be removed.

XIX. With respect to salutes at sea, the two high contracting parties agree to regulate them on the footing of the most perfect equality between the two crowns.

When their vessels of war meet at sea, the salutes shall take place in conformity to the rank of the commander, in such manner that he who holds the superior rank shall receive the first salute, which shall be returned gun for gun. If the commanders are of equal rank, no salute, shall take place on either side; before castles, fortresses, and at the entrance of ports,

* A schetwert is equal to five English bushels.

the party arriving shall salute first, and the salute shall be returned gun for gun.

XX. Difficulties which may arise on points not determined by this treaty shall be discussed by ambassadors or ministers plenipotentiary, respectively appointed, who shall be guided by the spirit of conciliation which has dictated the treaty.

XXI. This treaty shall be ratified by the two contracting powers, and the ratifications exchanged in proper and due form within four weeks, or sooner if possible, reckoning from the day of the signature of the present treaty.

In faith of which we, the undersigned, in virtue of our full powers, have signed the treaty of peace, and have thereto affixed our seals.

Done at Freidrieksham this $\frac{5}{17}$th of September, in the year of Grace 1809.

Count Nicholas de Romanzoff.
David Alopeus.
Count Stedinck.
A. F. Skjoldebrand.

Address of His Royal Highness the Duke of Sundermania to the People of Sweden, dated Stockholm, March 15th, 1809.

His Royal Highness the Duke of Sundermania deems it right and conformable to the duties of his high station publicly to lay before the Swedish people the motives and causes which produced the important change which has lately taken place in the government of this country.

The archives of the state contain a great variety of documents, which will prove the necessity of that measure, both to the present age and posterity.

For this long time past the public opinion condemned a system of warfare, which so little suits a country, the commercial concerns of which claim that neutrality which her fortunate geographical situation, which seems to secure Sweden, demands, and that was sacrificed by the Government as early as 1805. Sweden, joined by other powers, entered into a war with France, which from local circumstances was then, however, confined to the loss of her trade with nearly all the states of Europe; a loss which, although not to be compared with that she has since sustained, was yet of great moment.

Soon after differences with Prussia arose, which, however, were not attended with consequences equally important. In 1807, the share which Sweden took in the coalition against France became momentous, and its influence on the dearest interests of the country more detrimental. Swedish Pomerania was occupied by foreign troops, and Stralsund besieged; yet one prospect of more fortunate times yet remained.

A continental peace was on the point of being concluded at Tilsit, and Sweden invited to form one of the contracting parties; Sweden refused, and in consequence of this refusal she was compelled to fight France and her numerous allies single-handed on the Continent of Europe, and the siege of Stralsund was carried on with increased vigour. Even during that siege,—nay, after the conclusion of the convention, which stipulated the evacuation of Pomerania and Rugen by our troops, offers of peace were made by the enemy, and rejected; and the German possessions of Sweden, the last remains of the conquest of Gustavus Adolphus the Great, were lost. Sweden had, however, to sustain losses still more severe. In the winter of 1807 and the following year, serious apprehensions arose of an impending rupture with our neighbours, both from the east and west of our empire.

These apprehensions and dangers might have been warded off a few months before by the Swedish Government, by its accession to the peace of Tilsit,—a peace which Sweden was not prevented from concluding by her only ally, which was offered on terms by no means irreconcileable with the public interest of Sweden.

The war broke out in Finland, and its gallant

defenders, at the end of a severe and honourable conflict with an enemy far superior in numbers, were obliged to give up to him their beloved country. This misfortune, the most calamitous event which has befallen Sweden for centuries past, might have been avoided, if the powerful preparations of defence, which the situation and nature of the country admitted, had been conducted with wisdom and skill, and if the plans of resistance, no sooner adopted than relinquished, had been conceived and carried into effect with unity and firmness. Finland, which, in point of population and intrinsic value, formed one-third part of the Swedish empire, was lost, and this loss bore with the most destructive pressure on the two remaining thirds.

In this state of affairs, the means of waging war against such numerous enemies could not prove sufficient for any length of time; and no other resource was left than to burden with new taxes a people unable to bear them. The public necessities increased, in proportion as the means and resources of the State were destroyed; trade and navigation were at a stand; our mines and agriculture were unproductive for want of hands; universal ruin was spreading wide and far; and yet it was universally known that his Royal Majesty had again repeated his former firm and unalterable determination not to conclude a peace with the present Government of France, without which, however, no reconciliation with Denmark and Russia could take place.

In this situation of affairs, a considerable part of the western army formed a resolution to march to the capital, with the patriotic view which appears by the

proclamation issued on their part. Similar movements took place amongst the rest of the Swedish troops, and it was in this critical position his Royal Majesty came to the unfortunate resolution of leaving Stockholm, and directing his family and several officers of the state to follow him. The garrison was ordered to file off, and it was intended to assemble an army in the south, to oppose the troops who were approaching from the north and west. Two distinct governments were thus to be formed, two armies to be assembled, and a civil war was to fill up the measure of our calamities and distress.

The King's departure was, however, postponed until the 13th of March, at noon. A universal consternation prevailed. The most respectful remonstrances against his Majesty's determination were rejected, and no other means remained, even to secure the safety of the King's own person, than to prevent him from carrying his unfortunate resolve into effect. In these circumstances, all the officers of state, in conjunction with the States of the Empire who were present at Stockholm, expressed to his Royal Highness the constitutional wish that he might take the reins of government into his hands; a wish to which his Royal Highness, notwithstanding his advanced age, thought himself in duty bound to accede, confiding that this step will be viewed in its proper light by every honest, patriotic Swede.

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From the NAVAL AND MILITARY GAZETTE, *October* 23, 1852.

The History of the Battles of Ligny, Quatre Bras, and Waterloo, described by the Series of Accounts published by Authority. To which are added, Circumstantial Details from different parts of the Field, communicated by those who had the honour to share in its Operations; and a Register of all the Officers employed, with their respective Ranks and Casualties. With a brief Memoir of the Duke of Wellington, the Emperor Napoleon, F.M. Prince Blücher, H S.H. the Duke of Brunswick, and others engaged in this momentous Campaign. Illustrated by Maps and Plans, Portraits of Wellington and Blücher, and Thirty-Four Etchings from Drawings by George Jones, R.A. Keeper of the Royal Academy. L. Booth.

This cheap re-issue (the *eleventh edition!*) of a really valuable work, the title-page of which we have transcribed at length, will not fail to prove, at the present period, generally acceptable, and especially so to Military readers. In the "advertisement" prefixed to this commencing portion of the "History, &c.," we are told that upwards of 10,000 copies were disposed of in two years (1816-17); that the last edition in quarto, published at four guineas, has lately been exhausted; and that the present edition (in octavo) will be a reprint of the tenth quarto edition, "with several important additions, including a Memoir of F.M. the Duke of Wellington, and all the Maps and Illustrations."

We consider this announcement, taken in conjunction with the descriptive title-page given above, as superseding the necessity of any formal critique upon the work.

The illustrations of the *livraison* before us consist of a *fac-simile* note from the Duke of Wellington to the Editor and Publisher of the Work; Portraits of Wellington and Blücher, with Autographs; five Etchings relating to incidents in the Battles of Ligny and Quatre Bras, &c.; and Plans of those Battles, and of the Battle of Waterloo at different periods.

From the UNITED SERVICE GAZETTE, *December* 4, 1852.

The Battles of Waterloo, Ligny, and Quatre Bras. By George Jones, Esq. R.A. London: L. Booth.

This is the *eleventh* edition of one of the most popular books ever printed, and Mr. Booth has given a boon to the public in reproducing it at the present time. Many scores of Waterloos have been *got up* since this work was first introduced to the public in 1817, but each edition of this work invariably put them in the shade. In addition to the numerous spirited etchings of individual encounters, large plans of the battle-fields, and maps, the present edition has a panoramic view of the ground. In short, to the Civilian or the Military reader there is everything to teach him how the greatest victory upon record was fought and won by our late gallant Duke.

From the OBSERVER, *October* 3, 1852.

History of the Battles of Waterloo, Ligny, and Quatre Bras London: L. Booth. 1852.

The work under notice presents the history of these three great consecutive actions, as derived from authoritative sources. It also professes to give circumstantial details from different parts of the respective fields; together with a register of all the officers employed. As a record of facts, this publication is well deserving of special notice on the part of the public.

From BELL'S WEEKLY MESSENGER, *November* 6, 1852.

Booth's History of the Battles of Ligny, Quatre Bras, and Waterloo. London: L. Booth.

The return of this invaluable history of the great battles of 1815 to the light of day, almost makes us young again, for in reverting to its pages we seem as if we have gone back to the days of boyhood, when no opportunity was permitted to pass without our again and again devouring its details. We have often been astonished that it should so long have remained out of print, and cannot but congratulate the public that it is again being given to the world. As an illustration of the character of the late Duke of Wellington, it is only second to his Grace's Dispatches, and all who read its pages will at once see how useful it was to Captain Siborne in the preparation of materials for his narrative of the great Belgian campaign. As many of those who knew the value of Booth's history at the time of its first appearance are no more, and their posterity may have but little knowledge of its characteristics, we would earnestly recommend every person, who feels an interest in everything that relates to the name and achievements of Wellington—and who does not?—to possess himself of a copy of the eleventh edition, which is now publishing under the present form.

L. BOOTH, DUKE STREET, PORTLAND PLACE.